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Abstract
This thesis studies one of the most classical algorithmic optimisation paradigms, which
is the greedy paradigm. One of the main motivations for this thesis is to explore further
applications of the greedy paradigm and to provide foundation for the mathematical
analysis of the resulting greedy algorithms. We present a novel mechanism design
model in the area of ontology alignment and study greedy mechanisms for this model.
In particular, we provide bounds on the approximation ratios of truthful mechanisms in
our model. Then we study the price of anarchy and that of stability of Nash implemen-
tations of greedy mechanisms. This study shows that the greedy paradigm provides
a fast, practical and efficient mechanism. We then study the computational complex-
ity and approximability properties of the greedy algorithm for the classic optimisation
problem of computing maximum size independent sets in bounded degree graphs. We
develop a series of novel methods to design advice for the greedy algorithm together
with novel mathematical techniques of analysing the approximation performance of
the resulting greedy algorithms. These techniques allow us to successfully design and
prove the approximation ratios of the best known greedy algorithm for maximum size
independent sets on sub-cubic graph, by designing a scheme to use savings to precisely
pay for the greedy solution as compared to the optimal independent set. This scheme
is highly non-local and it requires a complex inductive argument which we provide.
We apply these methods also to the maximum size independent set problem on general
bounded degree graphs and obtain near tight results. The maximum size independent
set problem and the minimum size vertex cover problem are the two, mutually comple-
mentary, generic combinatorial optimisation problems. We apply our techniques also to
the minimum size vertex cover problem and obtain improvements compared to previous
results. Thus our techniques have a great potential for further applications of analysing
greedy on other classes of graphs and for related optimisation problems. Interestingly,
our theoretical analysis has been informed and advised by an experimental analysis
which is also presented in the thesis. Finally, we also present an experimental analysis
of our greedy algorithms.
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In this introduction we mention some optimisation problems and complexity classes,
however we do not define them formally here, because they are not closely studied in
this thesis. For formal definitions of problems which are closely studied in this thesis,
and notions related to approximability, complexity and graphs, we refer the reader to
Section 1.1 and Chapter 2.
The greedy algorithm paradigm is one of the most important in algorithm design,
because of both its simplicity and efficiency. In the domain of algorithm design, greedy
paradigms are mostly used in at least three directions: they provide exact algorithms
for a variety of problems; they are frequently the best approximation or good enough
algorithms for hard optimisation problems. And, due to their simplicity, efficiency
and not yet discovered properties, they are frequently used as heuristics for hard op-
timisation problems. This is often despite the fact that their theoretical analyses are
unknown, or far from being tight, or even known to be poor in the worst case. One of
the main motivations for this thesis is to explore further applications of the
greedy paradigm and to provide foundation for the mathematical analysis
of the resulting greedy algorithms.
In principle, the greedy paradigm is any algorithm that complies with the following
rule: at each step, it takes some element into solution which is regarded as “best”
according to a given criterion, and we never alter the solution already found, in the
future iterations. Note that the criterion of “best” that the algorithm adopts is not
precisely defined as it depends on the concrete problem. The criterion might, for
instance, be defined as a minimal or maximal size of a set, or value of a weight function
on elements, or even by a sophisticated function on a local structure of the solution and
properties of the input data. Therefore, rather than presenting general and abstract
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definition of greedy algorithms, we will present some concrete examples.
For the purpose of applying the greedy paradigm to find an exact (optimal) solu-
tion, one of the most prominent problems is the shortest path problem, and Dijkstra’s
algorithm [16] gives the optimal solution. Note that the Dijkstra’s algorithm belongs
to the class of greedy algorithms. Another well known example in discrete optimisation
is perhaps the optimality of the greedy algorithm for matroids, whose discovery dates
back to Edmonds [19]. Matroids provide a full characterisation of a structure where
one kind of greedy algorithm (in each iteration, the greedy algorithm takes an element
e whose weight is maximum, and excludes e from the universal set) can achieve an opti-
mal solution [56]. Various generalisations of Edmonds’s approach have been introduced,
for instance, generalised polymatroids in [23]. Korte and Lovasz [41] observed that in
many cases, even if we relax one condition of matroid, the same greedy algorithm still
performs well. In fact, they introduced a notion of greedoid to give a generalised such
characterisation.
For the purpose of approximation of hard optimisation problems, greedy algorithms
have been applied to numerous problems. For instance, for the minimum set cover
problem, there is a simple greedy algorithm [69], which achieves an approximation ratio
of ln(k), where k is an upper bound on the number of elements in any set. This greedy
algorithm applies the following rule: in each iteration, choose the set that contains the
largest number of uncovered elements, and remove the newly covered elements from
the universe. In [61], Raz and Safra proved a lower bound of (1 − o(1)) · lnn on the
approximation ratio for the minimum set cover problem, under the assumption P 6= NP.
This inapproximability result shows that the greedy algorithm is essentially the best-
possible polynomial time approximation algorithm for the set cover problem. A similar
result applies to the complementary problem of set cover: the maximum independent set
(MIS) problem. A simple greedy algorithm achieves an n-approximation ratio for the
MIS problem, where n is the number of vertices in the input graph. And, this problem
cannot be approximated to any factor of n1−ε, for any ε > 0, in polynomial time, unless
NP ⊆ ZPP [35]. This implies that the greedy algorithm is essentially optimal for the
MIS problem on general graphs. The best known analysis of greedy by Halldórsson
and Radhakrishnan [31] for MIS implies the approximation ratio of (∆ + 2)/3, and
better ratios are known for small values of ∆. Here, we assume that the graph has
maximum degree ∆. A detailed survey of results for the MIS problem will be presented
in Chapter 6. Furthermore, the greedy paradigm applies to many other problems. In
[37], Jain et al. provide two greedy algorithms for the metric uncapacitated facility
location problem, and the approximation ratio is 1.861 and 1.61. A tight result of the
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2-approximation ratio by a greedy algorithm for the k-center problem is presented in
[69].
For heuristic purposes, for several combinatorial optimisation problems, the greedy
algorithms are also good in the practical sense. This is even despite the fact that their
theoretical analysis in terms of the worst case performance is not as good as expected.
Examples of such practical applications can be found, for instance, in the following
papers: [40], [26], [36] and [63]. These applications show that greedy algorithms usu-
ally find out the optimum solution, and for majority of inputs, they generally output
relatively good solutions compared to the optimum. And it is quite rare that they
output a solution which reaches the worst case approximation ratio or even close to
it. The computational experiments show that the greedy algorithm is a popular choice
for tour construction heuristics. For instance, greedy methods work at acceptable level
for the Euclidean Travelling Salesman Problem (TSP), and present more accurate and
faster solutions for the Asymmetric TSP problem [36]. For packing and covering prob-
lems, in [26], the authors compare four common algorithms: greedy algorithm, linear
programming rounding based algorithm, primal-dual algorithm, and a dual algorithm.
All of these algorithms share basically the same approximation ratio in the theoretical
worst-case analysis. However, the greedy algorithm turned out to be outstandingly
better than the other three approaches when tested on many “typical” instances.
The greedy paradigm also finds useful applications in other areas closely related to
optimisation. For example, a recent active research area called algorithmic mechanism
design. Algorithmic mechanism design lies in an intersection of the research areas of
economic game theory and computer science. It is about the design and analysis of
games, where players have unknown and private utilities, and at an equilibrium of
the designed game, the mechanism designer’s goals are obtained in reasonable time
complexity independently of players’ utilities.
The motivation for studying greedy paradigm in algorithmic mechanism design is
quite strong. Firstly, for many settings in mechanism design, such as combinatorial
auction problem [10, 42, 53], greedy algorithms are natural candidates for truthful
mechanisms construction. That is because they embody the natural monotonicity
properties associated with the concept of truthfulness [50]. Moreover, in the prospect of
Nash equilibrium implementation, the greedy algorithm also usually achieves relatively
good price of anarchy, or price of stability [48]. Secondly, for many combinatorial
auction problems, the greedy algorithms are known to obtain asymptotically tight
approximation ratio bounds, even though the mechanisms are simple. For example, a
greedy algorithm obtains a tight approximation of O(
√
m) for combinatorial auctions
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with single-minded bidders, and it is a truthful mechanism in this setting [53], where
m is the number of goods. Finally, which is perhaps the most important reason, many
auctions used in practice apply greedy methods, despite the fact that they may not
be incentive compatible (truthful) and may not have a good theoretical bound on
their approximation guarantee. Importantly, simple greedy mechanisms seem to be a
good candidate for auctions and related settings due to other considerations beyond
truthfulness, such as being easily understandable to the public and for their perceived
fairness.
Although a greedy algorithm is usually easy to understand and to implement, and in
general, its approximation ratio is good, it is usually difficult to analyse the performance
of such an algorithm precisely. The current approaches are either to focus on the local
behaviour of the algorithm or to focus on the global properties that lead to bounds far
from the tight bound. Natural questions arise of how to analyse the performance of a
greedy algorithm to obtain the upper bound on its approximation ratio, that is close to
a lower bound? What ideas and methods can provide a tight analysis, by which we can
consider both local and global properties in a unified way without any or much loss?
In this thesis, we focus on the classic combinatorial optimisation problems, namely,
the maximum weighted bipartite matching and the maximum independent set prob-
lems. Using the first of those problems, we will define a novel setting of mechanism de-
sign in context of ontology alignment, a problem which finds many important practical
applications. We provide a complete picture of the exact and approximate performance
of various truthful mechanisms for this setting. We study the approximate performance
of truthful mechanisms in dominant strategies, both with and without payments and
both deterministic and randomised mechanisms. Then we study the approximate per-
formance of truthful greedy mechanisms in Nash equilibria implementation. On the
one hand, this settles the theoretical analysis of the complexity and approximability
of our model in almost all known mechanism design settings. On the other hand, an
interesting take-home message from our results is that although dominant strategy
mechanisms might not be enough time efficient for the practical applications in ontol-
ogy alignment, greedy mechanisms provide an excellent, time-efficient, alternative for
such applications in Nash equilibria implementation.
For the second problem, the maximum independent set problem, we focus on the
classic minimum-degree greedy algorithm. The approximation performance of this al-
gorithm has been analysed in numerous previous papers. Its importance also stems
from the fact that because of its simplicity, it has been used as a tool in various proofs
in graph theory multiple times. Thus this algorithm is important on its own right and
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its efficiency makes it a natural choice in practical implementations where the indepen-
dent set problem is used. Our main contribution here is a new mathematical theory
for the design and analysis of the minimum-degree greedy algorithm with advice (of
which minimum degree vertex should greedy choose in case of ties) for the maximum
independent set problem on bounded degree graphs. The main highlight of our work
here is a very precise mathematical proof of the 4/3-approximation ratio of this algo-
rithm on sub-cubic graphs, i.e., with maximum degree at most 3, which implies the best
currently known analysis of greedy in this setting. Moreover, our tools provide a new
and simple proof of the approximation ratio of greedy on graphs with any bounded de-
gree. Further applications include faster approximation algorithms for another classic
optimisation problem, the minimum vertex cover problem on sub-cubic graphs.
The main novelty that our new analysis techniques are based on is a very precise
potential function that allows us to design a scheme to pay for the greedy solution
as compared to the optimal independent set. This scheme is highly non-local and it
requires a very precise inductive argument for it to be applied. The importance of
these new techniques also stems from the fact that it gives a great potential for further
applications of analysing greedy on other classes of graphs and for related problems.
In conclusion, this study sheds a great light on the essence of greedy algorithms.
1.1 Preliminaries
In this section, we define basic concepts which are used in the thesis.
A graph is a pair G = (V,E) of finite sets such that E ⊆ V × V . The elements of
V are vertices, the elements of E are 2-element subsets of V , are its edges. A graph
with vertex set V is said to be a graph on V . The vertex set of a graph G is referred to
as V (G), and its edge set as E(G). These conventions are independent of any actual
names of these two sets: the vertex set W of a graph H = (W,F ) is still refered to as
V (H), not as W (H). In this thesis, we shall not always distinguish strictly between a
graph and its vertex or edge set. For example, we may speak of a vertex v ∈ G, rather
than v ∈ V (G), and so on.
A vertex v is incident with an edge e if v ∈ e; then e is an edge at v. The two
vertices incident with an edge are its end vertices or ends, and an edge joins its ends.
An edge {x, y} is usually written as (x, y), xy or yx. Two vertices x, y of G are adjacent,
or neighbours, if xy is an edge of G. Two edges e 6= f are adjacent if they have an end
in common. If all the vertices are pairwise adjacent, then G is complete. A complete
graph on n vertices is a Kn; a K3 is called a triangle.
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We set G ∪G′ := (V ∪ V ′, E ∪ E′) and G ∩G′ := (V ∩ V ′, E ∩ E′). If G ∩G′ = ∅,
then G and G′ are disjoint. If V ′ ⊆ V and E′ ⊆ E, then G′ is a subgraph of G, written
as G′ ⊆ G.
If G′ ⊆ G and G′ contains all the edges xy ∈ E with x, y ∈ V ′, then G′ is an induced
subgraph of G; we say that V ′ induces G′ in G, and write G′ =: G[V ′]. Thus if U ⊆ V
is any set of vertices, then G[U ] denotes the graph on U whose edges are precisely the
edges of G with both ends in U .
If U is any set of vertices of G, we write G \U for G[V \U ]. In other words, G \U
is obtained from G by deleting all the vertices in U ∩ V and their incident edges.
Let G = (V,E) be a graph. The set of neighbours of a vertex v in G is denoted
by NG(v), or briefly by N(v). More generally, for U ⊆ V , the neighbours in V \ U of
vertices in U are called neighbours of U , which is denoted by N(U). We also use NG(U)
to denote the neighbours of U according to a given graph G. We also abuse NG(e),
e = (v1, v2) ∈ E to denote the set of endpoint v1, v2 of e. The degree dG(v) = d(v) of a
vertex v is the number |E(v)| of edges at v according to given graph G. This is equal
to the number of neighbours of v. A vertex of degree 0 is isolated. If all the vertices of
G have the same degree k, then G is k-regular. A 3-regular graph is called cubic, and
a graph with maximum degree at most 3 is called sub-cubic.
For a given r ≥ 1, an algorithm A is an r-approximation algorithm for the maxi-
mization (minimization, respectively) problem Π, if for any instance I of Π, a solution
generated by A with value A(I) respects r · A(I) ≥ OPTΠ(I) (A(I) ≤ r · OPTΠ(I),
respectively), where OPTΠ(I) denotes the value of the optimal solution of Π on in-
stance I. The r is called also an approximation guarantee, factor or ratio. We will be
exclusively interested in polynomial time approximation algorithms, thus calling them
just approximation algorithms. If there exists an r-approximation algorithm for an
optimisation problem Π, then we also say that problem Π is approximable to within (a
factor of) r.
1.2 Organisation
This thesis is organised as follows. Chapter 2 provides background information pre-
sented in a high-level way, which is necessary to follow this thesis. In Chapter 3, we
study the problem of ontological alignment in both dominant strategy and Nash equi-
librium implementation and demonstrate that a mechanism based on greedy algorithm
achieves good price of anarchy. In the next three chapters, Chapter 4, 5 and 6, we turn
our attention to the study a classic combinatorial optimisation problem: the maximum
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size independent set problem. In Chapter 4, we provide a series of negative results
about limitations of the greedy algorithm for this problem. In Chapter 5, we start our
study of the maximum size independent set problem on sub-cubic graphs, including
experimental research and explanations of our approach. Then, the culmination of the
thesis, in Chapter 6, which is self-contained, is devoted to present the formal result
of a simple greedy algorithm which achieves a 43 -approximation ratio in O(n
2) time.
Finally, in Chapter 7, further applications of the techniques developed in the previ-
ous two chapters are presented. Namely, we extend these techniques to higher degree
graphs, while we also study the connection between independent set and vertex cover.
In Chapter 8 we conduct an experimental study on the heuristic and practical aspects
of the greedy algorithm for the maximum independent set problem on sub-cubic graphs.
The conclusion Chapter 9 presents possible directions of further study.
1.3 Overview of the main contributions
The main contributions of this dissertation are as follows.
• In Chapter 3, we introduce a novel model for mechanism design in context of
ontology alignment. The optimisation problem is an appropriate version of the
bipartite matching problem with a natural setting of agent’s private information
related to ontologies. We first show the impossibility results for this problem for
mechanisms in dominant strategy implementation. Then, we design a simple but
efficient mechanism and analyze it by the greedy paradigm. Namely, we prove
bounds on the price of anarchy and price of stability of the resulting game in the
Nash equilibria implementation.
Highlights: The ontology alignment problem is solved in practise on huge in-
put data, thus running time of the mechanisms is crucial, where even difference
between O(n2) and O(n) matters. The main message of our results in this new
mechanism design model is that the dominant strategy mechanisms cannot be
time efficient. But when we resort to Nash equilibria implementation we show
that the greedy paradigm provides a very fast and practical mechanism.
• In Chapter 4, we study inapproximability of greedy algorithms for the maximum
independent set (MIS) problem. We show that the algorithmic problem of identi-
fication of graphs on which greedy algorithm obtains any constant approximation
ratio is NP -hard. A previous result shows that it is co-NP -complete [8] by a
different proof. The authors also prove that it is NP -complete to decide if there
8 Nan Zhi
exists a sequence of choices of greedy leading to a fixed approximation. We also
present a simple proof to show for general graphs, that to advice greedy to obtain
the optimal solution is NP -hard. Furthermore, we are able to prove that the same
statement is true even for cubic planar graphs, which means that the problem of
advising greedy algorithm to obtain its optimum is NP -hard.
Highlights: This is the first result of the hardness of greedy on such restricted
class of graphs, which significantly strengthens the previously known hardness
results. This result potentially implies that it is difficult to algorithmically advise
the greedy algorithm to obtain a good solution even compared to the maximum
size greedy independent set.
• In the consecutive Chapters 5 and 6, we introduce a novel collection of mathemat-
ical tools and techniques to design and analyse greedy approximation algorithms
with advice for the MIS problem on sub-cubic graphs. These techniques let us
prove the existence in polynomial time of the 43 -approximate greedy algorithm,
which is the best approximation ratio currently known for greedy algorithms for
MIS on sub-cubic graphs.1 This also gives the fastest known approximation al-
gorithm with this approximation ratio, running in time O(n2), whereas the best
previously known algorithm (based on local search) with the same ratio has run-
ning time O(n7.3) [12], where n is the number of vertices in the input graph.
Highlights: The main novelty of our new analysis technique is based on a very
precise potential function that allows us to design a scheme to pay for the greedy
solution as compared to the optimal independent set. This scheme is highly
non-local and it requires a complex inductive argument which we provide. The
importance of these new techniques also stems from the fact that it gives a great
potential for further applications of analysing greedy on other classes of graphs
and for related problems. Moreover, we believe that with further development,
these tools will allow us to also analyse algorithms which do not comply with
greedy constrains.
• In Chapter 7, we apply our techniques to obtain improved fast greedy algorithms
for MIS on ∆-bounded degree graphs for any ∆ and for ∆ = 4. For any ∆,
we obtain a different proof than previous research [31] by using the technique
1We have recently managed to finally prove the existence of a 5
4
-approximation greedy algorithm,
which shows the strength of our tools and techniques. This proof however is not present in this thesis,
see [44].
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from the previous chapters, proving that any greedy algorithm provides a ∆+23 -
approximation ratio. This is an alternative and much shorter and simpler proof
for the same result in [31]. For ∆ = 4, we obtain a 1.8-approximation ratio
greedy algorithm, which gives the best known time complexity algorithm with
this approximation ratio. Moreover, by strengthening a construction in [31] we
prove that any greedy algorithm for MIS on ∆-bounded degree graphs has an
approximation ratio at least ∆+13 −O(
1
∆).
• Also in Chapter 7 we apply our new techniques to obtain improved approximation
algorithms for another classic optimisation problem on sub-cubic graphs, the min-
imum size vertex cover problem. We prove the existence of an 54 -approximation
algorithm, which is based on the greedy paradigm, but it is not a canonical greedy
algorithm. The running time of this algorithm is O(n2). We also find a better
algorithm by conducting a pre-processing step to obtain a 65 -approximation ratio
and the running time is bounded by complexity of the max-flow computation
on the graph. In contrast, the best currently known approximation ratio for the
minimum vertex cover problem is 1.166 by a local search approach [5] and the run-
ning time of this algorithm is at least O(n50), and O(n17.28) for a 65 -approximation
ratio.
Highlights: This new 65 -approximation algorithm also reflects the strength of
our techniques, and the potential of extending them to different optimisation
problems.
• We also conduct an experimental study in Chapter 8, to illustrate the efficiency of
the greedy algorithm for MIS on sub-cubic graphs, and to provide some insights
on the average approximation ratio.
Chapter 2
Background
The precise technical definitions of the various notions related to game theory and
mechanism design, complexity theory and (approximation) algorithms, used in this
thesis are presented in the appropriate respective chapters. This chapter contains
informal explanations of these concepts, that are necessary to follow the content of this
dissertation. The exceptions are the notions which refer to ontologies and ontology
alignment, which will be defined more formally in this chapter and we will not redefine
them later on.
2.1 Game theory and mechanism design
On the highest level of game theory, let us first explain the notion of a (non-cooperative,
one-shot) game. Given a finite set of selfish agents (players), each agent has a finite set
of actions to choose among. Such a game is played by the agents who simultaneously
choose an action from their action sets. For such selection of actions of each agent,
every agent gets a specific payoff, which is also sometimes called a utility. The goal
of the agents, supposedly without knowing what actions the other agents choose, is to
choose an action from its action set, that maximises their payoff.
As a simple example let us consider the classic Prisoners’ Dilemma, whose descrip-
tion is taken from the book [55], see Example 1.1 there. Two prisoners are on trial
for a crime and each faces a choice to confess to the crime or to remain silent. If they
both remain silent then the authorities will not be able to prove charges against them
and they will both serve a short prison term, say 2 years, for minor offenses. If only
one of them confesses, then its term will be reduced to 1 year and it will be used as a
witness against the other prisoner, who will get a sentence of 5 years. Finally if they
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Figure 2.1: Prisoners’ Dilemma
both confess they both will get a small break for cooperating with authorities, and will
have to serve prison sentences of 4 years each (rather than 5).
In this game the prisoners are the 2 players, P1 and P2, and each player has the
same set of actions {C, S}, where C denotes Confess and S denotes Silent. This game
can be modeled as in Figure 2.1 where the numbers in this matrix are the costs that
they incur for their choices of actions. Thus their payoffs are the negated costs. For
example if P1 chooses Silent and P2 chooses Confess, then P1’s cost is 5 (and payoff
-5), and P2’s cost is 1 (and payoff -1).
Based on this game we can also define basic solution concepts in game theory:
namely equilibria. A (pure) Nash equilibrium of a game is a selection of actions of
all players such that no single player can change its action unilaterally to increase its
payoff, that is, where the other players stick to their chosen actions.
For instance, observe that the selection P1 = C and P2 = C is a pure Nash equi-
librium of the Prisoners’ Dilemma. That is because if P1 changes to S, and P2 sticks
with C, then P1 decreases its payoff from -4 to -5; the same holds symmetrically for P2
changing its action. This Nash equilibrium is also a very strong kind of equilibrium,
called equilibrium, solution or implementation in dominant strategies. This means that
for a given player, say P1, even if the other player P2 does not stick to its action C, still
the best action for P1 is to indeed stick to C. Indeed, it is best for P1 to keep action C
when P2 chooses C (because then if P1 switches from C to S, then its payoff decreases
from -4 to -5). And, also it is best for P1 to keep action C when P2 chooses S (because
then if P1 switches from C to S, then its payoff decreases from -1 to -2). To conclude,
each player’s dominant strategy in Prisoners’ Dilemma is to play Confess.
There are also mixed Nash equilibria, where players are allowed to choose probability
distribution on the set of their pure strategies. For instance in Prisoners’ Dilemma,
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player P1 may choose C with probability 2/3 and S with probability 1/3. If, for
instance, P2 chooses C with probability 1 (pure strategy), then the expected payoff of
P1 will then be (2/3) · (−4) + (1/3) · (−5). In a mixed Nash equilibrium, no agent can
increase its expected payoff, by unilaterally deviating from its mixed strategy, while the
other players stick to their chosen mixed strategies. A given game may not possess a
pure Nash equilibrium, but if the set of agents is finite and their sets of pure strategies
(actions) are also finite, then such a game will always possess a mixed Nash equilibrium
(this is the famous Nash’s Theorem, see, e.g., [55]).
This thesis contributes to the part of algorithmic game theory, called algorithmic
mechanism design (AMD). AMD is the study of optimisation problems where part of
the input data is private data of selfish agents. We are interested in the design of
truthful mechanisms, where the goal of such mechanism is to incentivise the agents to
truthfully report their private data to the mechanism and to optimise the objective
function of the problem under consideration.
Intuitively, a mechanism is a pair that consists of an algorithm and a payment
scheme or rule. The algorithm outputs a solution to the problem under consideration.
Such solution usually contains a subset of the agents. The payment scheme provides
monetary payments for the agents present in this solution to incentivise them to be
truthful. Sometimes however, in quite rare cases, a mechanism without payment can also
incentivise the agents to be truthful. A mechanism defines a game in the sense defined
above by specifying for each agent valuations that this agent associates with a solution
output by the mechanism. Then, each agent’s action set is a bid, which is a value that
this agent reports to the mechanism about its private data. The mechanism collects
these bids and outputs a specific mechanism’s solution. Then, the agent’s payoff is just
its valuation of that solution minus the mechanism’s payment for this agent.
As an example, let us consider a simple instantiation of the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves
(VCG) mechanism,1 which is the single item second-price auction. We have n ≥ 2
agents who want to buy a single item. Each agent i has valuation vi ≥ 0 for the item.
The second-price auction (mechanism) collects bids b1, . . . , bn, which are non-negative
numbers, from the agents and declares the highest-bid agent a winner (this is a trivial
algorithmic part of the mechanism). The payment scheme is to ask the winner to pay
1Let Π be a maximisation problem with n agents, where each agent has a (private) valuation function
over feasible solutions to problem Π. The Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) mechanism collects a bid (for
the valuation function) from each agent and with these bids computes the optimal solution to Π that
maximises the sum of agents’ bids over this solution, called a social welfare. There is a way of defining
payments to agents (Clarke payments) such that this mechanism is truthful in dominant strategies.
This means that each agent’s dominant strategy is to report to the mechanism as its bid their true
valuation function. For more details, see book [55].
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the value of the highest submitted bid among the remaining agents. For instance, if
n = 3 and v1 = 5, v2 = 7, v3 = 2 and the bids are b1 = 5, b2 = 4, b3 = 2, then agent 1
wins and pays b2 = 4 and its payoff is v1 − b2 = 5 − 4 = 1. The payoff of any losing
agent is by convention 0. In this example, agents 1 and 3 bid truthfully (i.e., b1 = v1,
b3 = v3), but agent 2 lies (i.e., b2 6= v2). Because agent 2 lost the auction, its payoff is
0. But if 2 bids truthfully b2 = v2 = 7, and the others bid like before, then 2 wins the
auction and its payoff is now v2 − b1 = 7 − 5 = 2. A simple case analysis shows that
in the single item second-price auction truth-telling, that is choosing as action (bid)
bi = vi, is the (weakly) dominant strategy of each agent. This implies that the choices
of actions (bids) b1 = v1, . . . , vn = bn is a dominant strategy Nash equilibrium of this
game.
We will consider general notions of truthfulness in the design of mechanisms. The
first is truthfulness in dominant strategies (as explained above), where if an agent
lies about its private data, then this agent’s payoff is always worse (or not better,
for weakly dominant), even if all other agents lie. Mechanisms which are truthful
in dominant strategies, which we also call just truthful, are also called to possess a
dominant strategy implementation. Here, we will also distinguish two further kinds of
truthfulness in dominant strategies for randomised mechanisms, that is, mechanisms
that use internal randomisation in their computation. These two kinds are universal
truthfulness and truthfulness in expectation. A randomised mechanism is universally
truthful if it is a probability distribution over a set of deterministic truthful mechanisms.
Furthermore, a randomised mechanism is truthful in expectation, if any agent maximises
its expected payoff by being truthful, independently of the other agents’ declarations.
The second notion of truthfulness is truthfulness in Nash equilibria. In this case
the mechanism should output a solution and a payment scheme such that the resulting
game (as defined above) implies a Nash equilibrium.
As mentioned above, computational problems studied in computer science and in
this thesis, usually come with a specific objective function that the mechanism is sup-
posed to optimise (maximise or minimise). Focusing on maximisation problems, we
desire to compute a solution that maximises the objective function value.
In context of game theory, the following useful notions of price of anarchy and price
of stability help quantify the quality of Nash equilibria with respect to a given objective
function.
For instance let us introduce an objective function called social cost, as the sum of
the costs (numbers in Figure 2.1) of the two agents in a given solution (where solution
is a choice of pure actions of both agents) of the Prisoners’ Dilemma. Note that agents
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want to minimise their social costs (as opposed to maximising of their payoffs in this
game).
The social cost of the solution P1 = C,P2 = C is 8. Observe, however, that the
solution P1 = S, P2 = S has the minimum social cost in this game of 4. The solution
P1 = C,P2 = C is a Nash equilibrium, whereas the optimal solution P1 = S, P2 =
S (i.e., the one that minimises the social cost) is not. Given a game, with specific
minimisation objective function, the price of anarchy of this game is the worst-case ratio
(over all instances of the game) between the objective value of any Nash equilibrium in
the game and the objective function value of the optimal solution. For the Prisoners’
Dilemma example with the social cost objective the price of anarchy is 2. Note, that
to define the price of anarchy for a game with a maximisation objective (when the
objective is non-negative) the ratio would be between the value of the objective of the
optimum solution and the value of a Nash equilibrium. A related notion of the price
of stability differs from the price of anarchy in that if on a given instance of the game
there are multiple Nash equilibria, we take the one with the objective function value
that is closest to the optimal objective value. Note that we define the price of anarchy
and that of stability in a way that it is always a number of value at least 1 for both
minimisation and maximisation objective.
Intuitively, a large price of anarchy (or stability) says that there is large loss in
the objective function value when one resorts to (decentralised or anarchistic) Nash
equilibria solutions, compared to that of the optimal (centralised) solution.
As another example let us consider the introduced single item second-price auction.
We define the social welfare as the objective function value, that is, the (true) valuation
of the winner of the auction. We have seen that the truthful solution, that is b1 =
v1, . . . , vn = bn, is a Nash equilibrium of this game, and in this solution the item goes
to the highest bid (i.e., highest valuation) agent. This implies that the price of stability
of this game is 1. It can be shown by a simple example that the price of anarchy of
this game is unbounded.
We finally mention that the notions of the price of anarchy and stability can also
naturally be defined for the mixed strategies equilibria. Furthermore, the notions of
strategies, equilibria, price of anarchy and stability, etc, which were defined above,
naturally extend when we allow for randomisation as part of agents’ strategies (mixed
strategies) and/or as a part of the mechanism (which translates into universal truthful-
ness or truthfulness in expectation). Because we use these notions under randomness
only for a limited set of results, the precise definitions are in Section 3.4.
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2.2 Optimisation, approximation and complexity
This thesis deals with various graph theoretic optimisation problems in context of their
approximability and computational complexity.
The very basic notion of an undirected graph has been defined in Section 1.1. The
following fundamental graph optimisation problems are studied in this thesis:
• the maximum weight bipartite matching problem (Chapter 3),
• the maximum size independent set problem (Chapter 4-8),
• and the minimum size vertex cover problem (Chapter 7).
We will define these problems very briefly here. An undirected graph G = (V,E) is
called bipartite if its vertex set V can be partitioned into two non-empty sets, U and
W , that is V = U ∪W and U ∩W = ∅, such that E ⊆ U ×W . This simply means
that in a bipartite graph, edges can only run between these two sets U and W , but no
two vertices from U are connected by an edge, and likewise, no two vertices from W
are connected by any edge.
Given a graph G = (V,E) we call a subset E′ ⊆ E of its edges a matching if no two
edges in E′ share the same end vertex. We also call a subset V ′ ⊆ V of its vertices an
independent set if no two vertices in V ′ are connected by an edge from E. Finally, a
subset V ′′ ⊆ V is called a vertex cover of G if for every edge from E at least one of its
end vertices belongs to V ′′.
Given a bipartite graph G = (U,W,E) with V = U ∪W , with non-negative weights
on its edges, the maximum-weight bipartite matching problem is to compute a matching
in G with the maximum possible sum of its weights on the edges.
Another fundamental graph optimisation problem is the maximum size independent
set (MIS) problem, where for a given graphG = (V,E), this problem asks for computing
an independent set in G with maximum possible size.
Finally, the minimum size vertex cover (MVC) problem is, for a given graph G =
(V,E), to compute a vertex cover of G with the smallest possible size.
These three problems find numerous theoretical and practical applications. How-
ever, they greatly differ from the point of view of their computational tractability. For
more details about relevant complexity theory, see, e.g., the Appendix in the book [69].
We will only explain very brief intuitions here.
For instance, the maximum weight bipartite matching problem is a very prominent
member of the complexity class P, of efficiently solvable problems, that is, all problems
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(whose decision versions are) solvable in deterministic polynomial time. On the other
hand the maximum size independent set and the minimum size vertex cover problems
are prominent members of the complexity class NP, of all problems (whose decision
versions are) solvable in non-deterministic polynomial time. An alternative definition of
the class NP is that a decision problem belongs to this class if there is a polynomial time
algorithm that can guess a short certificate that can certify that the problem instance
is a “Yes” instance. Once this certificate is guessed, it can be checked efficiently in
polynomial time if it indeed certifies the “Yes” instance. A related complexity class
is co-NP, whose definition is the same as NP but the algorithm certifies now a “No”
instance of the problem.
In fact both MIS and MVC problems are NP -hard, which means that there are no
deterministic polynomial time algorithms to solve these problems exactly, unless P =
NP. This is the very famous P versus NP open problem in theoretical computer science,
and it is widely believed that in fact P 6= NP. We also say that the decision versions of
those problems, MIS and MVC, are NP -complete. Intuitively, if a problem is NP -hard
or NP -complete, it means that there is an overwhelming mathematical evidence in the
complexity theory that this problem cannot be solved efficiently, that is in polynomial
time, to optimality. Similarly, if a problem is co-NP -hard, it is also widely believed
that it does not possess an efficient exact polynomial time algorithm. For more details
on complexity theory, the reader is referred to the book [58].
This brings us naturally to the notion of an approximation algorithm, which is an
efficient, e.g., polynomial time, algorithm that computes an approximately optimal
solution to a given optimisation problem. A formal definition of an r-approximation
algorithm for a maximisation and minimisation problem has been given in Section 1.1.
Again, it turns out that the defined NP -hard problems, MIS and MVC differ greatly
with respect to what approximation guarantees can be achieved for them in polynomial
time. For instance, there are known polynomial time 2-approximation algorithms for
MVC (or even ones with smaller approximation ratios for bounded-degree graphs).
However, in general graphs, MIS cannot be approximated in polynomial time with
ratio n1−ε for any fixed ε > 0, where n is the number of vertices in the input graph. We
say that MIS is inapproximable within ratio of n1−ε. If, for instance, the given graph
has maximum degree at most constant, then MIS can be approximated in polynomial
time to within a constant approximation ratios. For more details about approximation
algorithms, the reader is referred to the book [69].
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2.3 Ontologies and ontology alignment
For agents within an open multi-agent system to successfully communicate in any form
of transaction or collaboration, they must first understand and agree on the terminology
they use [70]; i.e. any terms or symbols used within the communication should have
some agreed meaning, or semantics. The notion of describing the meaning of some
concept has long been an important subject in the field of Artificial Intelligence, and in
particular, the interest in ontology as a tool for defining notions within a domain or word
theory has seen a resurgence since the emergence of the Semantic Web [7]. Traditionally,
such conceptualisations were shared, and assumed an agreed upon representation [65].
However, within open environments ontologies used by different agents for some domain
will typically have been developed independently, and thus the agents will need to reach
an agreement over the semantics of different terms through the creation of an ontology
alignment.
Ontologies support the sharing of knowledge across domains and applications by
providing a common, ideally machine processable vocabulary. Many different views
have emerged on the ‘ontological’ question of what is an ontology [28, 29, 65], with
the most widely cited definition of the meaning of ontologies (in the area of Artificial
Intelligence) being that given by Thomas Gruber in 1993 [28]. This was later refined to
state that “an ontology is a formal, explicit specification of a shared conceptualisation”
[65], where, formal refers to the requirement for machine-readability and explicit means
that the meaning of ontological terms is precisely defined. Thus an ontology provides
a model, or “specification of a conceptualisation” about a domain of interest such as
food, or medicine.
Due to the subjective nature of ontological design, a domain may be modelled in
many ways, resulting in different conceptualisations of the same domain using differ-
ent names and formalisms. As with their subjective nature, ontologies can represent
varying levels of granularity, based on the requirement of the tasks for which they were
engineered. For example, ontologies for the medical domain may be targeted at a high
and general, or holistic level, as opposed to those that define concepts at the cellular
level.
Ontologies are comprised of five main components; concepts, relations, individuals,
functions, and axioms:
• Concepts, also known as classes, represent objects in a given world. Classes can
be subdivided into subclasses which represent an entity that is more specific than
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that of its superclass. For example, in the food domain2, classes include Food,
IceCream and Pizza, where the latter two are both subclasses of the first one.
As the concept Pizza is subsumed by Food (i.e. all instances of Pizza are also
instances of Food, but not vice versa), the definition of the Pizza concept would
also inherit all of the constraints and properties from its parent class Food.
• Relations, also known as properties, are the links between the concepts. Relations
can have specific characteristics that define their semantics; e.g. symmetry (e.g.
given the property hasBorder we could state that Country hasBorder Country),
or cardinality (e.g. the property hasChild may have a minimum cardinality of
1 in the statement Parent hasChild Child). The combination of concepts and
relations can be represented as a directed graph.
• Individuals are the instances or the manifestation of objects of a given world.
Whilst it is not a requirement that an ontology has to have instances (the ontology
may simply be descriptive), the notion of individuals allows for a division between
classes and instances of classes. In the pizza domain, two people may order two
pizzas, a Margherita pizza and a Hawaiian pizza. Whilst both would be instances
of Pizza, only the Margherita pizza would be an instance of a VegetarianPizza.
• Functions are a particular type of relation, defined on a set of concepts such that
they are sub-relations from a given parent quality. These can relate an individual
concept to a single value. For example, Spice would be a functional relation of a
Topping, and would draw values from the finite set {hot, medium, mild}.
• Axioms are logical formulae that can be used to infer and define specific class
restrictions that are always assumed to be true. They are commonly used to verify
the correctness of the knowledge represented, through checking, and inference. To
facilitate reasoning, the axioms are typically represented as declarative definitions
(typically stated using some logical algebra3). An example of an axiom is in the
definition of the concept VegetarianPizza, which is defined as a subclass of
Pizza that does not have toppings of type FishTopping or MeatTopping.
2A tutorial for a simple pizza ontology is available for the Ontology Editor, Protege, and can be
found at https://protegewiki.stanford.edu/wiki/Protege4Pizzas10Minutes
3Often, the use of declarative definitions are not sufficient to constrain completely the meaning of
concepts or capture the ‘procedural’ or decision making aspects of the application business logic. This
knowledge is often represented as additional rules that accompany the ontology, that can facilitate the
advanced reasoning capabilities necessary for such business logic.
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Because we will not present a formal definition of an ontology later in this thesis,
let us present it here:
Definition 1. An ontology, O, can be expressed as a tuple O = 〈C,≤C , R,≤R, I, Ax〉,
where: C is the set of all concepts; ≤C is a partial order on C, representing a concept
hierarchy; R is a set of properties which is disjoint with C; and ≤R is a partial order
on R, representing a relation hierarchy. I is the set of individuals; i.e. instances of
concepts in C and relations in R, such that I = {x : ∃y ∈ C ∪ R, instanceof(x, y)}.
Instances of concepts may be interconnected with other elements in I by instances of
relations in R. Finally, Ax is the set of axioms used for inferring knowledge or con-
straining expressions in the language.
A variety of knowledge representations have been proposed in the past, however
there has been a recent convergence on the use of a single syntactic representation
for ontological knowledge. By basing a representation on an XML syntax, Web-based
machinery can be exploited for publishing, indexing, acquiring and parsing both ter-
minological knowledge (e.g concepts and properties) and assertional knowledge (e.g.
instances). The Web Ontology Language, OWL4 provides a standard, ubiquitous repre-
sentation for describing ontologies, thus eliminating the need for addressing the problem
of representational heterogeneity. Whilst it may be reasonable to assume a standard for
ontology languages, it is still impractical to promote the use of a single global ontology
within a system of open agents, as agents will often differ in the ontology to which they
commit.
Whilst it may be possible to define a single, shared domain ontology for use within
well defined communities, it would be impossible to enforce the use of a centralised
ontology within a dynamic, open environment, where at runtime, the agents (repre-
senting different stake-holders) come together serendipitously, with no prior knowledge
of each other. As a consequence, agents may use different ontologies to model the
same domain, and although these different ontologies may be similar, they may differ
in granularity or detail, use different representations, or model the concepts, properties
and axioms in different ways.
Ontology alignment. An ontology representing a given domain may be mapped to
another ontology representing the same domain through the use of ontology alignments.
This enables semantic interoperability between the knowledge bases of the respective
agents, and thus is an essential component for agent communication. Known as the
Ontology Alignment Problem, this is crucial in supporting semantic integration. In order
4http://www.w3.org/2004/OWL/ - Web Ontology Language.
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for two systems to accurately and successfully communicate over their vocabularies, the
heterogeneity in ontologies needs to be resolved.
The ontology alignment community has proposed diverse approaches that align
ontologies in order to find these sets of correspondences [21]. A recent review of ontology
matching research [64] highlighted that whilst considerable progress had been made
in recent years, the performance of different ontology alignment mechanisms across
different tasks is still an issue, and can vary greatly. Thus it can be problematic to
determine which approach would produce the best alignment between two ontologies
for a specific task [60].
An alignment is a set of mappings (correspondences) between the corresponding
entities within a pair of ontologies, and can be defined as follows: An alignment, AO,O′
is a set of mappings or correspondences between two ontologies, O and O′ representing
a shared domain. A single correspondence, m, defines a relationship between corre-
sponding entities, e and e′ within the two ontologies, and can be defined as follows:
Definition 2 ([21]). A correspondence, m ∈ AO,O′, is expressed as a tuple: m =
〈e, e′, n, r〉 where: e ∈ O and e′ ∈ O′ are the entities (concepts, relations or individuals)
between which a relation is asserted by the correspondence; n ∈ R+ is a degree of
confidence in that correspondence; and r ∈ {≡,v} is the relation5 holding between e
and e′.
The formal definition of correspondences can be specialised when the entity type
is constrained: mappings between concepts = 〈c, c′, , 〉, mappings between properties
= 〈p, p′, , 〉, and mappings between individuals = 〈i, i′, , 〉, where the entity types
correspond to concepts, relations and individuals respectively. A correspondence over
which no agreement has yet been reached by the agents is called a candidate mapping.
Ontology alignment has traditionally been viewed as a centralised process, whereby
a central oracle is invoked in order to identify mappings between corresponding enti-
ties belonging to two ontologies provided as input. Such approaches try to maximise
the number of correspondences created (coverage) given some objective function, of-
ten disregarding the reason why the alignment was being generated (i.e. to facilitate
some task or queries), or other knowledge possessed by the ontology owner (e.g. an
agent). Thus, generic alignment mechanisms do not offer any guarantee that even if an
alignment can be found, this will actually support the representation of a joint task.
5This set of relations is not meant to constitute an exhaustive set of relationships, as the type of
relationships can depend on the type of correspondences generated, and the underlying logical algebra
assumed by the ontological model.
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3.1 Introduction
To address the problem of agents communicating in a meaningful way within an open,
distributed environment, the agents have to align their respective, individual, and typ-
ically private ontologies. Although many approaches have been proposed to align on-
tologies within a centralised setting, few studies have addressed how candidate corre-
spondences should be selected within this setting [38, 46, 60, 68], and even fewer, if
any, have considered the problem from a decentralised, one-shot game perspective [43].
Various static [46, 68] and dynamic [60, 38] approaches have explored how agents
can propose, and exchange candidate correspondences with the goal of aligning their
respective ontologies. In many cases, agents acquire knowledge of different candidate
correspondences from a variety of sources, or through negotiation with other agents.
These candidate correspondences may have an associated weight, which may reflect the
utility, significance, or simply the confidence that an agent has in the correspondence.
This weight may also be contextual as different weights may be associated to a cor-
respondence based on the specific task an agent is trying to achieve. Furthermore, in
adversarial scenarios, the agents may not wish to disclose their private weights, and
may lie when stating their preferences. An example of such a scenario is the health-care
domain where ontologies are currently being used to describe electronic patient records
(EPR), but where the vendor “ . . . may be reluctant to distribute (parts of) the contents
of [the ontology], as doing so might allow competitors to plagiarize [it] . . . ” [27]
As the composition of different subsets of correspondences can result in different
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Figure 3.1: Centralised example with two solutions: {e1, e3} and {e2}.
alignments, the challenge in negotiating a mutually acceptable alignment is that of
selecting and proposing correspondences that result in a preferred alignment that sat-
isfies the aims of both agents. Furthermore, some correspondences may map a single
entity in one ontology to different entities in other ontologies (which can compromise
the integrity of the resulting logical model), and therefore the outcome should also be
injective, i.e., a matching.
3.2 Background
To date, the ontology alignment community has proposed many diverse approaches that
align ontologies in order to find sets of correspondences between the ontology pairs.1
However, most approaches rely on the ontologies being fully shared with some alignment
algorithm [21, 64] which attempts to find correspondences between entities. Alignment
approaches usually initiate the process of identifying correspondences (mappings) by
computing a similarity matrix (lexical, structural or a combination of these) between
all the entities in the two ontologies that are being aligned [21, 51]. This produces a
number of different mappings involving the same entities from which an injective (one-
to-one) alignment needs to be extracted (i.e. correspondences for which to each entity
from the source ontology corresponds only one entity in the target ontology).
Typically, most alignment approaches model the alignment as a bipartite graph,
and thus select an injective alignment by finding a matching or independent edge set in
the graph, such that the set of edges (i.e. correspondences) have no common vertices
(i.e no entity in one ontology is mapped to more than one entity in the other ontology,
and vice versa). This assumes that each edge (or correspondence) is weighted such
that the weight represents the quality or desirability of the correspondence. The two
1For a comprehensive overview of the different approaches, we refer the reader to the Proceedings of
the Ontology Matching Workshops that have taken place annually since 2004, as part of the Ontology
Alignment Evaluation Initiative - http://oaei.ontologymatching.org
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most common methods used to compute a matching are: 1) to find a global optimal
solution (which is equivalent to the Assignment Problem) using algorithms such as the
Hungarian method [45]; or to find a sub-optimal, but stable solution using algorithms
such as Gale and Shapley’s Stable Marriage algorithm [24]. Solutions to the assignment
problem identify correspondences that maximise the sum of the weights (i.e. they
assume some objective function that maximises social welfare), such that the global
similarity of the alignment is considered, as opposed to the similarity of each pair of
entities. This is illustrated in Figure 3.1, where two correspondences are selected by
maximising the weights; in this case the weights associated to the two correspondences
{e1, e3} are 1 + 1 = 2.
The used approach should also be time-efficient, as ontologies can vary greatly in
size, with several in the Bio-Medical domain possessing tens of thousands of entities
[39]. Thus, given that the Hungarian method is computationally expensive (O(n3) for
its most efficient implementation), some sub-optimal approximate algorithm such as
a greedy matching algorithm [51] or a variant from the family of Stable Marriage al-
gorithms [30] are used that select a sub-optimal set of correspondences in those cases
when a stable solution is sufficient. This can result in a different alignment that empha-
sises the weights of individual correspondences; for example a greedy algorithm would
generate an alignment with a single correspondence, e2, as its weight is greater than
either e1 or e3, resulting in a sub-optimal total weight of 1 + ε.
A similar problem arises in decentralised settings, where agents negotiate over a set
of (partially observable) correspondences to agree upon a mutually acceptable align-
ment [2, 4, 13, 20, 38, 46, 60, 68], often based on the aims or goals of the agents that
may own or utilise them. As no single alignment approach can provide a panacea for all
ontology pairs, agents are left with the problem of either: 1) selecting a suitable align-
ment approach from the plethora that exist; or 2) assembling alignments from a subset
of relevant, candidate correspondences; for example using an ensemble approach. This
latter case occurs if agents have access to correspondences from shared repositories [46]
or garnered from previous transactions with other agents. Furthermore, alignments
with different constituent correspondences may be semantically equivalent with respect
to one of the agent’s ontologies and aims (due to the logical theory underlying each
agent’s ontology) but may have a different meaning to another.2 As the agent may
have preferences over the choice of correspondences used (e.g. due to privacy concerns
[27, 52]), agents can have a preference order over the resulting alignments within the
2 A classic example of terminological difference exists with the term “football”, which has a different
meaning depending on whether the reader is from the US or the UK.
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same equivalence class. Hence, for self-interested agents, this task becomes one of
selecting a mutually acceptable subset of preferred ontological correspondences.
The resulting alignment will typically be dependent on the valuation that each agent
associates to each correspondence. Whilst this is uncontroversial in centralised systems,
approaches that are decentralised (i.e. where agents may differ in the value they ascribe
to a correspondence) are subject to strategic manipulation; i.e. agents may lie about the
true valuation of a correspondence to ensure that the final alignment includes their pre-
ferred correspondences. The value that each agent assigns to each correspondence (i.e.
its private valuation) relates to how useful this edge is in resolving a query or achieving
a task, and in turn, the potential benefit the agent can obtain from performing a task.
Note that this is not the same as the confidence the agent has in the edge (based,
for example from some form of linguistic similarity metric over the concept labels).
For example, an agent may know of two correspondences in the publishing domain
{writer, editor} and {writer, author}. Both are viable correspondences, depending
on the task (e.g. for a conference proceedings and monograph respectively), but an
agent may assign different valuations to each correspondence based on some prefer-
ence; for example the agent can increase its benefit by resolving queries or performing
tasks (by providing a service to its peers) pertaining to monographs. Conversely, it
may have a low valuation for other correspondences for which it has little preference
(e.g. {writer, publisher}). However, within a service landscape where several agents
(providing services) may compete to perform a task for a requesting agent, they may
not wish to disclose the true valuation. This can potentially lead to agents strategically
manipulating the combined value of sets of correspondences, in order to maximise their
individual benefits; potentially resulting in semantically compromised correspondences
being selected, which may then prevent the query or task from successfully completing.
Thus, in an ideal setting, the agents should be incentivised to adopt strategies that
result in alignments that benefit both agents; i.e. find solutions that lie within a Nash
Equilibrium [55]. Our model which relates to two agents who seek to find a matching
between their sets of ontologies, assumes an existence of a third party, a mechanism de-
signer, who provides an online matching service such as an Agent Matchmaker [15, 67],
that facilitates the discovery of services (often based on semantically annotated service
descriptions3 [57, 66]). The mechanism designer uses a specific matching mechanism
which might require payments from agents. Those payments can be interpreted as the
mechanism’s charge for the provided matching service.
3Note that a discussion of the methods for discovering semantically annotated services [14, 22] is
out of scope of this thesis.
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3.3 Our contributions
Thus, given two agents, an instance of the ontology alignment problem can be mod-
elled as an edge-weighted bipartite graph G = (U ∪ V,E), where the vertices of U and
V correspond to named concepts and the edges e ∈ E represent the candidate corre-
spondences. Each agent assigns an independent value to each edge, which represents a
private weight associated to that correspondence. The outcome should be an injective
alignment (a matching) that maximises social welfare (i.e. the sum of the edge weights
in the resulting alignment is maximised).
Remark: Although, optimisation-wise, this problem is just the classic maximum edge-
weighted bipartite matching problem, the differences will emerge when we define the
very specific mechanism design version suited to our application to the ontology align-
ment problem. In particular, the main novelty will be a special kind of agents’ utilities
that will define a special kind of edge weights. This, in turn, will translate in an interest-
ing and new set of results on the approximability of the dominant strategy mechanisms
and price of anarchy and stability of the Nash equilibria implementation of the greedy
mechanism.
We explore this problem from a mechanism design perspective, and analyse imple-
mentations in Dominant Strategies and in Nash Equilibria. For the implementations in
Dominant Strategies, two alternate settings are considered: with payment, and without
payment ; where the problem is characterised as a social welfare maximising matching
setting, with an additive valuation function. We show that for a deterministic mecha-
nism with payment, the only truthful mechanism is maximal-in-range4 and any truthful
mechanism which is not optimal can do no better than an approximation ratio of 2.
Note here that we can obtain a truthful mechanism by just solving the edge-weighted
bipartite matching problem exactly and using the VCG payments to the agents. How-
ever, this still requires time for solving optimally the edge-weighted bipartite matching
problem, and we ask the question whether it is possible to have a faster truthful mecha-
nism? We answer this question in negative, because our results imply that any truthful
mechanism that is not optimal has to be maximal-in-range and at least 2-approximate.
This motivates us to study implementation in Nash equilibria by fast greedy algorithms
(see below).
4A mechanism is maximal-in-range if it computes an optimal, i.e., social welfare maximising, solution
on a fixed subset of feasible solutions. See also Definition 4.
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For settings without payment, we assume a priori that the individual true valuations
of each correspondence are public, and each agent bids a Boolean vector (indicating its
selection/rejection of a correspondence). Our polynomial time algorithm determines if
a deterministic truthful mechanism exists with a bounded approximation ratio; if so,
then the optimal solution is found. However, if such a mechanism does not exist for
the bid, then we show there is no truthful mechanism with bounded approximation
ratio. We also show that there are no randomised mechanisms that are: i) universally
truthful with an approximation ratio better than 2; and ii) truthful in expectation with
an approximation ratio better than 2. Note that ii) implies i), however, we also mention
and explicitly include i), because its proof is different from that of ii).
Given our results on truthful centralised mechanisms, either the problem should
be solved optimally (though costly) or strong lower bounds should be found for the
approximation ratios of truthful mechanisms. Thus, we have explored an implemen-
tation in Nash equilibria to efficiently approximate mechanisms for matching, using
the greedy allocation mechanism. We provide a complete picture of the complexity of
this mechanism by showing that when coupled with a first-price payment scheme, it
implements Nash equilibria which are very close (within a factor of 4) to the optimal
matching. The Price of Anarchy of this mechanism is characterised completely and
shown to be precisely 4 (this bound also holds for Mixed Nash equilibria), and when a
pure Nash Equilibrium exists, we show that the Price of Stability is at least 2. Thus
we can just let the agents play in a decentralised way and reach a Nash equilibrium,
which then will give a solution close to optimum within a factor of 4.
3.4 Preliminaries
We consider a setting in which there are two agents i ∈ {L,R} (the left agent and right
agent), where each agent possesses a private ontology Oi, which consists of named
concepts NC and named relations NR; i.e. Oi = NCi ∪NRi . An instance of the alignment
is modelled as an edge-weighted bipartite graph G = (U ∪ V,E), where the vertices
of U and V correspond to named concepts (i.e., entities) in the agents’ individual
ontologies U = NCL and V = N
C
R respectively, and the edges e ∈ E correspond to the
candidate correspondences. A matching M is a subset of E such that e ∩ e′ = ∅
for all e, e′ ∈ M with e 6= e′; i.e. no two edges have a common vertex. Each agent
i ∈ {L,R} has a non-negative valuation function for different matchings M , denoted
vi(M), where vi : M(G) → R+, which is additive; i.e. v(S) + v(T ) = v(S ∪ T ) such
that S ∩ T = ∅ for all S, T ∈ M(G), and M(G) is the set of all matchings in a graph
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G. The agents also have the valuation function vi : E → R+ to represent the value
vi(e) the agent i can get from the edge e. The combined value for an edge e is therefore
given as v(e) = vL(e) + vR(e) (as described below). Define that vi(M) =
∑
e∈M vi(e)
for every agent i ∈ {L,R}. The goal is to establish an alignment which is equivalent to
a matching M that maximises
∑
e∈M v(e). The valuation function vi can be regarded
as the agent’s true valuation, or type that it attributes to each matching. Furthermore,
we use v to represent the combined type profile for both agents, such that v = (vL, vR),
where vi is the type profile for agent i, and similarly, b denotes the combined bid profile
for both agents, such that b = (bL, bR), where bi is the bid profile for agent i. We
will also introduce the following useful notation: bei = bi(e) and v
e
i = vi(e) for any
i ∈ {L,R} and e ∈ E.
To determine the outcome given the bids of the two agents, we consider mecha-
nisms with and without payments (see §3.5). We define a direct revelation mechanism
M(A,P), which is composed of an allocation rule A to determine the outcome of the
mechanism, and a payment scheme P which assigns a vector of payments to each de-
clared valuation profile. For the mechanism with payment (§3.5.1), the mechanism
proceeds by eliciting a bid profile bi from each agent i, and then applies the allocation
and payment rules to the combined bid profiles to obtain an outcome and payment for
each agent. As an agent may not want to reveal its type, we assume that b does not
need to be equal to v.
For the mechanism without payment, we consider a restricted model of the dec-
laration, whereby each agent’s valuation on an edge e, vi(e) is public, and thus ∀e ∈
E, bi(e) = vi(e). What is private is a set of desirable edges Ei ⊂ E that the agent wants
in the outcome. Each agent i therefore declares a Boolean value for each edge, denoted
δi(e) ∈ {0, 1}, such that δi(e) = 1 iff e ∈ Ei. The payment scheme for this mechanism
is simply P = 0, and the allocation rule A is described in §3.5.2.
The utility ui(·) for agent i given a bid profile b = (bL, bR) and mechanism M is
based on the allocation rule A and the payment scheme P over the outcome of A(v)
(i.e. a matching or allocated set M), and can be written as ui(A(b)) = vi(A(b))−Pi(b).
For the implementation in Nash Equilibria, we assume a first-price payment rule, such
that an agent is charged its declared bid bi(M) for any allocated set M . Our mechanism
M maximises the social welfare given both agents’ bids (generating either optimal or
approximately optimal solutions), which is defined as SW (A(b), v) =
∑
e∈A(b) v(e).
A (deterministic) mechanismM is called truthful in dominant strategies or incentive
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compatible if, for any agent i ∈ {L,R}, we have
ui(A(vi, b−i)) ≥ ui(A(bi, b−i))
for any bid profile bi of agent i and any bid profiles b−i of the other agent.
Remark: Given any k-dimensional vector w = (w1, . . . , wk), and given any element
w′ and any index i ∈ {1, . . . , k}, we denote by w−i the (k − 1)-dimensional vector that
has all coordinates of vector w except the i-coordinate. Then we denote by (w′, w−i)
the vector (w1, . . . , wi−1, w
′, wi+1, . . . , wk). That is, (w
′, w−i) is vector w that has w
′ in
the i-th coordinate and other coordinates are the same as in vector w.
Thus, given a bid profile b = (bL, bR), the notation (vi, b−i) above for any agent
i ∈ {L,R} denotes the new bid profile in which the bid bi of agent i in b is replaced by
vi and the bid(s) of the agent(s) other than i, b−i, are the same as in profile b. That is, if
i = L, then we have (vi, b−i) = (vL, bR), and if i = R, then we have (vi, b−i) = (bL, vR).
Also, to be very formal, we should write A((bi, b−i)) instead of A(bi, b−i) above.
If the context is clear, we will omit A in the utilities ui, which means: ui(·, ·) :=
ui(A(·, ·)).
Nash Equilibria. Different types of Nash equilibria may exist, depending on the
strategy adopted by the agents. The bid profile b forms a Pure Nash equilibrium if, for
both agents, there exists no other bid profile b′i achieving a higher utility, i.e.,
∀b′i, ui(bi, b−i) ≥ ui(b′i, b−i)
Thus, no agent can obtain a higher utility by deviating from b.
Remark: Given a bid profile b = (bL, bR), the notation (bi, b−i) and (b
′
i, b−i) has
been explained in the remark above. And again, to be very formal, we should write
ui((bi, b−i)) instead of ui(bi, b−i) above.
The bid profile b may also form a Bayesian Nash equilibrium. Let i ∈ {L,R}, Vi
denote the finite set of valuations of agent i. As the set of possible valuation profiles of
the agents is V = VL×VR, there is a known probability distribution P over the valuation
V . We assume that P = PL × PR is the Cartesian product of independent probability
distribution Pi. Any valuation profile v = (v1, · · · , vn) occurs with probability P (v) =
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∏n
i=1 Pi(vi), where Pi(vi) is the probability that agent i has valuation function vi.
The strategy function Bi for agent i assigns a bid-vector bi = Bi(vi) to every valu-
ation function vi ∈ Vi. The function B = (B1, · · · , Bn) is a Bayesian Nash Equilibrium
if, for both agents i, and for every valuation function vi, the bid Bi(vi) maximizes i’s
expected utility, given that its valuation function is vi, and that the bids of other agent












−i = (B1(v1), · · · , Bi−1(vi−1), Bi+1(vi+1), · · · , Bn(vn)), and Ev−i∼P−i [X] denotes
the expectation of the random variable X assuming that vector v−i is sampled at
random from the distribution P−i.
We also permit a randomised strategy function which can result in a Mixed Nash
equilibrium. Given the probability distribution ω1, · · · , ωn over the declarations, and
any function f over the space of declaration profiles, we can state Eb∼ω[f(b)] for the
expected value of f over declarations chosen according to the product distribution
ω = ω1×· · ·×ωn. Thus, ω is a Mixed Nash Equilibrium if, for any agent and distribution
ω′i, we have: Eb∼ω[ui(b)] ≥ Eb∼(ω′i,ω−i)[ui(b)].




−i )] ≥ Ev−i∼P−i,b∼(ω′i,ω−i)[ui(bi, b
v−i
−i )]
As our aim is to maximise the social welfare, we denote SWopt(v) for maxM∈M(G) SW (M,v),
and state that the allocation algorithm A is a c-approximation algorithm if we have
SW (A(v), v) ≥ 1cSWopt(v).
The Price of Anarchy of mechanism M(A,P) in mixed (and pure, respectively)









where the supremum is over all valuations v, and all mixed Nash equilibria ω (likewise,
all pure Nash equilibria b) for v. Here A(ω) denotes a random matching with respect
to ω.
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Given a probability distribution P over valuations (types) of the agents, and an
allocation rule A, we denote: SW (A(b), P ) = Ev∼P [vL(A(b)) + vR(A(b))]. Then, the




SW (A(ω), P )
where the supremum is over all type distributions P and all mixed Nash equilibria ω
(respectively, all pure Nash equilibria ω, assuming that ω assigns probability 0 or 1 to
pure strategies) for v.
The price of stability for pure strategy games defined by mechanism M(A,P) is






Where the infimum is over all type valuation v, and all pure Nash equilibria b.
3.5 An Implementation in Dominant Strategy
Two truthful mechanism design cases have been investigated: with payment (§3.5.1)
and without payment (§3.5.2).
3.5.1 Mechanism design with payment
In this setting, both agents have to pay money to establish a matching. The first
observation is that if we are willing to solve the problem optimally (which is possible
in polynomial time by simply finding an optimal weighted bipartite matching), then
we can use the classic VCG mechanism with Clarke payment (e.g., [55]). The question
is: can we have a faster, non-optimal, approximate and truthful mechanism for our
problem? We show below that the answer is essentially no. We will need the following
well known theorem from the classic mechanism design theory:
Definition 3. [55] An allocation rule of mechanism A satisfies weak monotonicity if for
all i and all v−i, A(vi, v−i) = a 6= b = A(v′i, v−i) implies that vi(a)−vi(b) ≥ v′i(a)−v′i(b).
Theorem 1. [55] If a mechanism M(A,P) is incentive compatible, then A satisfies
weak monotonicity.
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Theorem 2. For the alignment problem with payment, any mechanism which does
not return an optimal solution, is either non-truthful, or if truthful, the non-optimal
solution has an approximation ratio of at least 2.
Before the proof of Theorem 2, the clarification for it is: if we apply the VCG
mechanism, then the mechanism will be truthful and the solution is optimum, thus,
the motivation behind this theorem is to seek any mechanism which is not VCG, to
examine whether such mechanism can be truthful and what is the quality of its solution.
This theorem shows that if any mechanism is not VCG, then it is either not truthful,
or it is truthful but cannot achieve a solution whose approximation factor is smaller
than 2.
Proof. Let M(A,P) be a mechanism, and recall that A(v) denotes the outcome gen-
erated by M, when the input is v (which may not be the true valuation).
We construct an instance of our problem of any size to prove the lemma. For any
two positive integers `, k, let the bipartite graph G = (U ∪V,E) have ` nodes on the left
side of bipartite graph (|U | = `) and k nodes on the right side (|V | = k). Then we have
two special edges e1, e2 ∈ E that are disjoint, e1∩ e2 = ∅, and their true valuations are




R = ω. The valuations of all other
edges in G for both agents are zero. In the following discussion, we will only consider
the right agent, and thus we omit the agent index when referring to valuations.
Consider any mechanism M(A,P) that does not adopt an optimal solution: the
outcome contains both edges e1 and e2. Thus, the non-optimal solution will contain at
most one of these edges, and note if both e1 and e2 are not adopted into the solution,
the approximation ratio is unbounded. We therefore assume that the mechanism specif-
ically accepts one of these two edges; w.l.o.g., assume that M will accept e1 ∈ A(v),
when the right agent declares its true valuation v.
If the right agent deviates from its valuation v to some other valuation v′, the
mechanism has two options:
Case-1. The mechanism changes the current outcome A(v) ⊇ {e1} to A(v′) ⊇
{e1, e2}, adopting both edges. Making the alternative valuation v′(e1) = v′(e2) = 0,
implies that v′(A(v′)) ≤ v′(A(v)). From the assumption, we also know that v(A(v)) <
v(A(v′)). Adding the left and right hand sides of these two inequalities, we obtain:
v′(A(v′)) + v(A(v)) < v′(A(v)) + v(A(v′))
v(A(v))− v(A(v′)) < v′(A(v))− v′(A(v′))
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As this violates the weak monotonicity condition in Theorem 1, it follows that M
is not a truthful mechanism.
Case-2. The mechanism does not change the outcome, i.e., A(v′) = A(v). Then
when the agent deviates its valuation to v′. The approximation ratio is at least
v(e1)+v(e2)
v(e1)
. Since we consider the worst case, the ratio is therefore at least 2.
Observe that if the outcome changes from e1 ∈ A(v) to e2 ∈ A(v′) and e1 6∈ A(v′),
then this case is symmetric to Case 2, and thus will also lead to a ratio of at least 2.
Furthermore, if the right agent has only one non-zero value edge, and the valuation
on the remaining edges is 0, then the approximation ratio is also unbounded, and all
such cases also lead to the lower bound on the approximation ratio.
Definition 4. [17] A mechanism is called maximal in range (MIR) if there exists a fixed
subset R of all allocations (the range of the mechanism), such that for every possible
input v, the mechanism outputs the allocation that maximizes the social welfare in R
with respect to v.
Theorem 3. For the alignment problem with payment, any deterministic mechanism
that does not return an optimal solution, is either non-truthful, or is a maximal-in-range
mechanism.
The idea behind Theorem 3 is the following. Given the agents’ bids, any mechanism,
if it does not return the optimal matching as the solution, the agents will declare a bid
which is lower than their true valuation. The agents are incentivised to do that, because
the mechanism will choose a sub-optimal solution.
Proof. Consider an instance, let the bipartite graph G = (U ∪V,E) have ` nodes on the
left side of bipartite graph (|U | = `), and only single node on the right side (|V | = 1).
For each vertex of the left agent, there is an edge that connects it to the right agent’s
vertex; thus, any matching for this instance includes only a single edge. Let us name
these ` edges as e1, . . . , e`. Fix any deterministic mechanism A that does not return an
optimal solution; and we assume that e1 is the optimal solution; then the mechanism A
will select one edge in {e2, · · · e`}. When agents deviate from their valuation, according
to the solution returned by the mechanism, we have three cases:
Case-1. Mechanism A does not accept an alternative solution, in particular {e2},
whatever the declaration is. Thus, if A is truthful then it is equivalent to a maximal-
in-range mechanism, whose range is R = {e2}.
Case-2. Mechanism A returns an alternative solution, {e1} (i.e. the optimal so-
lution in global) for some declaration v′: A(v′) = {e1}. However, by Theorem 1, the
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Figure 3.2: Disjoint Edges Figure 3.3: Shared vertices
mechanism is not truthful. To show this, suppose w.l.o.g. that the mechanism returns
e2 for a declaration v: A(v) = {e2}, and that one agent deviates from its valuation v to
v′ with v′(e1) < v
′(e2). Note we have v(e1) > v(e2) by the assumption. Adding the left
and right hand sides of these two inequalities, we have v(e2)−v(e1) < v′(e2)−v′(e1). By
assumption, we also have A(v) = {e2} and A(v′) = {e1}. This contradicts the mono-
tonicity condition from Theorem 1, which requires that: v(e2)−v(e1) ≥ v′(e2)−v′(e1).
Case-3. Mechanism A returns an alternative solution, which is one of the edges
from {e3, · · · , el}. In such a case, by Theorem 1, the same argument for Case 2 also
applies for this, the mechanism is again not truthful, since it violates the monotonicity
condition.
Note that putting together Lemma 2 and Theorem 3, we conclude the following
theorem:
Theorem 4. For the alignment problem and mechanism design with payment, the only
truthful mechanisms are ones that are maximal-in-range and have approximation ratio
at least 2.
To complement these lower bound results we in fact show below that there is a very
simple truthful mechanism which indeed has an approximation ratio of 2, also it does
not return optimal solution and it is a maximal in range mechanism.
We introduce some notations here. LetO be the optimal solution, andOL andOR be
the optimal solution for the left agent and right agent, i.e., OL = arg maxM∈M(G) vL(M),
OR = arg maxM∈M(G) vR(M).
Algorithm 1 Larger agent algorithm.
Require: Bipartite graph G = (V,E). bL, bR of the left and right agent.
Ensure: A matching M
1: set the left agent bids on all edges to be 0
2: find the optimal solution of the right agent OR.
3: set the right agent bids on all edges to be 0
4: find the optimal solution of the left agent OL.
5: max(OL, OR) is the solution.
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Theorem 5. The approximation ratio of Algorithm 1 is at most 2.
Proof. Since it finds the larger matching in {OL, OR}, then it is higher than 12O. To
prove it, we assume w.l.o.g. that vOLL ≥ v
OR
R . Since v
OL
L ≥ vOL , v
OL
R ≥ vOR then vOL +vOR ≤
vOLL + v
OR




R } = 2v
OL
L .
3.5.2 Mechanism design without payment
In the mechanism design without payment, if agents can misreport their valuations, no
non-trivial truthful mechanism exists [18]. A natural setting commonly used in previous
research assumes that an agent can only declare or hide which edge it wants to match.
We thus adopt this restricted model of the declaration. We assume that agents cannot
lie about their valuations, but they may lie about which edge can be used to establish
a matching. An instance of the alignment problem on a private bipartite graph is: the
valuations of agents on edge e, vi(e) are public information or verifiable, and agent i’s
private information is a set of edges Ei ⊆ E given by δi(e) ∈ {0, 1}. An edge e may
be accepted in the matching, only if for both agents, δL(e) = δR(e) = 1. The agent i
will receive value vi(e) from e if it is matched; otherwise for edge e it receives 0. The
goal is to maximise the social welfare via a mechanism without money, such that both
agents are incentivised to declare their Ei truthfully.
Theorem 6. Given an instance of the alignment problem, Algorithm 2 will decide
whether there is a deterministic truthful mechanism without payment for this instance.
If the answer is yes, then the mechanism also finds an optimal solution. If the answer
is no, then there is no deterministic truthful mechanism with a bounded approximation
ratio on that instance.
Algorithm 2
Require: Bipartite graph G = (V,E), the public known valuation of both agents.
Ensure: A matching M or ‘NO’
1: Find the optimal solution OL, given the vL and G.
2: Find the optimal solution OR, given the vR and G.
3: if OL = OR, return M = OL = OR. Otherwise, NO.
Proof. If OL 6= OR, then one agent will hide all edges which are not in its optimal
matching, but only declare those edges that are in its optimal matching. Consider
the example illustrated in Figure 3.3; in this example, the left agent’s valuation is:
vL(e1) = vL(e3) = 7, vL(e2) = 0, and the right agent’s valuation is: vR(e1) = vR(e3) =
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5, vR(e2) = 12. The optimal solutions are: OL = {e1, e3} and OR = {e2}. If the
mechanism does not accept any edges, the ratio is unbounded. Thus if it has a bounded
approximation ratio then the mechanism must accept some edges.
Now, suppose that {e2} was accepted with δL(e2) = 1. Note that the left agent can
hide the edge (by declaring δL(e2) = 0), so that the outcome would be {e1, e3} (or one
of these two edges), which increases the utility of the left agent compared to that when
δL(e2) = 1. On the other hand, if the mechanism accepts edges {e1, e3}, then the right
agent would declare δR(e1) = δR(e3) = 0, and the outcome would be {e2}. This again
increases the utility of the right agent. In both cases, one agent increases its utility by
lying.
Recall that truthful (deterministic) mechanism has been defined in Section 3.4. We
define now notions of truthfulness for randomised mechanisms.
Definition 5. A randomised mechanism M(A,P) is truthful in expectation if a bid-
der always maximises its expected profit by declaring truthfully. The expectation is
taken over the internal random coins of the mechanism. Formally, M is truthful in
expectation if for each agent i, every vi, v
′
i, and v−i, we have that E[ui(A(vi, v−i))] ≥
E[ui(A(v′i, v−i))].
Definition 6. A randomised mechanism M(A,P) is a universally truthful if it is a
probability distribution over deterministic truthful mechanisms.
Theorem 7. There are no randomized mechanisms that are universally truthful and
have an expected approximation ratio better than 2 for the setting without payment.
Proof. Let I and I ′ be two instances of the graph in Figure 3.3. The agents’ valuations
are vL(e1) = 5, vL(e2) = 10 + ε, vL(e3) = 5 and vR(e1) = 5 + ε, vR(e2) = 10, vR(e3) =
5 + ε. In instance I, edge e2 is not available, whereas in instance I
′, edges e1 and e3
are not available. Each instance occurs with probability 12 , and the expected maximum
social welfare is 12 · (5 + 5 + 5 + 5 + 2ε) +
1
2 · (10 + 10 + ε) = 20 + ε. Let mechanism
A, applied to instance I, accept e1 and e3. Since the mechanism is truthful, it must
accept the same solution when the instance is I ′. The expected social welfare of A is
1
2 · (5 + 5 + 5 + 5 + 2ε) +
1
2 · 0 = 10 + 2ε. And the approximation ratio is essentially
2 when we let ε tend to 0. If mechanism A does not accept e1 and e3 on instance I ′,
its expected social welfare is at most 10 + ε. By Yao’s principle [71], we obtain the
theorem.
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Theorem 8. There are no randomised mechanisms that are truthful in expectation and
have an approximation ratio better than 2 for the setting without payment.
Proof. Let I and I ′ be two instances. Again we use the graph structure in Figure 3.3.
Agent valuations are vL(e1) = vL(e3) = z, vL(e2) = k, vR(e1) = vR(e3) = λ, vR(e2) = 0.
In instance I, all agents truthfully report their types, and in instance I ′, edges e1 and
e3 are not available.
Let A be any randomised mechanism. Assume that the approximation ratio of A
is at most ρ. Suppose that A will output {e1, e3} with probability p, and output {e2}
with probability 1 − p in instance I, as well outputs {e1, e3} with probability q, and
{e2} with probability 1 − q in instance I ′. We assume that the optimal solution for
instance I is {e1, e3}, which then means 2(λ+ z) > k. We obtain that:
2(λ+ z)





Moreover, since A is truthful in expectation, the expected utility of the left agent from
A’s allocation for instance I should be at least that of instance I ′. Otherwise, this
agent would deviate from it. Therefore, we can obtain from inequality (3.2):
2zp+ k(1− p) ≥ (1− q)k ≥ k
ρ
(3.3)
From inequality (3.1), we deduce:
p(2(λ+ z)− k) ≥ (2(λ+ z)− kρ)
ρ
(3.4)
and from inequality (3.3), we deduce:
p(2z − k) ≥ k − ρk
ρ
(3.5)
Then, we combine the two inequalities, (3.4) and (3.5), and we obtain:
ρ ≥ 4kz + 4kλ− 4z
2 − 4λz − k2
2kλ
which after dividing by the denominator gives:










By assigning z = 1 and taking limits lim k →∞ and limλ→∞, finally, we obtain:
ρ ≥ 2.
Therefore, randomised mechanisms do not improve the approximation ratios for the
alignment problem.
3.6 Nash equilibria implementation
3.6.1 Pure strategy
In the first price greedy matching setting, the agents provide their declarations to the
mechanism, which computes an outcome. The agents measure their utility by subtract-
ing the payment from their true valuation of this outcome. The mechanism we use is
given in Algorithm 3, and the payment scheme is that each agent has to pay its own
bid, i.e., pi = bi(A(b)).
Theorem 9. The running time of Algorithm 3 is O(m logm), where m is the number
of edges in the input bipartite graph.
Proof. This time complexity comes from the fact that the greedy algorithm takes
O(m logm) time to sort the edges by their weights.
Theorem 10. The price of anarchy of the first price greedy matching game is precisely
4.
We prove this theorem by proving Theorems 11 and 13. Recall the notation: bei =
bi(e) and v
e











L. A matching M is found using the well
known greedy Algorithm (Alg. 3).
In the next two theorems we prove lower bounds on the price of anarchy and price of
stability for a first-price greedy matching game. These proofs present simple instances
of this game to give a possible intuition of pure Nash equilibria.

























Figure 3.5: Lower bound for Price of an-
archy
Proof. The graph structure is illustrated in Figure 3.4. The valuations assignment for






R = 1, v
e4
L = 1 + ε, and other unmentioned







R = 1, with bids on the remaining edges being 0, and denote strategy profile as
b.
The greedy algorithm’s outcome under b is {e4}. The left agent could not increase
its utility, as only one other outcome {e2, e6} has positive utility. If it bids b̃e2L > b
e1
R
and b̃e6L > b
e5
R , the outcome changes to {e2, e6}, however, the new outcome leads to a
negative utility for the left agent. The left agent also will not decrease its bid on e4,
otherwise, the outcome would be changed to another matching that is not {e2, e6}. The
right agent’s behaviour is the same as it is symmetric. This leads to a Nash equilibrium,
which implies the ratio of 4.
Algorithm 3 Greedy algorithm
Require: Bipartite graph G = (V ∪ U,E), bL, bR of the left and right agent.
Ensure: A matching M
Let M = ∅
if E 6= ∅ then
Find the edge e ∈ E that maximizes beL + beR
Let M := M ∪ {e}
Remove from E edge e and edges incident to edge e
end if
M is the outcome
Theorem 12. The price of stability of the first price greedy matching game is at least
2.
Proof. Consider an instance illustrated in Figure 3.5. The valuations assignment for
both agents are: ve1L = v
e5




R = 1 + ε, v
e3
L = 1 + 3ε. The valuations on the
remaining edges are 0 for both agents.
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Case-1. Suppose the outcome of the mechanism is {e1, e5}. The current bid cannot
be a Nash equilibrium, because the right agent would improve its utility by changing






L , where b̃
e2
R denotes the new
bid of agent R on e2.
Case-2. Suppose the current outcome is {e2, e4}. It also does not admit any
Nash equilibrium. If max{be2R , b
e4
R } < v
e3
L , then the left agent would improve its utility










R } > v
e3
L , let b
e2
R be a
smaller one, the left agent will bid b̃e1L > b
e2
R changing the outcome to {e1, e4}. This is
symmetric.
Case-3. Suppose the current outcome is {e1, e4} (or {e2, e5}). The right agent
would bid b̃e2R > b
e1
L to improve its utility, and change the outcome to {e2, e4}.
To complete the proof, we provide a Nash equilibrium: be1L = b
e5





1 + ε, be3L = 1 + 2ε. We can see in such a bid profile, the outcome would be e3, and it
is easy to check that no agent can increase its utility.
Now, we prove the main theorem. We use b̃ to denote an alternative bid to b.
Theorem 13. The price of anarchy of a first price greedy matching game is at most
4.
Before the proof of this theorem, we introduce two lemmas.
Lemma 1. Suppose that the current bid profile (bL, bR) produces outcome M by greedy





R ≤ vMR .
Proof. Assume that for outcomeM , some agent’s bid satisfies bMi > v
M
i , then ui(bL, bR) =
vMi − bMi < 0, which means its utility is negative. Therefore, agent i will change its bid
to a new one which increases its utility to be at least 0.
Lemma 2. Suppose that the current bid profile (bL, bR) produces outcome M by greedy
mechanism and bML ≤ vML , bMR ≤ vMR . Then there exists a bid for one agent, say the






L ) + ε, and b̃L can change the outcome to M
′.




′ as an edge in M ′. We assign each b̃e
′
L value by the following
procedure: ∀j ∈ {1, . . . , k} (in this order), if ej ’s left hand side vertex adjacent edge








L , and do the
same for the right hand side vertex adjacent edge, i.e., for right side vertex adjacent
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edge e′ ∈M ′ of ej , let b̃e′L + be
′




L . In any step
of this procedure, if we need to reassign to this edge the bid be
′
L of edge e
′, we keep it
as the larger one (actually, we keep the declaration unchanged, since the procedure is
conducted by decreasing order of beL+ b
e
R). Such bids distribution is valid, since we can






L ), which always changes the outcome to M
′. We can also






L ) + ε.
Proof. (of Theorem 13) Let M be any matching whose total valuation is strictly smaller




4Opt. Note that at least one of the








′ is the optimal
solution, this results in a contradiction. As they are symmetric, we assume the first
statement is true.
Assume b = (bL, bR) is a fixed bid profile. If the outcome under b is M , then we
either have: bML ≤ vML and bMR ≤ vMR ; or the agents will have negative utilities.
We want to show that the left agent would be incentivised to bid for the outcome
M ′. Let b̃M
′
L be the bid that can change the outcome M to M
′. By Lemma 2 (see
above), there exists a bid b̃L that will change the outcome to M


































L − 2(vMR + bML )− ε ≥ vM
′
L − (vMR + vML )− vMR − bML
vM
′
L − (vMR + vML )− vMR − bML > vML − bML
We can remove ε, since it can be arbitrarily small. The last inequality shows that the
left agent can change its bid from bL to b̃L and get M
′ with a higher utility. This
completes the argument as it shows that b cannot be a Nash equilibrium.
Theorem 14. There exists an instance which has no pure Nash-equilibrium.
Proof. We will prove this claim by showing that in whatever outcome M of mechanism
M, this outcome is not stable for agents’ bids, which means, there exists a new bid b̂,
and under this new bid, the new outcome M ′ would be different with original outcome
M .
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Figure 3.6: The instances where no pure Nash-equilibrium exists
Case-1. Suppose the outcome is M = {e1, e4}. We observe that be4R ≤ 40, otherwise
it leads to negative utility for right agent. And be1R = 0, otherwise the right agent can
always decrease bid to 0 to get larger utility. Additionally, it also implies that be1L > b
e2
R
or be3L > b
e2
R , because of the greedy order. The maximum utility the left agent can
achieve is at most 25, because the only edge which has positive valuation for the left
agent in the outcome M is e1, and v
e1
L = 25. Thus, b
e1
L ≤ 25, otherwise, the left agent
would achieve negative utility. This also implies that be2R ≤ b
e1
L ≤ 25, otherwise, due to
the greedy algorithm, e2 is in M .
We want to show the left agent can declare different bid to change the outcome






L = 0 and
be3L > 40. The new outcome now is M
′ = {e1, e3, e5}, because we know that be3L > b
e2
R
and be3L > b
e4





L = 75− 40− ε > 25 ≥ vML ,
the utility of left agent is increased.
The arguments can apply to symmetric case where the outcome is {e2, e5}.
Case-2. Suppose the outcome is M = {e1, e3, e5}. In this case, we observe that the
right agent’s utility is at most 0, because any edges which have positive valuation for
the right agents are not in the outcome M . We also know bML ≤ 75, otherwise the left
agent would achieve a negative utility. Since the right agent’s total valuation is 80, if
the outcome were {e2, e4}, it is easy to observe that the right agent can always find a
distribution of declaration to change the outcome M to M ′ = {e2, e4}. And under the
new outcome, the utility of the right agent is increased.
Case-3. Suppose the outcome is M = {e2, e4}. In this case, we observe that the
left agent’s utility is at most 0, because any edges which have positive valuation for the
left agents are not in the outcome M . We know bMR ≤ 80, otherwise the right agent
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would achieve a negative utility. Note that e2 and e4 are symmetric with the bid.
Firstly, if we assume that be2R > 55 and b
e4
R < 25, then the left agent could declare
25 ≥ be5L > b
e4
R , which will change the outcome and increase the utility of the left agent.
Secondly, if we assume that be2R ≤ 55 and b
e4
R ≤ 55, then the left agent could declare
be3L > 55 ≥ b
e2
R We should notice that if b
e2
R > 55, b
e4
R < 25, then the left agent could bid
25 > be5L > b
e4
R , which change the outcome and increase the utility. If b
e2
R > 55 ≥ b
e2
R ,
and be1L = b
e5
L = 0, then the outcome will change to M
′ = {e1, e3, e5}, and it increase
the utility of the left agent.
This proves the claim that this instance admits no pure Nash-equilibrium.
Theorem 14 implies that the existence of Nash equilibrium in all possible instances
seems to be rare, because the graph structure and agents’ types we used to prove the
non-existence of pure Nash equilibrium are rather common. Therefore, a natural ques-
tion is which graph structure and agents’ types can form a instance, which guarantee
the existence of pure Nash equilibrium? Are those instances truly rare?
3.6.2 Relation to smooth games
Roughgarden [62] has introduced a seminal tool of smoothness as a technique to proving
the results on the price of anarchy for various games. One may wonder if we could use
his techniques in our context. However, we show here that our game is not smooth,
and therefore we cannot apply the smoothness paradigm in our context.





i , s−i) ≥ λ · V (s∗)− µ · V (s)
for all strategy profiles s,s∗. Here V (·) is an objective function that satisfies V (s) ≥∑k
i=1 ui(s) for every strategy profiles s.
Claim 1. The first price greedy matching game is not smooth.
Proof. Consider an instance where the graph structure is illustrated in Figure 3.3. The
valuation of agents are: ve1L = v
e3
L = 0 and v
e2
L = 20, v
e1




R = 0. We
select two strategy profiles s∗, s, where in s∗, the left agent bids is: be2L = 100− ε, b
e1
L =
be3L = 0, the right agent bids is: b
e1




R = 0. And in s, the left agent bids




L = 0, the right agent bids is: b
e1










R, bL) = vL(e2)−b∗L(e2)+vR(e1∪e3)−b∗R(e1∪e3) = −80+0 = −80.
λ · V (s∗) = λ · 100, and µ · V (s∗) = µ · 20. Therefore, by this strategy, we can construct
any instances to make the inequality to be false.
3.6.3 Mixed strategy
Let us first recall the definition of mixed Nash equilibrium from Section 3.4. It is usual
in the literature to study the price of anarchy even if there might be instances without
pure Nash equilibria [49]. Thus, Theorem 10 can be read as: if there exists pure Nash
equilibria, then their social welfare is at least 25% of the optimum. We can also show
that mixed Nash equilibria always exist, by transforming the problem into a new one
in which each agent only has a finite number of strategies, where a strategy is for bids
on edges. We define a small ε > 0 as the minimum increment that any two bids can
differ by. This leads to a finite number of strategies of any agent i as i will not bid
more than
∑
e∈E vi(e). In particular, b
e
i ∈ {0, ε, 2ε, · · · ,
∑
e∈E vi(e)}.
Theorem 15. The mixed Nash equilibrium exists for all instances of the discretised
first price greedy matching game.
This theorem is deduced directly from Nash’s theorem [55]. This theorem proves
that if agents can use mixed strategies, then every game with a finite number of players
in which each player can choose from finitely many pure strategies has at least one
mixed Nash equilibrium.
Theorem 16. The price of anarchy of the discretised first price greedy matching game
for mixed strategy is 4.
The key observation for proving this theorem is: for any strategy profile b, if under
this profile, the outcome is M , then bML ≤ vML and bMR ≤ vML , otherwise, b cannot be part
of mixed Nash equilibrium strategy. Therefore, assume that vL. Another observation
is: If new bid b′ cannot change entirely M to M ′, then the mixed new matching M∗’s
total valuation is still larger than M .
Proof. Let M be any matching whose total valuation is strictly smaller than a quarter of




4Opt. Note that at least one of the following statements








′ is the optimal solution, this results
in a contradiction. As they are symmetric, we assume the first statement is true.
Now, let b = (bL, bR) be a fixed bid profile from a mixed strategy profile ω. If the
outcome under b is M , then we have the following statements: bML ≤ vML and bMR ≤ vML .
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Assume that given a b, where bMR > v
M
L and bωR, which means P (b) > 0. Under the
assumption that M is the outcome, uR(b) = v
M
R − bMR < 0, then P (b)(uR(b)) < 0,





R ]. Therefore, given a outcome M , for all strategy b ∈ ω, where P (b) > 0,
bML ≤ vML and bMR ≤ vML . Note that this claim ensures the applicability of the lemma.
We want to show that the left agent would be incentivised to bid for the outcome
M ′ with respect to corresponding strategy b̃. Let b̃M
′
L ⊆ b̃ be the pure strategy (bid)
that can change the outcome M to M ′, precisely, b̃ ∈ ωL and P (b̃) = 1. By Lemma 2,
there exists a bid b̃L that will change the outcome to M
′. Thus, we want to show:
Eb̃∼ω′L




































































We can remove ε, since it can be arbitrarily small. The last inequality shows that the
left agent can change its bid from ωL to ω
′
L and get M(b̃) with a higher utility. This
completes the argument as it shows that b cannot be a Nash equilibrium.
3.7 Conclusion
In this chapter, we have presented the ontology alignment problem, and we studied
this problem algorithmically as a mechanism design problem, modeled as a social wel-
fare maximising bipartite matching setting, where the valuation function is additive.
Firstly, we proved the impossibility results for this problem, that dominant strategy
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mechanisms cannot be time efficient. Secondly, we have provided a complete picture of
the complexity of this mechanism design problem by showing that when coupled with a
first-price payment scheme and a greedy method, it implements Nash equilibria which
are very close to the optimal matching. This has been achieved by completely charac-
terising the Price of Anarchy of this mechanism that has been shown to be precisely 4;
this bound also holds for Mixed Nash equilibria.
Chapter 4
Negative results for greedy
maximum independent set
4.1 Introduction
In this chapter, we will present negative results related to finding the maximum in-
dependent set problem by the greedy algorithm. These results prove two statements.
Firstly, the identification of graphs on which the greedy algorithm can obtain optimal
solution in general graphs and planar cubic graphs is computationally hard. Secondly,
and most importantly, we prove that it is computationally hard to find an appropri-
ate advice (of which minimum degree vertex to choose in case if there are more than
one) for the greedy algorithm that can lead to good approximation. This suggests that
the task of finding such advice and proving that they lead to good approximation can
itself be a difficult task. Indeed, our analysis in the following Chapter 6 is inherently
complex.
An independent set in a graph G is a set of vertices in which every pair of vertices
are not adjacent. An independent set is maximal if it is not a proper subset of other
independent sets, and is maximum if it has maximum cardinality, i.e., size, among
all independent sets. We denote by α(G) the cardinality of a maximum independent
set, and let I be any particular independent set. Then, the maximum independent set
problem or simply MIS is defined as the following decision problem: Given a graph G
and an integer k, whether there is an independent set I in G with cardinality |I| ≥ k?
The algorithm that is described in Algorithm 4 is called a Greedy algorithm. We call
an outcome S of the greedy algorithm a greedy set and its elements are called chosen
or selected vertices. It is easy to check that a greedy set is a maximal independent set.
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Noting that the minimum degree in the remaining graph might not be unique, then
the greedy algorithm varies according to different greedy rule for finding the minimum
degree vertex. For example, a greedy algorithm with an oracle advice will generate the
optimal greedy set (maximum greedy set), and a greedy algorithm with no particular
advice will in each iteration arbitrarily choose one of the minimum degree vertices. We
present a precise definition here.
Definition 8. The greedy order or advice of greedy of a greedy algorithm is a fixed
deterministic rule or algorithm which advises the greedy algorithm which minimum
degree vertex to be chosen, if the choice of minimum degree vertices is not unique.
We note here that such randomised rules were also studied in context of finding
large independent sets in random graphs. However, in this thesis we only study such
deterministic rules.
For example, oracle advice is an algorithm that in each iteration, advises the greedy
algorithm to choose the vertex which maximise the size of the greedy set. Specifically,
oracle advice might compute the optimum maximum independent set of given graph G,
and then advise greedy algorithm how to choose its minimum degree vertices according
to this solution. Note however that it requires exponential time to compute.
Algorithm 4 General greedy algorithm
Input: a graph G = (V,E)
U ← V
S ← ∅
while U 6= ∅ do
Find a vertex v ∈ U with minimum degree in G[U ], according to given greedy
order.
U ← U \NG(v)




In this section, we will address several questions about limitations of the greedy algo-
rithm for the maximum independent set problem. The following definitions are useful.
48 Nan Zhi
Definition 9. The MaxGreedy problem is given a graph G and an integer k, and to
decide if there is a greedy set S in G with cardinality |S| ≥ k.
Definition 10. The MinGreedy problem is given a graph G and an integer k, and to
decide if it is true that for all possible greedy sets S in G their cardinality is such that
|S| ≥ k.
It is easy to see that definition of MinGreedy is equivalent with the following state-
ment:
Definition 11. The MinGreedy problem is given a graph G and an integer k, and to
decide if there is a greedy set S in G with cardinality |S| ≤ k.
We denote α+(G) and α−(G) as the size of a maximum and minimum greedy set
in G respectively.
We want to measure given a graph G, whether there exists one greedy set S in G
with cardinality r · |S| ≥ α(G), where α(G) is the size of the maximum independent
set of G. Additionally, we also want to measure a stronger version of such kind of
measurement, i.e., given a graph G, whether for all possible greedy sets S in G their
cardinality is r · |S| ≥ α(G).
Definition 12. The GreedyOPT ∃r problem is given a graph G, to decide whether it
holds that r · α+(G) ≥ α(G).
Definition 13. The GreedyOPT ∀r problem is given a graph G, to decide whether it
holds that r · α−(G) ≥ α(G).
Theorem 17. The GreedyOPT ∀r problem is NP-hard, for any r ∈ Q and 0 < r ≤ 1.
Proof. To prove hardness for NP, we present a reduction from maximum independent
set problem to the GreedyOPT ∀r problem. According to the statement, r is a rational,
so we can use two integers s, t to represent it: r = st and 0 < r ≤ 1. Let G = (V,E)
be the given graph where we want to know whether the size of maximum independent
set of G is larger than or equal to a given integer k.
We construct the graph G′k as follows:
Let Gc be a clique with t · |V | vertices. And G∗ is a graph which contains s · k − 1
vertices without any edges between these vertices. And G be a set of graphs, which
contains t times duplicated graph G. Let G′ be the graph such that:
V (G′) = V (G) ∪ V (Gc) ∪ V (G∗),
E(G′) = {(u, v)|u ∈ V (Gc), v ∈ V (G)} ∪ {(u, v)|u ∈ V (G), v ∈ V (G∗)} ∪ E(G) ∪
E(Gc)
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Figures 4.1 and 4.2 illustrate the construction of graph G′. An observation about
the degree of different vertices in these graphs is helpful to understand the following
part of the proof. For each vertex v in the graph G∗, the degree d(v) of v is d(v) = t·|V |.
For each vertex v in each graph G, d(v) ≥ t · |V | + s − 1, because besides the edge it
already has, each of its vertices connects to t · |V | vertices in the clique Gc. And for
each vertex v in Gc, d(v) ≥ 2t · |V |.
Now, we run greedy algorithm on the graph G′, we observe that whatever greedy
algorithm it is, it will always select all v ∈ G∗ and one of the vertices in Gc as the solu-
tion, because at the beginning, vertices’ degree in G∗ are smallest. After the execution
of this vertex, all vertices in G are removed, thus the remaining s−2 vertices in G∗ will
be selected as solution, and for clique Gc, one of its vertices will be selected as solution.
Observe that finally the size of the greedy solution is s.
Let us define an oracle O(G, r) for GreedyOPT ∀r that given a graph and a rational
number r, will provide the answer of whether r · α+(G) ≥ α(G) or not. Then, we run
the oracle on graph G′ and given rational number r = 1. If the answer from the oracle
is Yes, then we know that the independent number of the set of graphs G will not be
larger than s. Thus, the independent number of each graph G ∈ G will be no larger
than st = r, and if 1 ≤ r < 2, then the independent number of G will be 1. If the answer
is No, then we repeatedly execute the following procedure until the answer turns to
Yes.
In each iteration, we add s number of vertices v into G∗, and add edges into G′
with {(u,v)|u ∈ G, ∀G ∈ G}, assuming now G∗ has z = k · s− 1 vertices, k ∈ N+. We
run the oracle again, and if the answer is Yes, then we know the independent number
of graph G will not be larger than zs . This procedure only requires at most |V (G)|
iterations, and after that we can know the exact independent number of G.
This completes the argument for proving NP -hardness of the GreedyOPT ∀r prob-
lem.
For a comparison to previous work, in paper [8], the authors show the following
theorem:
Theorem 18. [8] GreedyOPT ∀r problem is co-NP-complete, for any r ∈ Q and 0 <
r ≤ 1.
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Figure 4.1: Step 1 of constructing
graph G∗
Figure 4.2: Step 2 of constructing
graph G∗
4.2.1 Planar graphs
Since the main goal of the thesis is to study the greedy algorithm on sub-cubic graph,
we want to know whether the advice for greedy algorithm on sub-cubic graph is also
computationally hard. The answer is positive by the following theorem.
Theorem 19. MaxGreedy problem is NP-hard even for planar cubic graphs.
Proof. To prove NP -hardness, we present a reduction from the maximum independent
set problem to the MaxGreedy problem.
Let G = (V,E) be a cubic planar graph with |E| = m. We construct a graph
G′ = (V ′, E′) by replacing each edge (u, v) ∈ E by a graph structure described in
Figure 4.3; we call this gadget as He. When we refer to this gadget, we will use the
same notations. The gadget He contains vertices {a, b, c, d, g} and three substructures
A,D, C, and the edges between them as defined in the figure. The edge point vertices u
and v in the original graph are connected to vertices a and b respectively as illustrated
in the figure. It is easy to see that the construction of G′ can be done in polynomial
time from graph G. Denote by I(G) a maximum independent set on a graph G.
To prove the theorem, we use an equivalent optimisation version of the maximum
independent set problem.
Let S be a greedy set for the constructed graph G′, and S = (S ∩V )∪ (S ∩V ′). We
say a set of vertices S ∈ V ′ of the constructed graph G′ is independent with respect to
the original graph G, if its corresponding set of vertices in V of G is independent. For
convenience, let f : V → V ∗ be a 1 − 1 mapping, where v∗ is the set of vertices of G′
which are not in any gadget.
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Some observations about He are needed. For any greedy algorithm, denote its
solution on graph G by SOL(G). Consider a He, and suppose that:
1. u and v of He is in SOL(G), then |(SOL(G) ∩ V (He))| = 8. Assume that u is
chosen by the greedy algorithm first, then the algorithm will successively choose
vertices b, c in He and the remaining vertices in A,D and C. That is because these
vertices will be the minimum degree vertices in each step of the execution. Thus,
we see that we have |(SOL(G) ∩ V (He))| = 8. Note that after these executions,
v can be chosen by the greedy algorithm because now its degree is minimum.
2. only one of u or v of He is in SOL(G), then |(SOL(G) ∩ V (He))| = 9. Assume
that u is chosen by the greedy algorithm, then the algorithm will successively
choose vertices b, g in He and the remaining vertices in A,D and C (the reason
for this is as above). Then by a calculation, we have |(SOL(G) ∩ V (He))| = 9.
Note that after the execution of vertex g, v is removed by the greedy algorithm,
thus v will never be chosen.
3. none of u or v of He is in SOL(G), then |(SOL(G) ∩ V (He))| = 9. Assume that
u is removed by greedy algorithm previously, then the algorithm will successively
choose vertices a, g in He and remaining vertices in A,D and C. By a calculation,
we have |(SOL(G) ∩ V (He))| = 9. Note again that after the execution of vertex
g, v is removed by the greedy algorithm, thus v will never be chosen.
Then, we prove the following claim.
Claim 2. There is a greedy set S for the constructed graph G′, which satisfies:
1. S ∩ V ′ is independent with respect to G.
2. |S| = z + 9m, where z = |S ∩ V ′|.
3. S is a maximum greedy set on G′
Proof. Firstly, we show that a particular set of vertices is the maximum greedy set
on G′. Let I(G) be the maximum independent set of graph G, and let V (I(G)) be
the set of vertices {f(u) ∈ V ′|u ∈ I(G)}. There exists a greedy set S∗, such that
V (S∗) \
⋃
e∈E V (He) = V (I(G)) by the greedy algorithm. Then, we want to show that
for any other greedy set S′ on G′, |S∗| ≥ |S′|.
Note |S∗| = z + 9m, where z = |I(G)|. Observe that for any He, at most one of u
or v is in S∗. Thus, for every He, we have |V (He) ∪ S∗| = 9 by the above observation.
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Figure 4.3: Gadget He for edge of planar graph
For any different set of vertices I ′ on G that is an independent set, any set of vertices
S′, with V (S′) \
⋃
e∈E′ V (He) = V (I ′), it is obvious that |S∗| ≥ |S′|.
It completes the proof of the claim.
Now, we will complete the proof of the theorem. By the assumption of MaxGreedy,
it provides a greedy set which is of maximum size, and let S∗ be the greedy set such
that it satisfies the conditions in Claim 2. Then f−1(V (S∗)\
⋃
e∈EHe) is the maximum
independent set of G. This completes the reduction from the maximum independent
set problem to the MaxGreedy problem.
4.3 Conclusion
In this chapter, we have studied the negative aspects of finding MIS by the greedy
algorithm. The results show that even in planar cubic graphs, the problem of computing
the optimal greedy set is an NP -hard problem. This suggests that the task of finding
the nice advice to guide greedy and proving that they lead to good approximation can
itself be a difficult task. Indeed, our design of good advice and its analysis in the next
chapters turns out to be quite complex.
Chapter 5
Instance study for maximum
independent set problem
5.1 Introduction: Approximability of MIS
The problem of finding an independent set of maximum size in a graph, the Maximum
Independent Set problem (MIS), is one of the fundamental NP -complete combinatorial
optimisation problems. Because of its hardness of exact computation, we are interested
in approximation algorithms for the maximum independent set problem. However,
the MIS problem is also notoriously known for its approximation hardness. The best
known algorithm for the general MIS problem performs slightly better than trivial,
whose approximation ratio is O(n/ log2 n) [9]. Hastad [35] provided a strong lower
bound of n1−ε for any ε > 0 for general MIS problem, under a reasonable assumption
that NP ⊆ ZPP. Furthermore, even for MIS with bounded degree ∆ (MIS-∆) problem,
it is still NP -complete, and it belongs to the class MAX SNP -complete, a subclass of
NP optimisation problems consisting solely of constant factor approximate problems,
shown by Papadimitriou and Yannakakis [59]. Later, for MAX SNP -hard problems it
has been proved that no polynomial time approximation scheme (PTAS) is possible
unless NP = P [3]. Actually, even MIS-3 is known to be MAX SNP -complete [1].
The first known nontrivial approximation ratio for MIS on graphs with maximum
degree ∆ is ∆ acquired by Lovasz’s algorithmic proof [47] of Brooks’s coloring theorem.
Hochbaum [34] using the coloring technique accompanied with a method of Nemhauser
and Trotter [54] obtained an algorithm with ratio ∆/2. This approach can also be
applied to the case of weighted graphs. Halldorsson and Radhakrishnan [31] showed
that the greedy algorithm actually delivers a better ratio, (∆+2)/3. Berman and Furer
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[6] designed a new algorithm whose performance ratios are arbitrarily close to (∆+3)/5
for even ∆ and (∆ + 3.25)/5 for odd ∆.
Halldorsson and Radhakrishnan [32] afterwards, via subgraph removal techniques,
obtained asymptotically better ratios, ∆/6 + o(1) for relative small ∆, and O( ∆log log ∆).
After that, Berman and Fujito [5] obtained a better ratio arbitrarily close to ∆+35 .
Finally, the latest results from Chleb́ık and Chleb́ıková [12], their approximation ratio






(∆+1)!! , which is slightly better than the previous
results. Note, that the symbol k!! denotes a product of all integers in {1, 2, . . . , k} that
have the same parity (odd or even) as k.
Since in this thesis we are particularly interested in the case of subcubic graphs, we
shall give more attention to it. Firstly, the negative results show that it is NP -hard to
approximate MIS for low degree graphs to within 9594 for ∆ = 3,
48
47 for ∆ = 4 and
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for ∆ = 5 see [11]. We will see that these lower bound results are far from the best
currently known upper bounds analyses. There are numerous research papers on the
upper bounds. Hochbaum [34] presented an algorithm with 1.5 ratio, whose running
time is proportional to the time complexity of the bipartite matching problem, O(n1.5).
Berman and Fujito [5] obtained a 65 ratio, however, their running time is huge, and
even a tighter analysis from [32] shows that the complexity appears to be no less than




2 , which is slightly better than
6
5 . Moreover, the time complexity of their
algorithm is also better. Specially, if the ratio is fixed to 54 , then the running time is
n16, and if the ratio is fixed to obtain 43 , then the running time is still n
7.3. The authors
of [6], [5] and [12] used basically the same technique: local search. Halldorsson and
Radhakrishnan [32] provided another local search approach based on [6] and obtained a
ratio of 75 in linear time, and a
4
3 + ε ratio in time O(ne
1/ε). Halldórsson and Yoshihara
[33] wrongly claimed a 97 approximation ratio of a greedy algorithm, and we will show
why it is wrong in this chapter.
Since there is a complementary relation between the maximum independent set
and minimum vertex cover, it is useful to see what is the previous research about
the minimum vertex cover problem. For the minimum vertex cover problem in general,
Garey and Johnson [25] presented a simple approximation algorithm based on maximal
matching and gave an approximation ratio of 2 for general graphs. For the minimum
vertex cover problem on sub-cubic graphs, Hochbaum [34] provided a 43 -approximation
ratio, by using the method of Nemhauser and Trotter [54]. Berman [6] gave a 76 ratio
by the same approach. And the authors of [12] showed that a ratio which is slightly
better than 76 can be obtained. The time complexity of these algorithms is the same as
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the previously cited ones and it is huge.
The ultimate goal of this study is to understand the full power of the greedy
paradigm for the maximum independent set problem on sub-cubic and more general
bounded degree graphs. This means, we aim to obtain the best possible approxima-
tion ratio of the greedy algorithms with best possible time complexity. By the above
literature review, we see that the advantage of the greedy paradigm is not only its
simplicity and efficiency, but also the potential for theoretical analysis. This chapter is
not necessary for the understanding of Chapter 6.
5.2 Instances study for Greedy MIS
In this section, we study the characterisation of graph structures which prevent any
greedy algorithm from achieving a relatively good solution on them. The motivation of
such kind of study is clear, we want to prevent some graph structure which is the barrier
to a good solution to appear in the remaining graph created after some execution of
the greedy algorithm. This is potentially feasible, because given a graph G, the vertex
which has minimum degree might not be unique. Actually, in most of the cases, the
minimum degree vertices are hardly unique, and thus the “good” greedy algorithm
should choose the “right” one. The different choice of the minimum degree vertex
affects the quality of the solution significantly. Therefore, to characterise potentially
problematic graph structures is a crucial study for the greedy algorithms for MIS. We
begin from the primitive greedy algorithm of Algorithm 5. Note that this algorithm
differs from the previous Algorithm 4 in that it does not use any fixed order of choosing
minimum degree vertices.
Algorithm 5 Primitive greedy algorithm
Input: a graph G = (V,E)
U ← V
S ← ∅
while U 6= ∅ do
Arbitrarily select a vertex v ∈ U with minimum degree in G[U ]
U ← U \ (NG(v) ∪ v)
S ← S ∪ {v}
end while
return S
We begin our study from cubic graphs, and in the following Chapters 5 and 6, when
we mention graph G, then G is a sub-cubic graph. During the study, several important
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observations are found. We first present some notation. The important concept in the
following is that of a reduction, inspired by Halldorsson and Radhakrishnan [31]. We
will present their precise definition in the next chapter and provide further elaboration.
However, for the purpose of the current explanation of the observations and ideas, in
here, we provide a less complete but consistent version of the definition of a reduction.
Observe that for a graph with its maximum independent set I, it is natural to define
a reduction with respect to I. Initially, a reduction can be understood as vertices and
edges removed by one iteration of the greedy algorithm. That is, a reduction consists
of a vertex which is added into the current solution and its neighbouring vertices along
with their incident edges. An (i,j)-reduction refers to the case of such reduction, where
i + 1 vertices and j edges are deleted from the current graph when the reduction is
executed.
We will have the following reductions: (0,0), (1,1), (1,2) (1,3), (2,3), (2,4)-1, (2,4)-
2, (2,5)-1, (2,5)-2, (2,6)-reduction, which are the same as those in Halldorsson and
Radhakrishnan [31], and are illustrated in Figure 5.1. Note, that the number x ∈ {1, 2}
in the notation (2,4)-x is used to just differentiate between two different reductions
of type (2,4), and the same applies to (2,5)-x. For instance, if a (2,6)-reduction is
executed, see the last reduction in Figure 5.1, then its root vertex is chosen as part of
the independent set (the current solution of the greedy), and the two vertices in the
middle are also deleted from the current graph. Also, 6 edges in total are deleted.
Note that these reductions are all possible reductions in sub-cubic graph G, where
the minimum degree of G is at most 2. For any reduction, there is a unique vertex
v∗ that we call a root vertex, and such that the greedy algorithm will take it into the
solution. The set of vertices VR of reduction R includes v
∗ and its neighbour vertices
N(v∗). We use a term contact vertices to refer to the vertices which are neighbours to
N(v∗). Moreover, the edges of the reduction include edges which are removed by its
execution. We call contact edges the edges which are incident to the contact vertices.
If the context is clear, we abbreviate (2,4)-2 and (2,5)-2 to just (2,4) and (2,5),
respectively.
The execution of the greedy algorithm naturally defines a sequence of reductions S
as an ordered set of reductions, S = {R1, . . . , Rk}, and for every pair of i, j, if i < j,
then we say the reduction Ri is executed before Rj .
An example illustrated in Figure 5.2, shows how greedy algorithm executes reduc-
tions. In the first step, the greedy algorithm execute reduction 1, as a (2,6)-reduction.
In the second step, it executes a (2,3)-reduction. Subsequently, it executes the re-
maining reductions. Note that reduction 4 is a (1,3)-reduction, reduction 7 is a (1,2)-
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reduction, and reduction 8 is a (1,1)-reduction.
root vertices
contact vertices
(0, 0) (1, 1) (1, 2) (1, 3) (2, 3) (2,4)-1 (2,5)-1 (2,4)-2 (2,5)-2 (2,6)
Figure 5.1: Collection of reductions with root of degree at most 2.
A natural question is what we can say about the reductions such as (3, x), whose root
vertex has degree 3? The answer is that for any connected graph, only the first reduction
is possible to be such reduction in the entire sequence of reductions. Therefore, with
the increasing of number of vertices, the loss of solution will be asymptotically small.
Actually, in the next chapter, we will provide an approach to even eliminate this small
loss.
Given a graph G, let OPT(G) be the maximum independent set of G, we also use
OPT(S) to denote the maximum independent set in sequence of reductions S. And
let SOL(G) be a greedy set output by the greedy algorithm we considered on graph
G, and use SOL(S) to denote the set of the solution in sequence of reductions S, note
|SOL(S)| = |S|.
The following definition is crucial for the following analysis.
Definition 14. A 1-good reduction is a reduction R executed by greedy algorithm on
graph G with maximum independent set, where |OPT (G)∩VR| = 1. A 0-good reduction
is a reduction R, where |OPT (G) ∩ VR| = 0. Finally, a bad reduction is reduction R,
where |OPT (G) ∩ VR| = 2. Denote the number of 1-good reductions as g1, and the
number of 0-good reduction as g0, and the number of bad reduction as b.
Let us note here that we only consider here reductions R such that |OPT (G) ∩
VR| ≤ 2, that is, assuming that the root of R has degree at most 2. We do that
because if the input graph has minimum degree 3, only the first executed reduction
can have |OPT (G) ∩ VR| = 3, and all the following executed reductions will have
|OPT (G)∩VR| ≤ 2. We will treat the very first such reduction with |OPT (G)∩VR| = 3
separately in a different way later.
We will also refine the concept of good and bad reduction later, but the current
version of these concepts is sufficient to follow the text here.
When a reduction R is executed, depending of which type R is, 0-good, 1-good or








Figure 5.2: Example of reductions during an execution of the greedy algorithm.




. Note that if the
executed reduction is bad, then 2 will be added to the numerator of this expression
and one will be added to the denominator. Therefore, this will potentially increase
approximation ratio. However, if the executed reduction is a 1-good reduction, then
to both numerator and denominator 1 is added, which implies that the approximation
ratio decreases to 1. The 0-good reduction decreases the approximation ratio even
further. By this observation, we can introduce notions of saving and payment. A
saving comes from a good reduction, and if there exists a bad reduction, we can say
that we can use savings to pay for a bad reduction. These notions will be refined and
made more precise in the next chapter.
Claim 3. For any sequence of reductions S executed by any greedy algorithm on G, if
S does not contains any (2,5), (2,4) or (2,6)-reductions, then |OPT (S)||SOL(S)| = 1.
Proof. As we observed, only (2,5), (2,4) or (2,6)-reduction can be a bad reduction,
which means two of the vertices in the reduction belong to the independent set. Thus,
if there is no such reduction, |OPT (S)||SOL(S)| = 1.
This observation is simple but useful, because it implies that given a degree at most
3 graph G and any greedy algorithm, if the greedy algorithm executes a sequence of
reductions S′ = {R1, . . . , R`, R`+1} ⊆ S, where ∀R ∈ {R1, . . . , R`}, R is not (2,5),
(2,4) or (2,6) reduction, and R`+1 is one of them, then, the approximation ratio of
the greedy algorithm on graph G is not larger than the approximation ratio of this
algorithm on subgraph G′ ⊆ G, where G′ = (V ′, E′), V ′ = V \ V ({R1, . . . , R`}),
E′ = E \ E({R1, . . . , R`}). This implies that we can always assume that the first
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Figure 5.4: Example for Claim 5
reduction in the sequence of reductions executed by the greedy algorithm is one of
(2,5), (2,4) or (2,6)-reduction without any loss in the approximation ratio.
The following observation shows that there exist a universal graph structure, for
any greedy algorithm, on which it cannot achieve optimum solution.
Claim 4. Consider several connected components C1, . . . , Ck, and a reduction structure
R as (2,6), such that the contact edges of R are connected to C1, . . . , Ck. If the degree
of any vertex in C1, . . . , Ck is 3, then there exists an instance that any greedy algorithm
cannot achieve optimum solution on this graph.
Proof. Let the independent set vertices of OPT in R be two vertices adjacent to the
root vertex. Because the degrees of all other vertices are 3, R must be executed before












Figure 5.3 illustrates such case, where in the first step, the greedy algorithm chooses
vertex 1 into the solution and 2, 3 subsequently. Note the size of the maximum inde-
pendent set in this graph is 4, but the size of solution is 3.
An important observation from Claim 4 is the following:
Claim 5. Given a graph G described in Claim 4, where not all vertices in the connected
components C1, . . . , Ck have degree 3, there exists a greedy order to prevent the execution
of reduction R.
Proof. Let v be the vertex in C1, . . . , Ck whose degree is not 3, then the existence of
such vertex forms a different reduction R′. If d(v) = 1, then it will be executed before
the execution of R, because whatever greedy order we design, reduction whose root
vertex’s degree is 1 always has higher priority than reductions whose root degree is 2.
If d(v) = 2, then greedy algorithm can choose R′ rather than R to execute, because
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the greedy algorithm can freely choose one of two reductions because their degrees are
equal. If greedy algorithm executed R′, then after the execution of R′, either it removed
some vertices of R (then R will never be executed), or it removed some edges of the
new connected component C ′ which contains R. In this new connected component C ′,
because not all vertices have degree 3, it implies an existence of vertex with degree at
most 2, which forms a reduction R′′. Thus, the same argument can be applied to each
iteration of the greedy algorithm. Therefore, we have proved that by the right greedy
algorithm, R will never be executed.
Figure 5.4 illustrates such case, where in the first step, the greedy algorithm takes
vertex 1, and 2,3,4 subsequently. Note in this execution order, the size of the solution
is 4. The key is that in the first step, the greedy chooses vertex 1 rather than 2, thus
no (2,6) reduction is executed.
The importance of Claim 5 is that it implies that if the greedy algorithm is carefully
designed, the problematic reductions such as (2,6) will never be actually executed in
some worst cases. However, since reduction R′ might be another bad reduction, such
approach is not necessarily useful for solving the problem unless we can find a method
to show that the execution of R′ rather than R is actually good.
This observation actually implies the order of greedy algorithm. Since for the re-
duction R which is not (2,4), (2,5), (2,6), we have: |OPT (G) ∩ V (R)| ≤ 1, then the
greedy algorithm we expect should prioritise R rather than reductions (2,4), (2,5),
(2,6). Therefore, the updated greedy algorithm is:
Algorithm 6 Updated greedy algorithm
Input: Graph G = (V,E)
U ← V
S ← ∅
while U 6= ∅ do
choose a reduction R according to the following order in GE [U ]:




U ← U \ (NG(v∗) ∪ v∗), where v∗ is the root vertex of R.
S ← S ∪ {v∗}
end while
return S
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If there is no further designation, then in this chapter, the default greedy algorithm
is updated greedy algorithm of Algorithm 6.
Since Claim 4 implies that there exists a worst case instance to prevent any greedy
algorithm from archiving a good solution, the concrete examples are useful for further
study. Before we go to the next subsection to study such examples, we present a
characterisation of graphs on which any greedy algorithm obtains optimum solution,
for arbitrary degree.
Lemma 3. Given any graph G with arbitrary degree, any greedy algorithm can achieve
an optimal solution on G, if for each iteration of the execution, ∀v ∈ arg minu∈V deg(u)
G[N(v) ∪ {v}] forms a clique.
Proof. For each iteration, let v be the vertex which is chosen, and R is the reduction
defined by v. Since G[N(V )∪{v}] forms a clique, the size of the solution of the greedy
algorithm on R is 1, and the size of the optimum is at most 1. This implies that
|OPT (R)|







This claim is not restricted to degree at most 3 graphs. We can use Lemma 3 to
prove that in the following classes of graphs: complete graphs, trees, co-graphs, and
split graphs, the greedy algorithm is optimal.
5.3 Towards computer assisted guide for proof of greedy
MIS
As we have shown in Claim 4, in the general case, the greedy algorithm cannot obtain
the optimum. Thus, a natural question is what is the best ratio that greedy algorithm
can obtain? We note here that Halldorsson [31] has proved that 54 is the best possible
approximation ratio achievable by any greedy algorithm for MIS on sub-cubic graphs.
Our main goal in the next chapter will be to indeed design such best possible greedy
algorithm and prove that it indeed obtains the 54 -approximation.
In our study of greedy algorithms for maximum independent set problem on sub-
cubic graphs, he following conjecture is crucial for achieving the 54 approximation ratio
for the greedy algorithm.
Conjecture 1. Consider a graph G such that there exists a greedy algorithm with
specific greedy order, which will execute a bad (2,6)-reduction firstly. Then the following
inequality holds: 5g0 + g1 ≥ 4. And if the first executed reduction is a bad (2,5)-
reduction, then 5g0 + g1 ≥ 3.
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Figure 5.5: Construction of Hk
Observe that if Conjecture 1 is true, then if the first executed reduction is a (2,6)-





1 + g1 + g0
=
10 + 5g1
5 + 5g1 + 5g0
≤ 10 + 5g1
5 + 5g1 + 4− g1





Therefore, the approximation ratio of the greedy algorithm on G is at most 54 . Then,
we will show that Conjecture 1 is necessary for achieving a 54 -approximation ratio for
the greedy algorithm.
Claim 6. If Conjecture 1 is not true, then there exists a counter-example, that no greedy
algorithm can obtain 54 approximation ratio for MIS problem on sub-cubic graphs.
Proof. Consider the graph G illustrated in Figure 5.5. Graph G is constructed in the
following way: at the top of the graph is a (2,6)-reduction, and we say that it is in layer
1, and its four contact edges are connected to another four (2,6)-reductions. We say
that these four new (2,6)-reductions are in layer 2. For each (2,6)-reduction, we do the
same. Thus, for layer i, there will be 4i (2,6)-reductions. In the end, say, k-th layer,
for each (2,6)-reduction R, its four contact edges are connected to some structure C,
where after the execution of R, the greedy algorithm can only execute at most 3 1-good
reductions.
Suppose that there are k layers of (2,6)-reductions. Thus, the number of (2,6)-
reductions in the last layer is 4k−1, and the total number of (2,6)-reductions is 4
k−1
3 .
Assume that Conjecture 1 is not true. Observe that if g0 ≤ 1, then it is always true,
then we can assume that g0 = 0, and g1 ≤ 3 for each (2,6)-reduction. Denote by r2,6
the number of (2,6)-reductions in the graph. For any (2,6)-reduction R in the last layer
S, let gR1 be the number of 1-good reductions which are executed after R. Therefore,
we have that: for any k ≥ 2,




















2 · 4k−13 + 3 · 4
k−1
4k−1
3 + 3 · 4k−1
=
8(4k−1)− 2 + 9 · 4k−1





It proves that for any greedy algorithm, the statement of Conjecture 1 must be
true, if the approximation ratio of such an algorithm is as good as 54 .
A natural question arises to ask is which greedy algorithm satisfies Conjecture 1?
Does the updated greedy algorithm satisfy it?
Conjecture 2. Consider a graph G such that the updated greedy algorithm of Algorithm
6 will execute a bad (2,6)-reduction firstly. Then, the following inequality holds: 5g0 +
g1 ≥ 4. And if the first executed reduction is a bad (2,5)-reduction, then 5g0 + g1 ≥ 3.
We have implemented a computer program to examine whether Conjecture 1 is
true. If it is not true, then the program will identify what the potential problematic
structure looks like. The identification of potential problematic structures played a
important role in finding a proof for greedy on MIS problem. As we have shown, if
such structure has the property that every vertex has degree exactly 3, then we could
find a higher lower bound and show that 54 -approximation ratio is impossible to obtain.
Or, if not all degrees of the vertices are 3, then we want to know the structure in order
to design a specific greedy advice to resolve such problematic cases. Or if the program
cannot find any such structure, then it would be promising to theoretically prove that
the Conjecture 1 is true.
Some notation is useful to elaborate the detail of the program. Let us say an edge
e of a sequence of reductions S is type L, if (NG(e) ∩ V (S)) ∈ I ∧ (V (S) \NG(e)) 6= ∅.
It means that one endpoint of such edge is not included in
⋃
R∈S V (R), and another
endpoint which is included in
⋃
R∈S V (R) are in the independent set.
The idea of how the program works is the following: because of the observation
that the savings from the 1-good-reduction or 0-good-reduction have to compensate
bad (2,6) or bad (2,5) reductions, the program will construct a small graph G which
consists of limited number of reductions. Essentially, a sequence of reductions S =
{R1, . . . , R`}, such that R1 is bad (2,6)-reduction or (2,5)-reduction, and the type of
reduction R ∈ S \R1 is not these two kind reductions. However, good (2,6)-reduction
or good (2,5)-reduction is allowed to be present in S. The proposition we want to
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examine is that following a bad (2,6)-reduction, before the execution of the next bad
reduction, the total number of 1-good-reductions g1 and the number of edges of type
L, is equal or greater than 4, and is equal or greater than 3, if they are followed by
a bad (2,5)-reduction. If there is no feasible combination of {R1, R2, R3, R4}, then
the feasible combination must contain at least 5 reductions. Thus the sequence of
reductions S = {R1, . . . , R`} we want to examine with ` ≤ 3 is enough for our purpose.
The program enumerates all possible combinations of S = {R2, . . . , R`}, for ` = 1, 2, 3.
Let us consider the possible combinations S. Now, for each reduction in S, the
independent vertex has been assigned, and this determines the type of edges which
are connected to vertices. The program executes an operation of Cartesian product to
connect vertices between different reductions.
A full example of one possible combination is given to explain how it works: given
three reductions R2, R3 and R4, assume that R2 and R3 are (2,4)-1 -reductions and
R4 is a (2,3)-reduction. Then for R1 as a (2,6)-reduction, it has four edges which can
be connected to other reductions. Similarly, for R2 and R3, each of them has one edge
which can be connected to R2, and each of them can be connected to another vertex
which belongs to different reduction, in this case, R2. Therefore, after connecting
vertices, the program can compute how many edges with type L remains, and then the
program can show whether the proposition we want to examine is true or false.
Algorithm 7 Conjecture testing algorithm
1: Define all possible reductions S = (R1, R2, R3, R4), where R1 is (2,5) or (2,6)
reduction.
2: for all combinations of four reductions (R1, R2, R3, R4) do
3: Enumerate all possible combinations between the contact edges and the vertices
which can receive such edges. The forbidden situation would be that after con-
nection, both endpoints are in the independent set.
4: Check whether the combination is feasible by examining the independent set
property. The feasible combination demands the first reduction executed is (2,6)
or (2,5).





Surprisingly, the final result after running the program was positive and negative.
The negative part was that Conjecture 2 is false. The program examined thousands
of combinations and actually generated several instances which violate the claim of
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the conjecture. We observed however that all those instances share a single unified
property, which will profoundly be reflected in the proof of the greedy algorithm in
the next chapter. This observation is: after the execution of R1 as a bad reduction,
{R2, . . . , R`} forms an isolated odd cycle. The positive part was that Conjecture 1 is
not proved false, because in the above situation, there exists alternative choice of degree
2 vertex, and if we choose this alternative vertex, then Conjecture 1 holds. Now, we
turn back to consider this problematic structure for the updated greedy algorithm.
Definition 15. Say a sequence of reductions S = {R1, . . . , Rk} forms an isolated
odd cycle, if R1 is a (2,4)-2 reduction, and Rk is a (1,1)-reduction and reductions
in {R2, . . . , Rk−1} are (1,2) reductions. For simplicity, we call S an isolated odd cycle
reduction R. An isolated odd cycle reduction with k vertices R is bad or problematic,
if |OPT (G) ∪ V (R)| = k−12 .
Based on this observation, we found another general observation that, informally
states, that if any isolated odd cycles are created at last, then in the worst case, they
are not enough alone to compensate for the bad reductions. Peculiarly, each of the
isolated odd cycle would need one more saving, in order to pay for the bad reductions.
The existence of such examples also implies a mistake in the previous research in
[31]. The authors of the paper [31] presented a greedy algorithm for MIS on sub-cubic
graphs for which they claimed a 9/7-approximation ratio. We have found an example
of instances on which this algorithm does not provide this approximation ratio.
Claim 7. The example given in Claim 6 shows that the 97 -approximation greedy algo-
rithm for MIS in subcubic graphs presented in [31] is incorrect.
Proof. As we calculated in Claim 6, in the worst case, the algorithm from [31] will have
the same sequence of reductions, and will achieve a 1713 approximation ratio, which is
worse than 97 .
However, if we exclude the existence of any such problematic odd cycle reduction,
then the conjecture will finally be proved true.
Corollary 1. Consider a graph G such that Greedy will execute (2,6) reduction firstly.
Then the following inequality holds: 5g0 + g1 ≥ 4. And if the first executed reduction is
(2,5), then 5g0+g1 ≥ 3, if there is no problematic odd-cycle reduction which is executed.
We do not prove Corollary 1 here, because in the next chapter, we will prove a more
general Lemma 4, which will imply this corollary.
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Figure 5.6: Example of bad cycle-
reductions.
Figure 5.7: Example for bad (2,5)-
reductions.
5.4 Observation for problematic graph structures
In this section, we present the basic observation for two problematic graph structures
identified in the previous section: bad odd cycle and bad (2,5)-reduction.
5.4.1 Isolated odd cycle reduction
Mentioned in the previous section, the experimental study provides a counter-example
to disprove Conjecture 1: there exist instances such that after the execution of bad
(2,6) or (2,5)-reduction, the following reductions executed by the greedy algorithm
are not enough to compensate the loss from the first bad (2,6) or (2,5)-reduction, to
achieve desired approximation ratio. From the point of view of algorithm design, for
preventing such situation to occur, this implies that we have to either:
(1) find enough savings from the previously executed reductions which have extra
saving to pay for such odd problematic cycle, and that they can uniquely pay for
it, or
(2) modify the order of the greedy algorithm, to make the occurrence of the odd
problematic cycle impossible due to the execution order of the greedy algorithm.
The savings in (1) must be found in the previously executed reductions. This
is because our experimental study shows that the example found implies that if the
problematic case happens, then it might has no further reductions (that could pay for
it in the future).
Let us consider two examples to show that both methods described in (1) and (2)
are necessary for solving the problem.
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Figure 5.8: Example of problematic cycle
reduction
Figure 5.9: Example for odd-problematic
cycle
Consider the first example in Figure 5.6, combined with Figure 5.8. We assume
there that in each component C (represented as grey rectangles in the figure), there is
a problematic structure that we found in our experiment, i.e. the four edges which run
from independent into non-independent vertices are connected to four non-independent
vertices in Figure 5.8. Assume the greedy algorithm chooses vertex 1 and creates four
connected components, and then the algorithm chooses vertices 2, 3, 4, 5 and creates
four isolated cycles. Finally, the greedy inevitably executes the following cycle reduc-
tions and there is no extra saving from the previous reductions. By this sequence of
reductions, the approximation ratio in this case is strictly greater than 54 . However, we
also observe that when the greedy algorithm decides which vertex, 2 or a, should be
chosen, and if the greedy algorithm chooses a, then this is feasible, because b is one of
the minimum degree vertices at that moment. Then the sequence of reductions under
the new execution order contains no bad reduction. Thus, the total approximation
ratio of this example is at most 54 . This implies that approach (2) is necessary.
Observe that in the second example illustrated in Figure 5.9, whichever the choice
of a or b by the greedy algorithm is, it will create a problematic odd cycle left alone.
Therefore, the method in (1) alone might not work anymore, because the odd problem-
atic cycle will be inevitably created. However, we can also observe that the reduction
executed first is actually a good reduction, and it can be used to compensate the loss
in this problematic odd cycle. Again, it implies that the total approximation ratio of
this example is at most 54 . This implies on the other hand that the approach (2) is
necessary.
Therefore, the above two examples illustrate that it seems quite difficult to tell
how the algorithm should proceed, because sometimes the greedy algorithm has to
face two different choices. However, it might still be possible to design a sophisticated
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greedy algorithm to choose the right minimum degree vertex, which achieves a good
enough approximation ratio. In fact, in the next chapter, we prove the existence of
such a sophisticated greedy algorithm, and such algorithm is capable of finding the
right minimum degree vertex in polynomial times.
Surprisingly, the special rule for advising greedy algorithm to find the right choice
is simple. However, we have found this rule after testing many ideas.
5.4.2 Bad (2,5)-reduction
A (2,5)-reduction there is a further problem. Observe that even the following sequence
of reductions does not contain any problematic odd cycles, the inequality 5g0 + g1 ≥ 3
is not sufficient to achieve the 54 approximation ratio. See the example illustrated in
Figure 5.7. We can assume that each vertex in every components C represented by
the grey boxes has degree exactly 3. This means that no alternative choice is possible.
Note that if the greedy algorithm firstly chooses vertex 1 as a (2,6)-reduction, and
subsequently chooses vertices 2, 3, 4, 5 as (2,5)-reductions, then it satisfies the formula,
but it is still not enough.
This example shows that we need some ways to avoid the choice of 2, 3, 4, 5 as
(2,5)-reductions, but rather choose 6, 7, 8, 9. Actually, there exists two possible ways
to address this situation, either:
(1) the greedy chooses one of the vertices 6, 7, 8, 9 as (2,6)-reduction first, rather than
choosing vertex 1 as the first reduction.
(2) after the execution of the (2,6)-reduction whose root vertex is a, the greedy chooses
6, 7, 8, 9 as a (2,5)-reduction, rather than choosing one of 2, 3, 4, 5 as a (2,5)-
reduction firstly.
Only one of these two solutions suffices for our purpose. But whichever way we
decide, it seems that it is not easy to design a proper greedy order such that the greedy
algorithm will choose the right reduction. That is because if we adopt the first approach,
the greedy algorithm has to decide which (2,6)-reduction is the right one, under the
circumstance that there might be many different (2,6)-reductions in the current graph.
And if we adopt the second approach, the greedy algorithm has to decide which of the
two alternative (2,5)-reductions to choose as the right one. This seems also difficult,
because the algorithm might be required to decide this also for the reductions in the
future.
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However, as we will show in the next chapter, both ways can potentially lead to
greedy algorithms whose approximation ratio is 54 .
5.4.3 Non-locality of payment
As we observed in the previous two subsections, in some cases, after the execution
of a (2,6)-reduction, there might be only isolated problematic cycle alone. Or after
the execution of a (2,5)-reduction, only three 1-good reductions may be left. In this
case it would not be enough to get a 54 -approximation ratio. We also observed that in
some cases, we cannot prevent it to happen by only modifying the greedy algorithm for
avoiding such graph structures to occurs. This implies that in some situations we have
to show that in the previous reductions, there exist extra saving which can pay. We
observe that it is possible that the “location” of such reduction with an extra saving
may be very far from the location of the problematic reduction that needs a payment.
Such example is difficult to find without the analytic tools that we develop in the next
chapter. Thus, we will present this in next Chapter 6. However, this strongly suggests
that if we are able to obtain a 54 -approximation ratio, then there must exist some
non-locality of payment in the analysis of the greedy algorithm.
5.4.4 Conclusion
In this chapter, we introduced basic notions and presented a number of basic observa-
tions about how to design a good greedy advice. We identified two kinds of problematic
cases, and gave a basic idea of how to resolve them. In the next chapter, we will see that
these observations will actually imply the graph structures which are “problematic”,
and will help us to essentially characterise graphs which are short of savings.
Chapter 6
Towards Ultimate Greedy for
MIS in sub-cubic graphs
We present the result of our study on the greedy algorithm for the maximum indepen-
dent set problem on sub-cubic graphs in this chapter. We achieve a greedy algorithm
with an approximation ratio of 43 on sub-cubic graphs in O(n
2) time.
This chapter is devoted to present the entire proof. We begin in Section 6.1 to
present formal arguments for the payment scheme, that is, for how to “pay” for bad
reductions by using the reductions with savings (1- and 0-good reductions). Next,
we introduce an useful graph computation during the execution of the greedy algo-
rithm, namely by using an extended graph and extended reductions. Finally, we give
an argument for dealing with problematic structures and obtain the main result in
Section 6.3. After that, we discuss a possibility to obtain an analysis for the ultimate




At the beginning, we start from the updated greedy algorithm (Algorithm 5), and finally
present the ultimate greedy algorithm. Given a graph with degree at most 3, observe
that when the greedy algorithm is working, in each iteration i, one of the vertices in
the remaining graph is taken into the solution set S, and its adjacent vertices and edges
are removed from the remaining graph. Finally, after the k-th iteration, the graph will
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be empty and the solution of greedy will be S = {v1, · · · , vk}.
Let Gi be the remaining graph after the execution of step i of the greedy algorithm
(in step i execution the vertex vi and its neighboring vertices are removed). Note for the
k-th iteration of the greedy algorithm, Gk−1 is the graph in which vk is still present, and
Gk is the graph in which vertex vk is removed. Therefore, we talk about a sequence of
graphs created by an execution of the greedy algorithm: G ⊃ G1 ⊃ G2 ⊃ . . . ⊃ Gk = ∅.
For convenience, given an independent set I in G, we call a vertex v black vertex if
v ∈ I and a white vertex otherwise. Also, given a subset V ′ of vertices in the graph G,
V ′ is called black (white, respectively) if all vertices in V ′ are black (white, respectively).
As we said in the previous chapter, in each iteration, the greedy algorithm executes
a reduction, which was explained intuitively in the previous chapter. Now, we begin to
present the precise definition of a reduction. We define a reduction Ri executed by the
greedy algorithm in iteration i as a 2-tuple (we will omit subscript i of Ri if the context
is clear), R = {VR, ER}, where VR = V (Gk−1) \ V (Gk). There exists a vertex v∗ ∈ VR,
which we call a root vertex. The root vertex v∗ is the vertex which is taken into the
solution of the algorithm when reduction Ri is executed. The set of edges of reduction
R, is ER = E
R
past ∪ ERself ∪ ERcontact, where ERself = E({v∗} ∪N(Gk−1\Gk)(v
∗)), ERcontact =
(E(Gk−1) \ E(Gk)) \ Eself, and ERpast = E(NG(VR)) \ E(Gk−1). Whenever R is clear




contact and write just Epast, Eself, Econtact.
We also call contact vertices the vertices which are incident to Econtact, but are not in
VR. These notions will be illustrated in Figure 6.1.
Furthermore, we define two types of edges: loan and debt edges. The loan edge e
of a reduction R is the edge such that e ∈ Econtact and N(e) \ VR is white; and a debt
edge is the edge such that e ∈ Epast and N(e) ∩ VR is white. Let us use Eloan(R) to
denote the total number of loan edges of reduction R, and Edebt(R) to denote the total
number of debt edges. Note for any loan edge from a reduction, it is identical to one
debt edge from some other reduction. Therefore, the total number of loan edges of all
reductions is equal to the total number of debts edges of all reductions.
In Figure 6.1, we illustrate two reductions giving two examples. Let a box vertex in
the figures represent the vertex which is black. VR are vertices which are in the dotted
rectangle. The contact vertices are vertices which are in layer Lc. Econtact are edges
between the vertices of layer Lm and Lc, and Epast are edges between the vertices of VR
and vertices of layer Lp. And Eself are edges which are completely contained in the dot-
ted rectangle. The loan edges in the left reduction are {(2, 4), (3, 5)}, because vertices
4,5 in layer Le are white. The same argument applies to the right reduction, showing





















Figure 6.1: example of reductions
(6, 1), because the vertex in VR is white, and debt edge in the right reduction is (8, 1).
The crucial concept throughout the following thesis is a potential function of a
reduction. The potential function helps us to clearly capture the complex relation
between the locality of saving and losing of single reduction. It also helps to capture
the global properties if such a reduction is executed, what will be the affects it creates
in the future execution of the greedy algorithm. It also reflects the way of how the
already executed reductions in the past influence the future.
We define a potential function Φ(R) of a reduction R as
Φ(R) = 5|SOL(R)| − 4|OPT (R)|+ |Eloan(R)| − |Edebt(R)|, (6.1)
where SOL(R) = {v ∈ VR|v is root vertex}, thus |SOL(R)| = 1 always and OPT (R) =
{v ∈ VR|v is black}. Eloan(R) and Edebt(R) is the set of loan edges and debt edges of
R.
For instance, for the left hand side reduction in Figure 6.1, namely a good (2,5)-1
reduction, R, its potential function value is Φ(R) = 5−4+2−1 = 2, while for the right
hand side reduction, namely a bad (2,6)-reduction, R′, its potential function value is
Φ(R′) = 5− 8 + 4− 1 = 0.
6.1.2 Ideas
Let us first explain the intuition behind the arguments of a payment scheme that uses
the potential function defined above. Let us assume I is a fixed maximum independent
set of graph G. When the greedy algorithm executes a reduction, it will take one of the
vertices into the solution and remove adjacent vertices to it. At this moment, the size
of the solution is increased by 1, and depending on how many vertices in VR ∩ I there
are, the size of optimum in this reduction or particular “sub-graph” is increased by 1,
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Figure 6.2: Structure with
bad (2,6)-reduction
Figure 6.3: Structure with
good (2,6)-reduction
Figure 6.4: Structure with
good (2,6)-reduction
by 2 or by 3. It is easy to see that given a reduction R, if the increase in the size of its
solution and optimum are the same, then this reduction is fine from the point of view
of the local approximation. Such a reduction is also better than other reductions whose
size of the solution is strictly smaller than that of the optimum, because potentially
it will lead to an approximation ratio of 2 or worse. Unfortunately, for any greedy
algorithm, the size of the solution is only depending on the number of executions of
reductions, particularly, on the number of root vertices of the reductions. This means
that, each reduction can only contribute 1 to the size of the solution, but it is possible
to contribute 2 (or 3) to the size of the optimum. For instance, consider a bad (2,6)-
reduction (illustrated in the Figure 6.2). Because two of its vertices belong to I, thus,
locally, the approximation ratio is 2 for this reduction. Even though it is possible,
it would be extremely difficult to argue that the greedy algorithm will never execute
such bad (2,6)-reduction. Therefore, we need some method to address such kind of
reductions.
The crucial observation is that whenever such kind of bad (2,6)-reduction occurs,
the following type of reductions in some sense are determined, due to the fact that both
vertices 2, 3 are in the independent set I. An example will illustrate it.
Observe that in Figure 6.2, vertices {2, 3, 9} belong to the provided maximum inde-
pendent set I. The greedy algorithm will execute the bad (2,6)-reduction R1 (formed
by vertices {1, 2, 3}), and subsequently two (2,3)-reductions (the first is formed by ver-
tices {4, 5, 6}, and the second is formed by {6, 7, 8}). Now, we can see that the first
(2,3)-reduction R2 formed by {4, 5, 6} contains no vertex in I, and this implies that the
size of the solution of R1 is increased by 1, while the size of the optimum does not in-
crease. Moreover, because we assume that the vertices {2, 3} belong to I, then whatever
is the assignment of independent set vertices among the vertices {4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9}, there
is only one vertex which is feasible to belong to I. This implies that only one of the
two reductions R2 and R3 contains one independent set vertex. In contrast, illustrated
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in Figure 6.3, because R1 is a (2,6)-reduction which has single black vertex, then it is
possible that two vertices in {4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9} belong to I. In the example, we assume
that they are vertices 6 and 7. Thus, though both R2 and R3 contain an independent
set vertex and consequently both increase the size of the solution and optimum by 1,
R1 also increases both sizes by 1. Therefore, it achieves in this example the optimal so-
lution. Furthermore, we can observe that in Figure 6.4, though the independent vertex
in R1 is 1 rather than 2, the same property is preserved.
What we can learn from these observations is that: the type of reduction determines
the type of the following reductions, and the reason for that is that the type of vertices
determines the type of the adjacent vertices. More precisely, given a reduction, through
the type of its contact edges, it determines the type of the following reduction, and this
is why we introduce loan and debt edges. For instance, if the end vertex of a contact
edge is white then such an edge is called a loan edge. Let us explain this in a more
detail now with an example.
We observe that each loan edge “predicts” the existence of a particular kind of re-
duction in the future, while each debt edge “recalls” the existence of another particular
kind of reduction in the past. For example, in Figure 6.3, because R1 has two loan
edges (2, 4), (2, 5), it implies that in the worst case, in the future, there are two good
reductions which will be executed by the greedy algorithm. Even though these two
reductions are not executed immediately after the execution of R1, there will need to
be executed “somewhere”. Moreover, reduction R2 also has one loan edge (6, 9), so it
also implies that there will be one good reduction in the future, and, actually, R3 is
this reduction.
In fact, the story of “prediction” and “recall” is even more complicated, and we will
explain it later. Let us recall the potential function Φ(R) defined above.











(5|SOL(R)| − 4|OPT (R)|), (6.3)
where the last equality is true because |Eloan(S)| = |Edebt(S)|.
Therefore, if we can prove for any S executed on a graph G such that Φ(S) ≥
0, (5|SOL(S)| − 4|OPT (S)|) = Φ(S) ≥ 0, then OPT (S)SOL(S) ≤
5
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Figure 6.5: Bad (2,5)-reduction Figure 6.6: Bad 5-cycle-reduction
Let us try to compute the potential function on the previous example illustrated
in Figure 6.2: the execution of greedy algorithm leads to the sequence of reductions
S = {R1, R2, R3}. Φ(R1) = 5 − 8 + 4 − 0 = 1, Φ(R2) = 5 − 0 + 0 − 3 = 2 and
Φ(R3) = 5 − 4 + 0 − 2 = −1, then Φ(S) = 2. And we know in this case, the greedy
algorithm achieves an optimal solution.
Therefore, the crucial part is to show that Φ(S) ≥ 0. Fortunately, for almost every
reduction R ∈ S, Φ(R) ≥ 0, and this fact will be formally proved in the next section.
Thus, the sum of the potential values in the sequence of reductions is also larger than
0. Unfortunately, not every reduction R has non-negative value. The following two
reductions violate this property. It is easy to check that both reductions R1 and R2
in Figure 6.5 and 6.6 have Φ(R1) = Φ(R2) = −1. To deal with such reductions is the
main difficulty, and we will address it in Section 6.3.
6.1.3 Value of potential function of payment scheme
In this subsection, we will compute the potential value for all kinds of reductions. We
only consider the reductions whose root vertex’s degree is at most 2. Firstly, we classify
reductions depending on their graph structures. Initially, we have: (0,0), (1,1),(1,2),
(1,3),(2,3),(2,4)-1,(2,4)-2,(2,5)-1,(2,5)-2,(2,6). However, because the algorithm used
here is the updated greedy algorithm of Algorithm 6, then (2,4)-2 reduction is executed
only if there exists a collection of isolated cycles. Then we replace the (2,4)-2 reduction
by an isolated cycle reduction – see Definition 15.
A bad (2,5)-reduction R is defined as a (2,5)-reduction with each vertex v adjacent
to the root vertex of R to be black, and such that ∃e ∈ Epast – e is a debt edge. A
bad (2,3)-reduction R is defined as a (2,3)-reduction such that ∃v ∈ VR, v is black and
∀v′ ∈ NR(v) v′ is white, and ∀e ∈ ERpast – if (NR(e) ∪ VR) is white, then (NR(e) \ VR)
is black. Similarly, a bad isolated cycle reduction with length of k is an isolated cycle
reduction with length k such that k is odd and there are exactly k−12 black vertices,
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and ∀e ∈ ERpast, if (NR(e) ∪ VR) is white, then (NR(e) \ VR) is black. And, finally, a
bad (1,1)-reduction R is defined as a (1,1)-reduction such that ∃v ∈ VR, v is black and
∀e ∈ ERpast, if (NR(e) ∪ VR) is white, then (NR(e) \ VR) is black.
Claim 8. For any reduction R, if R is a bad (2,5)-reduction, bad isolated cycle reduc-
tion, bad (2,3)-reduction of bad (1,1)-reduction, then Φ(R) = −1.
Proof. Observe that a (2,5)-reduction R has three loan edges and one debt edge, and
two black vertices in V (R). Then the potential is Φ(R) = 5 − 8 + 3 − 1 = −1. A bad
(2,3)-reduction R has two debt edges, and one black vertex in VR. Then the potential
is Φ(R) = 5 − 4 − 2 = −1. Finally, a bad (1,1)-reduction R has two debt edges, and
one black vertex in VR. Ans so the potential is Φ(R) = 5 − 4 − 2 = −1. This proves
the claim.
Observe that for all the remaining reductions R, we have |Econtact| > 0, which means
that there must exist at least one contact edge.
Lemma 4. For any reduction R, if R is not of of the above four types of reductions,
then Φ(R) ≥ 0.
Proof. To prove this claim in a simple way, we only consider reductions’ structure on
VR and Eself. Thus they can be further classified into four groups: isolated vertex
reduction, single edge reduction, triangle reduction and branching reduction. Denote
by v∗ the root vertex of the reduction we consider.
1. For an isolated vertex reduction R, VR = {v∗} and Eself = ∅. Note |Epast| ≤ 3. If
v∗ is black, then |{e ∈ Epast|e is debt edge}| = 0, then Φ(R) = 5− 4 + 0− 0 = 1.
If v is white, then |{e ∈ Epast|e is debt edge}| ≤ 3, and then Φ(R) ≥ 5−0+3 = 2.
2. For a single edge reduction R, VR = {v∗, v2} and Eself = {(v∗, v2)}. Note |Epast|+
|Econtact| ≤ 4 and |Epast| ≤ 3. If v∗ is black, then |Edebt| ≤ 1, because two of them
cannot be debt edges. Thus, Φ(R) ≥ 5 − 4 + 0 − 1 = 0. If N(v) is black, then
|Edebt| ≤ 2 and |Eloan| ≥ 1, and thus, Φ(R) ≥ 5 − 4 + 1 − 2 = 0. If v and N(v)
are white, it is obvious that Φ(R) ≥ 0.
3. For a triangle reductionR, VR = {v∗, v2, v3} and Eself = {(v∗, v2), (v∗, v3), (v2, v3)}.
Note |Epast| + |Econtact| ≤ 3 and Epast ≤ 2. If there is one of the vertices v such
that v is black, then |Edebt| ≤ 2. If |Edebt| = 2, then |Eloan = 1|, and in such a
case, Φ(R) = 5− 4− 2 + 1 = 0. If |Edebt| ≤ 1, then also Φ(R) ≥ 5− 4− 0 + 1 = 0.
If none of the vertices v is black, then Φ(R) ≥ 5− 0− 0 + 3 = 2.
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1
2k
Figure 6.7: Example of an extended reduction.
4. For a branching reduction R, VR = {v∗, v2, v3} and Eself = {(v∗, v2), (v∗, v3)}.
Note |Epast| + |Econtact| ≤ 5 and |Epast| ≤ 2. If v∗ is black, then |Edebt| ≤ 1,
and then we have Φ(R) ≥ 5 − 4 + 0 − 1 = 0. If v∗ is white, and at least one
of two adjacent vertices is black, then we have |Eloan| ≥ 1, and |Edebt| ≤ 2, thus
Φ(R) ≥ 5− 4 + 1− 2 = 0.
Therefore, by Claim 4, we proved Corollary 1 from the previous chapter. This
completely reflects the observations that we have made in our experimental study.
Remark. The fact that the potential value of a bad 5-odd cycle reduction is −1 also
reflects the fact that in our experimental study in the previous chapter, it is possible to
construct an instance where the approximation ratio is strictly greater than 54 .
6.2 Extended reductions
In this section, we consider an useful graph transformation during the execution of
the Greedy: basically, in each iteration, we locally modify the graph into an extended
graph, and the Greedy can execute extended reductions of the extended graph.
The motivation for that is derived from the following observation. We consider a
part of the remaining graph, which is illustrated in Figure 6.7. We assume that greedy
will subsequently execute reductions R1, R2, . . . , Rk, (in the example, the dotted box are
repetitions of a (1,1)-reduction). Note that R1 is a bad (2,5)-reduction, and as we show
in the previous section, Φ(R1) = −1. Observe that for this particular sub-sequence
of reductions S = {R1, R2, . . . , Rk}, Φ(S) = 0, because even though Φ(R1) = −1,
Φ(Ri) = 0,∀i, 1 < i < k and Φ(Rk) = 1. Besides that, if we look at these reductions in
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This implies that the number of contact edges in S is equal to the number of loan edges
in S. Moreover, we have: |Eloan(S)| = 4.




(5|SOL(Ri)| − 4|OPT (Ri)|)




















4|OPT (Ri)|) = 1
We can see that there might be k debt edges in S, however, according to the
interpretation of debt edges, only one of them is “real” (or “unpaid”), which means
that the other k − 1 debt edges is paid by reductions from S itself.
Therefore, by |E′debt(S)| = 1 and |Eloan(S)| = 4, we are able to say that for the
sequence of reductions S, its performance according to the potential function is equiv-
alent to that of a bad (2,6)-reduction. That is because there are four contact edges
and all of them are loan edges, and only one of debt edges really affects the potential
function. This implies that in some sense, we might contract S into a single reduction.
6.2.1 Definition of extended reductions
Define vertices of the extended graph GE as extended-vertices or nodes, and its edges
as extended-edges. For the original input graph G these are just referred to as vertices
and edges, respectively.
Let G = (V,E) be the (current) original graph, then the extended graph GE =
(VE , EE , L) is defined informally as follows:
VE = {v ∈ V : dG(v) ∈ {0, 1, 3}}
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EE = {(u, v) : u, v ∈ VE such that there exists a u− v − path in G with
consecutive degree-2 vertices in G}.
We now have the following formal definition of the extended graph.
Definition 16. An extended graph GE = (VE , EE , L) is an undirected multi-graph with
labeled edges defined for a given input graph G = (V,E) as follows. Let the following
two functions {f, g} be bijective, such that:
f : V ′ → VE, where V ′ = {v ∈ V |dG(v) ∈ {0, 1, 3}},
g : P → EE, where P is the set of path of degree-2 vertices in G, and p is the element
of P , that is,
p = {(v0, . . . , vk) ∈ V k+1|v0 ∈ V ′ ∧ vk ∈ V ′, ∀i = 0, 1, . . . , k − 2 : (vi, vi+1) ∈
E, dG(vi+1) = 2, (vk−1, vk) ∈ E},
L : EE → {0, 1}, where L(e) = 1, if the length of path g−1(e) in G is odd and L(e) = 0,
if the length of path g−1(e) in G is even.
By using functions {f, g, L} defined above, given any graph G, we can convert it
into its corresponding extended graph GE . Therefore, after each iteration i of the
execution, we convert graph Gi into its extended graph.
Claim 9. In each iteration of the greedy execution, we can update the extended graph
from the previous extended graph in O(1) time.
Proof. Because in each iteration of the greedy algorithm, only one original reduction is
removed, then only a constant number of edges and vertices are removed, and therefore,
we can update the extended graph in constant time.
Then, based on the extended graph, we define extended reductions. The illustration
is present in the Appendix in Figure A.1. We formulate now a new greedy algorithm,
see Algorithm 8, on the extended graph, by defining a specific order of executing ex-
tended reductions. The detailed explanation of how this algorithm executes extended
reductions is described just below Definition 18.
Definition 17. An execution of the updated greedy algorithm of Algorithm 8 on the
extended graph takes single edge non-branching, single edge branching, loop, even-
backbone and odd-backbone reduction, where these reductions are defined below.
1. Single edge non-branching reduction RE: RE = {VR, ER}, where VR = {u},
d(u) = 1 in the extended graph Gk−1E , ER = {(u,N(u))}, and L((u,N(u))) = 0.
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2. Single edge branching reduction R: VR = {u1, u2}, where dGk−1E (u1) = 1 and
d(u2) = 3 in G
k−1
E , ER = {(u1, u2)} and L((u1, u2)) = 1.
3. Loop reduction R: VR = {u}, where dGk−1E (u) = 3, and ER = {(u, u), N(u)}.
4. Even-backbone reduction R: VR = {u1, u2}, where dGk−1E (u1) = dGk−1E (u2) = 3,
ER = {(u1, u2)}, and L((u1, u2)) = 0.
5. Odd-backbone reduction R: VR = {u}, where dGk−1E (u) = 3, ER = {(u1, u2)}, and
L((u1, u2)) = 0.
Remark. We will use the terms “basic” and “extended” to distinguish the reductions
in the original graph and in the extended graph, respectively.
Now, we need to explore the connection between a reduction and an extended
reduction. For convenience, assume that an extended reduction is executed at k-th
iteration. We have VR = V (G
k−1
E ) \ V (GkE), ER = E(G
k−1
E ) \ E(GkE).
Definition 18. We say that the execution of an extended reduction R in GE is equiv-
alent to the execution of a sequence of (basic) reductions S, if
f−1[V (G1E) \ V (G2E)] ∪ [V (g−1(E(G1E))) \ V (g−1(E(G1E)))] = V (G1) \ V (G2),
Where G1 and G2 is the graph before and after the execution of the sequence of re-
ductions S, respectively, and G1E and G
2
E is the extended graph before and after the
execution of R, respectively.
How extended reductions are executed: Given a graph G and its extended graph
GE , for an extended edge e ∈ EE , we say that the extended edge e is removed by an
extended reduction R, if after the execution of R, the path g−1(e) in G is removed by
a sequence of reductions SR.
The following are extended reductions R and their sequences of (basic) reductions
SR.
1. Single edge non-branching reduction, RE = {R1, . . . , Rk}, ∀R ∈ RE , R is a (1,2)-
reduction. Moreover, ERicontact ∩ E
Rj
past 6= ∅ for every i = j − 1.
2. Single edge branching reduction consists of a series of reductions {R1, . . . , Rk}
in which R1 to Rk−1 are (1,2)-reductions and Rk is a (1,3)-reduction. Moreover
ERicontact ∩ E
Rj
past 6= ∅ for every i = j − 1.
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3. Loop reduction consists of a series of reductions R1, . . . , Rk, in which R1 is a (2,5)
reduction, R2 to Rk−1 are (1,2)-reductions, and Rk is a (1,1)-reduction, where
ERicontact ∩ E
Rj





4. Even-backbone reduction either is a (2,6)-reduction, or it consists of a series
of reductions R1, . . . , Rk, where R1 is a (2,5)-reduction, R1 to Rk−1 are (1,2)-




past 6= ∅ for every
i = j − 1.
5. Odd-backbone reduction consists of a series of reductions R1, . . . , Rk, where R1





for every i = j − 1.
We see that every extended reduction, say R, consists of a sequence of basic
reductions, say {R1, . . . Rk}. The notions of Epast, Eself and Econtact defined previ-










Then, we need to compute the extended graph’s potential value. Because of the
following analysis, the value of the potential needs to be very accurate, we will classify
the reductions into two categories: good and bad.
Also, we will use following notation.
Definition 19. Single edge non-branching, single edges branching, loop and even-
backbone reductions are called high-priority reductions.
Furthermore, we categorise reductions into two groups, mixed or non-mixed reduc-
tions. Firstly, we present them in a basic reduction form (that is, those in Figure 5.1),
then we present them in an extended reduction form. The interpretation of a non-
mixed and mixed reduction is that all contact edges of the former have the same type
of endpoints (black or white), and such claim is false if the reduction is mixed.
Definition 20. A reduction R is non-mixed, if ∀v ∈ N(ERcontact) \ V (R), v is black or
∀v ∈ N(ERcontact)\V (R), v is white. And a reduction R is mixed, if it is not non-mixed.
Definition 21. The set of contact edges of an extended reduction RE = {R1, . . . , Rk} is








past. An extended reduction RE is non-
mixed, if ∀v ∈ (N(EREcontact)\
⋃k





v is white. And a reduction R is mixed, if it is not non-mixed.
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6.2.2 Value of potential function of extended reduction
In this subsection, we compute the precise value of the potential function of the ex-
tended reductions. The crucial property for an extended reduction which is mixed is
that its potential value is strictly larger than 0. It implies that they are the reductions
which have extra saving to pay for other reductions which lack payment, i.e. their
potential value is negative.
Claim 10. For an even-backbone reduction R, if R is a mixed reduction, then Φ(R) ≥ 2.
Proof. Because an even-backbone reduction R has an even number of edges, let us say
k, in its backbone p = {(v1, v2), . . . , (vk, vk+1)}, there are k + 1 vertices in backbone
p. And because R is a mixed reduction, then only one vertex of the two endpoints of
p is in I by definition. Assume the v1 is black, and vk+1 is white, then v2 is white.
Now, we consider the sub-backbone p′ = {(v3, v4), . . . , (vk−1, vk)} of p, and denote by
j the number of vertices v such that v is black in p′ and by ` the number of vertices v
such that v is white in p′. Note that the length of sub-backbone p′ is odd, and by the
property of an independent set in odd length path, we have: j ≤ `. By adding v1, v2
and vk+1, we have: j + ` = k − 2. We compute the potential value: SOL(R) = k2 ,








2j + 5− 4 + 2− 1 ≥ 2.
Claim 11. For an odd-backbone reduction R, if R is a mixed reduction, then Φ(R) ≥ 1.
Proof. Because an odd-backbone reduction R has an even number of edges (it should
not be confusing with the fact that an odd-backbone reduction’s backbone is an odd
length path), let us say k, in its backbone p = {(v1, v2), . . . , (vk, vk+1)}, there are k+ 1
vertices in backbone p. And because R is a mixed reduction, then only one vertex
of the two endpoints of p is in I by definition. Let us assume that dR(v1) = 2 and
dR(vk+1) = 3, then we have two cases.
Case 1, let us assume v1 is black, and vk+1 is white, then v2 is white. Now, we
consider the sub-backbone p′ = {(v3, v4), . . . , (vk−1, vk)} of p, and denote by j the
number of vertices v such that v is black in p′ and by ` the number of vertices v such
that v is white in p′. Note that the length of sub-backbone p′ is odd, and by the
property of the independent set in an odd length path, we have: j ≤ `. By adding
v1, v2 and vk+1, we have: j+ ` = k−2. We compute the potential value: SOL(R) = k2 ,








2j + 5− 4 + 1− 1 ≥ 1.
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Case 2, let us assume v1 is white, and vk+1 is black, then vk is white. We consider
the sub-backbone p′ = {(v2, v3), . . . , (vk−2, vk−1)} of p. Note that the length of p′ is odd,
and by the property of independent set in odd length path, we have: j ≤ `. By adding
v1, v2 and vk+1, we have: j+ ` = k−2. We compute the potential value: SOL(R) = k2 ,








2j + 5− 4 + 2− 2 ≥ 1.
Claim 12. For an even-backbone reduction R, if R is a non-mixed reduction, and v1
and vk+1 are black, then Φ(R) ≥ 0.
Proof. Let us p be the backbone of R, p = {(v1, v2), . . . , (vk, vk+1)}. Let us consider the
sub-backbone of p, p′ = {(v3, v4), . . . , (vk−2, vk−1)}. Denote by j the number of vertices
v such that v is black in p′ and by ` the number of vertices v such that v is white in p′.
Note that the length of p′ is even, and by the property of the independent set in an even
length path, we have: j ≤ `+1. By adding v1, v2, vk−2 and vk−1, we have: j+` = k−3.
We compute the potential value: SOL(R) = k2 , OPT (R) = j + 2, |E
R
loan| = 4 and

















Claim 13. For an even-backbone reduction R, if R is a non-mixed reduction, and v1
and vk+1 are white, then Φ(R) ≥ 1.
Proof. Let us p be the backbone of R, p = {(v1, v2), . . . , (vk, vk+1)}. Let us consider the
sub-backbone of p, p′ = {(v2, v3), . . . , (vk−1, vk)}. Denote by j the number of vertices
v such that v is black in p′ and by ` the number of vertices v such that v is white in
p′. Note that the length of p′ is even, and by the property of an independent set in an
odd length path, we have: j ≤ `+ 1. By adding v1 and vk, we have: j + ` = k− 1. We
compute the potential value: SOL(R) = k2 , OPT (R) = j, |E
R
loan| = 0 and |ERdebt| = `.















Claim 14. For an odd-backbone reduction R, if R is a non-mixed reduction, and v1
and vk+1 are black, then Φ(R) ≥ −1.
Proof. Let us p be the backbone of R, p = {(v1, v2), . . . , (vk, vk+1)}. Let us consider
the sub-backbone of p, p′ = {(v3, v4), . . . , (vk−2, vk−1)}. Denote by j the number of
vertices v such that v is black in p′ and by ` the number of vertices v such that v is
white in p′. Note that the length of p′ is even, and by the property of an independent
set in an even length path, we have: j ≤ ` + 1. By adding v1, v2, vk−2 and vk−1, we
have: j + ` = k − 3. We compute the potential value: SOL(R) = k2 , OPT (R) = j + 2,
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|ERloan| = 3 by the fact that dR(v1) + dR(vk+1) − 2 = 3 and |ERdebt| = ` + 2. Then,
Φ(R) ≥ 5·k2 − 4(j + 2) + 4 − (` + 2) =
5(j+`+3)













Claim 15. For an odd-backbone reduction R, if R is a non-mixed reduction, and v1
and vk+1 are black, then Φ(R) ≥ 0.
Proof. Let us p be the backbone of R, p = {(v1, v2), . . . , (vk, vk+1)}. Let us consider
the sub-backbone of p, p′ = {(v2, v3), . . . , (vk−1, vk)}. Denote by j the number of
vertices v such that v is black in p′ and by ` the number of vertices v such that v is
white in p′. Note that the length of p′ is even, and by the property of an independent
set in an odd length path, we have: j ≤ ` + 1. By adding v1 and vk, we have:
j+ ` = k−1. We compute the potential value: SOL(R) = k2 , OPT (R) = j, |E
R
loan| = 0
and |ERdebt| = ` + 1 by the fact that one of v1 and vk+1 might has a debt edge. Then,















Now, we can update our greedy algorithm into the extended reduction form of
Algorithm 8.
Algorithm 8 Updated Greedy algorithm in extended reduction version
Input: a graph G = (V,E)
GE = extended graph of G
U ← VE
S ← ∅
while U 6= ∅ do
choose a reduction R according to the following order in GE [U ]:
1: single edge non-branching reduction




U ← U \ VE(R)
S ← S∪ root vertices in S
Update the extended graph
end while
return S






Figure 6.8: Instance example with an arbitrarily negative potential value.
6.3 The final proof
In this section, we will present the final proof. From the previous section, we know that
for any reduction R ∈ S, only bad odd-backbone reductions and isolated cycle reduc-
tions’ potential value is negative. Additionally, we have observed that the difficulties
of addressing these two kind of reductions.
6.3.1 Observations and ideas
For some inspiration, let’s review the example from the previous section and extend it
in Figure 6.8.
The sequence of reductions in this example is: S′ = {R1, R2, R3, R4, R5}, where
R1 is a bad even-backbone reduction with vertex 1 as its root vertex. R2 and R3
are two single edge branching reductions with 2 and 3 as their root vertices. R4 is
a bad odd-backbone reduction with 4 as its root vertex and R5 is an isolated cycle
reduction. The dash edges in the example are edges which are already removed by
the previous execution of the greedy. The two grey boxes containing vertex 6 and 7
are gadgets which are other isolated cycle reductions or odd-backbone reductions. It
is easy to check that Φ(S′) = −2, because at the end, a bad odd-backbone reduction
and an isolated 5-odd cycle reduction are created. This structure can be extended to
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an arbitrarily large structure by including more isolated cycle and bad even-backbone
reductions. Thus the potential value can also be arbitrarily large.
We observe that at the moment before R1 is executed, potentially, there are at
least three different vertices 1,8,9 whose degree is 2 and no vertices’ degree is 1, and
because the reductions formed by 8 and 9 are an even-backbone reduction and a loop-
reduction, they are the candidates for the root vertex of the next execution. If the
greedy algorithm chooses either vertex 8 or 9 as a first reduction, then for the following
sequence of reductions executed, S′′, it is easy to check that Φ(S′′) ≥ 0. That is because
no bad reduction is created, thus no bad reductions are in S′′. Nevertheless, if the first
reduction executed by the greedy algorithm is R1 by taking vertex 1, then the degree
of vertices 2 and 3 would become 1. Then R2 and R3 formed by vertices 2 and 3 are
inevitably executed, and then, the isolated cycle reduction is created. This implies that
the greedy algorithm has to determine which reduction it needs to execute in an early
iteration of the execution in order to obtain the desired approximation ratio.
Furthermore, although the greedy algorithm is unable to do anything if an isolated
bad cycle reduction has been created, the algorithm is able to do something for an odd-
backbone reduction. Note that an even (1,3)-reduction of vertex 2 has been executed,
and a (2,5)-reduction is left. At this moment, the greedy algorithm still has a chance
to choose the right vertex, by choosing the odd-backbone reduction with root vertex 8.
However, in the following analysis in this section, we will not adopt such an approach;
the discussion of this approach is relocated to Section 6.4.
A crucial observation has been found in the study of bad isolated cycle reductions.
Let us call it R, and, without loss of generality, assume that R is an 5-odd-cycle. We
know that if Φ(R) = −1, which means that it is a bad reduction, it must have all 3
debt edges. Now, we consider the previous reduction R′, and assume that the execution
of R′ will create R. Then if either all edges from R′ are connected to vertices which
are in the independent set or are not in the independent set, formally, ∀e ∈ ER′contact,
(N(e) \ VR′) are black or ∀e ∈ ER
′
contact, N(e) \ VR′ are white, then there exists a high-
priority reduction in R∪R′. This reduction is not R itself, if R itself is a high-priority
reduction. In the next section, we can generalise this observation by induction for all
sequences of reductions S, where Φ(S) = −1.
Now, let us consider a reduction R which creates two such structures, which means
that after the execution of R, two disjoint such structures are created. Then before
this execution, if the edges from R which are connected to these two structures satisfy
above property, then in both structures, if the assumption is correct, then there should
be two high-priority reductions in there. Also because of the disjointedness of the
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two structures, R and together with these two structures form a tree-like graph. This
observation of such tree-like structure implies that the greedy algorithm should be
advised to choose the leaf reduction of this tree rather than the reduction that is non-
leaf. We discuss the role of leaf reductions in next subsection 6.3.2. This argument
would be crucial to the final proof.
At this moment, we present the Ultimate Greedy algorithm of Algorithm 9. We will
prove that the ultimate greedy algorithm 9 obtains a 43 -approximation ratio. For the
reminder of this Section, when we mention greedy algorithm in the proof, this phase
refers to the ultimate greedy algorithm.
Algorithm 9 Ultimate Greedy algorithm in extended reduction version
Input: a graph G = (V,E)
GE = extended graph of G
U ← VE
S ← ∅
while U 6= ∅ do
choose a reduction R according to the following order in GE [U ]:
1: single edge non-branching reduction
2: single edge branching reduction.
3: loop reduction
4: even-backbone reduction in the leaf
5: odd-backbone reduction
U ← U \ VE(R)
S ← S∪ root vertices in R
end while
return S
6.3.2 The leaf reduction
In this subsection, we discuss the definition of even-backbone reductions in the leaf and
how the algorithm finds such a reduction.
Definition 22. We say that a graph contains or that there exists a high-priority re-
duction in the graph, if there exists a vertex with degree at most 2, where the greedy








Figure 6.9: Example of an even-backbone reduction in the leaf.
Given a graph G, we consider a spanning tree of G, and a leaf path of a spanning
tree is a path whose one endpoint has degree 1.
Definition 23. Given a graph G, an even-backbone reduction R is in the leaf, if for
a spanning tree of G, at least one vertex of VR belongs to a leaf path of this spanning
tree.
In Figure 6.9, we present an example to show which even-backbone reduction is
the leaf one. In the example, there are three different even-backbone reductions, and
their root vertices are respectively a, b, c. Consider a spanning tree T of G, where the
spanning tree will cover all vertices in the graph. Let us assume that both b and c are
degree one vertices of T , and a and the adjacent vertices of a are not in any leaf path.
Then the even-backbone reductions in H2 and H3 are in the leaf. Therefore, the greedy
algorithm of Algorithm 9 will execute either even-backbone reductions in H2 or H3,
but not the reductions in H1.
Lemma 5. There exists an algorithmic way to find a leaf high-priority reduction in
O(n) time complexity.
Proof. Assume that the current graph is G, and the execution of R will create at least
two disjoint connected components C1 and C2. If as assumed, in both C1 and C2, there
exist high-priority reductions Ra and Rb, then, there must exists a path p from Ra to
Rb, and one of the vertices of R belongs to p, i.e. ∃v ∈ V (R), v ∈ p. Therefore, a
spanning tree can be implemented in O(n) time.
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6.3.3 Proof for existence of 4
3
-approximation greedy algorithm
We will prove a less tight result for MIS problem with ∆ ≤ 3, to show the existence of
a 43 -approximation greedy algorithm with O(n
2) time complexity. Though this result is
a progressive achievement to the ultimate greedy algorithm, it is interesting in its own
right, because it improves the previously known analysis of the greedy. The previous
best known ratio of the greedy on sub-cubic graphs was 32 [31]. As we show in Claim
7, the 97 -approximation greedy algorithm in [31] is incorrect.
Since here we prove less tight ratio, we can reformulate the potential function as:
Φ(R)
4
3 = 4|SOL(R)| − 3|OPT (R)|+ |Eloan(R)| − |Edebt(R)|
In this section, we will only consider Φ
4
3 (R).
Lemma 6. For any reduction R, Φ
4
3 (R) = Φ
5
4 (R), except a bad (2,6)-reduction, for
which we have Φ
4
3 (R) = 1 and a bad (2,5)-reduction, for which Φ
4







=5|SOL(R)| − 4|OPT (R)|+ |Eloan(R)| − |Edebt(R)|
− (4|SOL(R)| − 3|OPT (R)|+ |Eloan(R)| − |Edebt(R)|)
=|SOL(R)| − |OPT (R)|
Observe that if |SOL(R)| = |OPT (R)|, then D(R) = 0. It is easy to check for every
reduction R, that only a bad even-backbone reduction and a bad odd-backbone reduc-
tion R satisfy |SOL(R)| = |OPT (R)| − 1. Then in this case, we have: D(R) = −1.
Therefore, we have: Φ
5
4 (R) + 1 = Φ
4
3 (R), and thus obtain the lemma.
Remark. For the consistence of notation, when we talk about a bad odd-backbone re-
duction, Φ(R) is an abbreviation of Φ
4
3 (R).
Now, we introduce some concepts to characterise the property we described in the
previous subsection. For an isolated cycle reduction R, observe that if the previous
reduction R′ provides only single type of edges to connect R, i.e. all edges that are
connected only to v ∈ VR have black v or all the edges that are connected to v ∈ VR have
white v, then there exists a high-priority reduction in graph G(R′ ∪ R). We extend
this observation to every graph G such that Φ(G) = −1. To formally capture this
observation, we introduce the dummy graph as follows. Before that, given a connected
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graph G and an independent set I in G, we call any path p in G alternating if the black
and white vertices on p alternate, i.e., for any two consecutive vertices u, v joined by
an edge on path p, we have that |{u, v} ∩ I| = 1.
Definition 24. Let G be a connected graph with minimum degree ≤ 2 and I an inde-
pendent set in G. We construct a black dummy graph ( resp. white dummy graph),
denoted G̃, as follows. First, add a dummy vertex ω /∈ V (G) and choose a non-
empty subset of dummy black edges ( resp. dummy white edges) : Ẽ ⊆ {(ω, v), v ∈
V (G), dG(v) ≤ 2, v ∈ X} where X = I ( resp. X = V (G) \ I), and define G̃ =
(V (G) ∪ {ω}, E(G) ∪ Ẽ). A dummy graph G̃ might contain parallel edges (ω, v) but
must satisfy d
G̃
(v) ≤ 3, ∀v ∈ V (G).
We say that an (extended) reduction R in G is of white type or white (black type
or black, respectively) if the root of R is white (black, respectively).
Then, we say that G is potentially problematic if, for any black (white, respectively)
dummy graph G̃, there exists a non-odd-backbone reduction R of white type (black type,
respectively), such that V (R) ⊆ V (G).
Lemma 7. Given a problematic odd isolated cycle reduction or an isolated single
edge reduction R, its any black (white, respectively) dummy graph contains a non-odd-
backbone reduction R of white type (black type, respectively), such that V (R) ⊆ V (G).
Proof. Observe that for a bad isolated cycle reduction R, if the length of R is k, then
there are k−12 vertices v, and for each of them, v is black. We have: ∃v1, v2 ∈ VR, and
v1 and v2 are white, and v1 ∈ NR(v2). Moreover, let p be a path of R, then for every
pair of distinct vertices vs, if vs and ve are black, then there exists a path p with vs
and ve as its two endpoints, and |p| is an even number. Therefore, if we consider the
black dummy graph G̃ of R, then either there exists an extended edge ee with label 0,
which means there exists an even-backbone reduction, or there exists a loop reduction.
In both cases, we have a high-priority reduction.
The argument is the same for the white dummy graph. For every pair of vertices
vs and ve with vs 6= ve, if vs and ve are white, then there exists a path p with vs and
ve as its two endpoints, and |p| with even. Then either there exists an extended edge
ee with label 0, which means there exists an even-backbone reduction, or there exists
a loop reduction. Again, in both cases, we have a high-priority reduction.
For a single edge reduction R, the arguments for both white and black dummy
graph are the same. Thus, there are high-priority reductions of each corresponding
type within it.
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The strategy of the next lemma is: for every connected component C, we first prove
Φ(C) ≥ −1. Then, if Φ(C) = 1, then let us consider a reduction R, such that after
the execution of R C is created. Then there is a high-priority reduction R′ in R ∪ C
and R′ 6= R if all contact edges of R are of the same type. Therefore, if R1 is a bad
odd-backbone reduction, then R1 will not be executed, since it would violate the greedy
order. We consider all kind of reductions and we will prove that either it will not be
executed because of the greedy order, or their potential value is enough to pay for these
connected components.
Lemma 8. Let G be a graph, and R be a non-mixed reduction in G and VR ⊂ V (G)
and ERcontact ⊂ E(G), and Φ(R) ≤ 0. If the connected component C = G(V (G) \V (R))
is potentially problematic, then G is potentially problematic.
Proof. We consider each kind of a reduction.
1. Suppose R is an even-backbone reduction, the by the assumption, if Φ(R) ≤ 0,
then Φ(R) = 0. Let p be the backbone ofR with length k, p = {(v1, v2), . . . , (vk, vk+1)}.
Let us consider a sub-backbone of p, p′ = {(v2, v3), . . . , (vk−1, vk)}. Denote by
j the number of vertices v such that v is black in p′ and by ` the number of
vertices v such that v is white in p′. We have: j + ` = k − 3, SOL(R) = k2 ,
OPT (R) = j + 2, |ERloan| = 4 and |ERdebt| = ` + 2, and Φ(R) = 0. Then we have:
Φ(R) = 5·k2 − 4(j + 2) + 4 − (` + 2) =
3
2(` − j + 1). In the even path p
′, by the
property of an independent set, j ≤ `+ 1. Then, note that j = `+ 1, Φ(R) = 0.
Therefore, in the even backbone p′, ` + 1 + ` = k − 3, and then ` = k2 − 2 and
j = k2 − 1. Therefore, in the backbone p, the number of vertices v such that v is
black is k2 . And, the number of vertices v such that v is black is
k
2 + 1, and by the
property of an independent set in an even path, it is an alternating backbone.
Because C is potentially problematic, then by the definition, if Econtact ⊆ Ẽ of
dummy white edges (dummy black edges, resp.), then there exists a high-priority
reduction R of black type (white type, resp.). Therefore, we obtain the lemma.
2. Suppose R is an odd-backbone reduction, then by the assumption, if Φ(R) ≤ 0,
then Φ(R) = 0. Let p be the backbone ofR with length k, p = {(v1, v2), . . . , (vk, vk+1)}.
Let us consider a sub-backbone of p, p′ = {(v3, v4), . . . , (vk−2, vk−1)}. Denote by
j the number of vertices v such that v is black in p′ and by ` the number of
vertices v such that v is white in p′. We have: j + ` = k − 3, SOL(R) = k2 ,
OPT (R) = j + 2, |ERloan| = 3 and |ERdebt| = ` + 2, and Φ(R) = 0 by assumption,
then we have: Φ(R) = 4·k2 − 3(j + 2) + 3− (`+ 2) = `− j + 1 (Recall that Φ(R)
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in here is an abbreviation of Φ
4
3 (R)). In the even path p′, by the property of an
independent set, j ≤ ` + 1. Then, note that j = ` + 1, Φ(R) = 0. Therefore,
in the even backbone p′, ` + 1 + ` = k − 3, and then ` = k2 − 2 and j =
k
2 − 1.
Therefore, in backbone p, the number of vertices v such that v is black is k2 , and
the number of vertices v such that v is black is k2 + 1. By the property of an
independent set in an even path, it is an alternating backbone.
Because C is potentially problematic, then by the definition, if Econtact ⊆ Ẽ of the
dummy white edges (dummy black edges, resp.), then there exists a high-priority
reduction R of black type (white type, resp.). Therefore, we obtain the lemma.
Lemma 9. Let G be a graph, and R be a single edge branching or a single edge non-
branching reduction in G. Let VR ⊂ V (G) and ERcontact ⊂ E(G), and Φ(R) ≤ 1. If
graph G′ = G(G(V ) \ VR) forms at most 2 connected components C1 and C2, such that
C1∩C2 = ∅ and C1∪C2 = G(V (G)\V (R)) and C1 and C2 are potentially problematic,
then G is potentially problematic.
Proof. We consider two cases.
1. Suppose R is a single edge non-branching reduction and by the assumption,
Φ(R) = 0. Let p be the path of R with length k, {(v1, v2), . . . , (vk, vk+1)},
where k is odd. Firstly, suppose vk+1 is black. Let us consider the sub-backbone
of p, p′ = {(v1, v2), . . . , (vk−2, vk−1)}. Denote by j the number of vertices v
such that v is black in p′, and by ` the number of vertices v such that v is
white in p′. We have: j + ` = k − 1, SOL(R) = k+12 , OPT (R) = j + 1,
|ERloan| = 1 and |ERdebt| ≤ ` + 2. In an odd path p′, we have: j ≤ `. Then,
Φ(R) = 5·(k+1)2 − 4(j + 1) + 1− (`+ 2) =
3
2(`− j) = 0, and thus, ` = j. And by
the property of an independent set in an odd path, this implies that the path is
alternating.
Secondly, vk+1 is black. Let us consider sub-backbone of p, p
′ = {(v1, v2), . . . , (vk−1, vk)}.
Denote j as the number of vertices v such that v is black in p′ and ` as the
number of vertices v such that v is white in p′. We have: j + ` = k + 1,
SOL(R) = k+12 , OPT (R) = j, |E
R
loan| = 0 and |ERdebt| ≤ ` + 1. Then Φ(R) =
5·(k+1)
2 − 4j+ 0− (`+ 1) =
3
2(`− j)− 1 = 0. This is contradiction, then E
R
debt ≤ `,
then if j = `, Φ(R) = 0. And by the property of independent set in odd path,
this implies the alternating of the path.
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2. Suppose R is a single edge branching reduction and by assumption, Φ(R) = 0.
Let p be the path of R with length k, {(v1, v2), . . . , (vk, vk+1)}, and note k is
odd. Firstly, suppose vk+1 is black. Let us consider a sub-backbone of p, p
′ =
{(v1, v2), . . . , (vk−2, vk−1)}. Denote by j the number of vertices v such that v is
black in p′ and by ` the number of vertices v such that v is white in p′. We have:
j + ` = k − 1, SOL(R) = k+12 , OPT (R) = j + 1, |E
R
loan| = 1 and |ERdebt| ≤ `+ 2.
In an odd path p′, we have: j ≤ `. Then, Φ(R) = 5·(k+1)2 −4(j+1)+1− (`+2) =
3
2(` − j) = 0, and thus, ` = j. And by the property of an independent set in an
odd path, this implies that the path is alternating.
Secondly, let vk+1 be black. Let us consider a sub-backbone of p, p
′ = {(v1, v2), . . . , (vk−1, vk)}.
Denote by j the number of vertices v such that v is black in p′, and by ` the num-
ber of vertices v such that v is white in p′. We have: j+` = k+1, SOL(R) = k+12 ,
OPT (R) = j, ERloan = 0 and E
R




2(`−j)−1 = 0. This is a contradiction because E
R
debt ≤ `, and if j = `, Φ(R) = 0.
And by the property of an independent set in an odd path, this implies that the
path is alternating.
We present now the main lemma for the proof of an 43 -approximation ratio the
greedy algorithm.
Lemma 10. Let G be a connected graph with minimum degree ≤ 2, I an independent
set in G and the sequence of reduction S = {R1, · · · , Rk} executed by greedy algorithm
on G, then:
1. Φ(S) ≥ −1.
2. if Φ(S) = −1, then G is potentially problematic.
Proof. We prove this result by induction on the number k of the executed reductions.
Firstly, we consider the base case. If k = 1, it implies that the reduction R1 has
no contact edges, i.e. it would be one of an odd problematic cycle, isolated single edge
reduction or an isolated vertex reduction. From Claim 8, we know that the potential
value of each of those reductions is at least −1. Among them, the odd problematic
cycle and bad isolated single edge reduction’s potential value is exact −1. Then due to
Lemma 7, G(R1) is potentially problematic. The inductive base is true.
Then, we prove the inductive step. Suppose that S contains k ≥ 2 reductions. Now




Figure 6.10: Single edge branching
reduction in Lemma 10
C1 C2
R1
Figure 6.11: Bad even-backbone
reduction in Lemma 10
these cases the induction hypothesis will be applied to each connected component of
the graph after executing reduction R1.
We will frequently refer to Claim 10, Claim 15, and to Lemmas 7, 8, 9.
1. Let R1 be a single edge branching reduction. Note that Φ(R) = 1. If the execu-
tion of R1 creates only one connected component C, then due to the inductive
hypothesis, Φ(C) ≥ −1. Then Φ(R1) + Φ(C) ≥ 0. If the execution of R1 creates
2 connected components, see Figure 6.10, C1 and C2, the due to the inductive
hypothesis, Φ(C1) ≥ −1 and Φ(C1) ≥ −1. Then Φ(R1) +
∑2
i=1Ci ≥ −1. Due
to Lemma 8, G(R1 ∪
⋃2
i=1Ci) is potentially problematic, thus the inductive hy-
pothesis is preserved.
2. Let R1 be a bad even-backbone reduction. Note that Φ(R1) = 0. If the execution
of R1 creates only one connected component C, the due to the inductive hypoth-
esis, Φ(C) ≥ −1. Then Φ(R1) + Φ(C) ≥ −1. Due to Lemma 8, G(R1 ∪ C) is
potential problematic.
If the execution of R1 creates at least two connected components, see Figure
6.11, say Ci where i ∈ {1, . . . , k} and k ≤ 4, then due to the inductive hypothesis,
Φ(Ci) ≥ −1, ∀i ∈ {1, . . . , k}. Assume that there are at least two connected
components C1 and C2 with Φ(C1) = Φ(C2) = −1. Because for each Ci, ER1contact ⊆
Ẽ of dummy white edges of Ci, there exists a high-priority reduction R
′ of black
type because Ci is potentially problematic. Due to the leaf order of the greedy,
R1 will not be executed which leads to a contradiction. Thus, there is at most
one connected component with Φ(R1) = −1. Therefore, the inductive hypothesis
is again preserved.
3. Let R1 be a bad odd-backbone reduction. Note that Φ(R1) = 0. If the execution
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of R1 creates k connected components Ci, where i ∈ {1, . . . , k} and k ≤ 3, the due
to the inductive hypothesis Φ(Ci) ≥ −1 for i ∈ {1, . . . , k}. Assume that there is
at least one connected component C with Φ(C) = −1. Because for C there exists
a high-priority reduction R′ of black type, because Ck is potentially problematic,
by the order of greedy, R1 will not be executed. This leads to a contradiction.
Thus, no connected component Ci has its potential value equal to −1. Thus,
∀i ∈ {1, . . . , k}, Φ(Ci) = 0. Then Φ(R1) +
∑k
i=1 Φ(Ci) ≥ 0, and therefore, the
inductive hypothesis is preserved.
4. Let R1 be a good mixed odd-backbone reduction. Note that Φ(R1) = 1. If
the execution of R1 creates only one connected component C, then due to the
inductive hypothesis, Φ(C) ≥ −1 and Φ(R1) + Φ(C) ≥ 0.
If the execution of R1 creates at least two connected components, say Ci for
i ∈ {1, . . . , k} and k ≤ 3, then due to the inductive hypothesis, Φ(Ci) ≥ −1,
∀i ∈ {1, . . . , k}. Assume that there are at least two connected components C1
and C2 with Φ(C1) = Φ(C2) = −1. Since R1 provides 2 edges of one type and
1 edge of another type, at least one connected component, say C1, receives only
one type of edges. Due to the inductive hypothesis, C1 is potentially problematic,
and then there exists a high-priority reduction R′ of black type. Then R1 will
not be executed by the order of the greedy which leads to a contradiction.
Thus, at most one connected component created by R1 has potential value −1,
and then Φ(R1) +
∑k
i=1 Φ(Ci) ≥ 0. Therefore, the inductive hypothesis is pre-
served.
5. Let R1 be a good mixed even-backbone reduction. Note that Φ(R1) = 2. If
the execution of R1 creates at most two connected component C1 and C2, then
due to the inductive hypothesis, Φ(C1) ≥ −1 and Φ(C2) ≥ −1. Then Φ(R1) +∑2
i=1 Φ(Ci) ≥ 0.
If the execution of R1 creates at least 2 connected components, say Ci for i ∈
{1, . . . , k} and k ≤ 4, then due to the inductive hypothesis, Φ(Ci) ≥ −1, ∀i ∈
{1, . . . , k}. Assume that there are at least three connected components Ci,
i = 1, 2, 3, with Φ(Ci) = −1 for i = 1, 2, 3. Because R1 provides only two edges of
one type and two edge of another type, at least two of the connected components
receive only one type of edges. Let us say that C1 and C2 are those two connected
components. Due to the inductive hypothesis, C1 and C2 are potentially prob-
lematic, and then there exists a high-priority reduction R′ of black type in both
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C1 and C2. Thus, R1 will not be executed by the leaf order of the greedy which
leads to a contradiction. Thus, at most two of the connected components created
by R1 have potential value −1. Then Φ(R1) +
∑k
i=1 Φ(Ci) ≥ 0. Therefore, the
inductive hypothesis is again preserved.
6. Let R1 be a good non-mixed even-backbone reduction. Note that Φ(R1) = 1. If
the execution of R1 creates only one connected component C, then due to the
inductive hypothesis, Φ(C) ≥ −1, and Φ(R1) + Φ(C) ≥ 0.
If the execution of R1 creates at least 2 connected components Ci, where i ∈
{1, . . . , k} and k ≤ 4, then due to the inductive hypothesis, Φ(Ci) ≥ −1, ∀i ∈
{1, . . . , k}. Assume that there are at least two connected components, say C1 and
C2, with Φ(C1) = Φ(C2) = −1. Since for each Ci, ER1contact ⊆ Ẽ of dummy black
edges of Ci, there exists a high-priority reduction R
′ of white type, because Ci
is potentially problematic. Due to the leaf order of the greedy, R1 will not be
executed which leads to a contradiction. Thus, there is at most one connected
component with Φ(R1) = −1. Therefore, the inductive hypothesis is preserved.
7. Finally, let R1 be a good non-mixed odd-backbone reduction. Note that Φ(R1) =
0. If the execution of R1 creates k connected components Ci, where i ∈ {1, . . . , k}
and k ≤ 3, then due to the inductive hypothesis, Φ(Ci) ≥ −1 for each i. Assume
that there is at least one connected component, say C1 with Φ(C1) = −1. For
C1 there exists a high-priority reduction R
′ of white type by the fact that C1 is
potentially problematic. Due to the order of the greedy, R1 will not be executed
thus we have a contradiction. Consequently, no connected component Ci has −1
potential value, thus, ∀i ∈ {1, . . . , k}, Φ(Ci) = 0. Then Φ(R1) +
∑k
i=1 Φ(Ci) ≥ 0.
Therefore, the inductive hypothesis is preserved.
This concludes the proof of the lemma.
Then we will show that the first reduction in the entire sequence of reductions
executed by the greedy has a saving of 1 to pay for the cases in which the potential
value of the execution is −1.
Corollary 2. Let S = {R1, . . . , R`} be a sequence of reductions executed by the greedy
algorithm on G, then Φ(S) ≥ 0.
Proof. By Lemma 10 we have that Φ({R2, . . . , R`}) ≥ −1 and we now consider the
very first reduction, R1, in the sequence, depending on how it may look like.
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1. Let R1 be any good-reduction, including: good even-backbone reduction, good
mixed odd-backbone reduction, good mixed even-backbone reduction and good
odd-backbone reduction. If any of those is the first executed reduction, then
Φ(R1) ≥ 1 as we know, and therefore, we proved that Φ(S) ≥ 0.
2. Let R1 be a bad odd-backbone reduction and let Epast = ∅. Then Φ(R1) = 1,
therefore, we have Φ(S) ≥ 0.
3. Let R1 be a bad even-backbone reduction and Epast = ∅. Then Φ(R1) = 2,
therefore, we again have Φ(S) ≥ 0.
Therefore, we have proved the following theorem.
Theorem 20. The ultimate greedy algorithm of Algorithm 9 for MIS on sub-cubic
graphs, obtains a 43 -approximation ratio and its time complexity is O(n
2), where n is
the number of vertices of the input graph.
6.3.4 Towards a proof of existence of the ultimate greedy algorithm
We will show now that the previous proof does not work when we apply it to prove a
5
4 -approximation for the greedy algorithm.
To prove the 54 -approximation we would need to apply following potential function:
Φ(R) = 5|SOL(R)| − 4|OPT (R)|+ |Eloan(R)| − |Edebt(R)|.
Note that Φ(R) = −1, if R is an odd-backbone reduction. Then in the proof of
Lemma 10, we cannot preserve the inductive hypothesis in the case of a bad odd-
backbone reduction R1. Note that in such a case, if the potential value of one of the
connected components created by R1 is −1, then we are able to show that such a case
violates the greedy order, then it leads to a contradiction. However, if the potential
values of all of these connected components are 0, then the sequence of reductions
{R1, . . . , Rk}’s potential value is −1. But we cannot prove that the inductive hypothesis
is preserved, i.e. that G({R1, . . . , Rk}) is potentially problematic. Observe that this
problem does not happen in the proof for the 43 -approximation ratio, where we use a
different potential function (with 4 and 3 instead of 5 and 4, respectively).
Payment delaying approach: The crucial observation for solving this problem is
that the analysis fails only under the circumstances where in a connected component
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there exists a special cycle structure. At this moment, the inductive hypothesis cannot
be preserved.
We construct an example to show the problematic case. Consider the sub-sequence
of reductions S = {R1 · · · , R4}, and let R4 be a bad isolated cycle reduction with 9
vertices. Let us call the vertices in R4 as follows V (R4) = {v1, v2, . . . , v9}, where v1 and
v2 are two adjacent vertices, v1 and v2 are white, and vk is the anti-clockwise vertex
adjacent to vk−1. Note that in a bad isolated cycle reduction, for i = 0 mod 2 and 1,
vi is white, and for i = 1 mod 2, vi is black. R3 is a good non-mixed (2,5)-reduction
such that Φ(R3) = 1 and let v10 and v11 be two vertices adjacent to the root vertex of
R3. Assume also that v10 is white and v11 is black, and before the execution of R3, in
current graph, there exists the set of edges {(v10, v5), (v10, v7), (v11, v6)}. R2 is a bad
(2,5)-reduction such that Φ(R2) = −1, and let us denote two non-root vertices as v12
and v13. Before the execution of R3, there exists the set of edges {(v12, v4), (v13, v8)}.
Finally, R1 is a good non-mixed (2,6)-reduction, and assume that before the execution
of R1, v14 is the vertex connected to v3 and v9. Note that for the sub-sequence of
reductions S′ = {R2, R3, R4}, we have Φ(S′) = −1. However, even if v9 and v3 are
black, satisfying the inductive hypothesis in Lemma 10, there is still no high-priority
reduction in S. Therefore, the inductive hypothesis cannot be preserved.
6.4 Technique of Super-Advice
The content of this section is independent from the other sections.
We will explain here an approach that has a potential to prove that our ultimate
greedy algorithm has a 54 -approximation ratio, and it even has a potential to help
improve the approximation ratio beyond this ratio using a non-greedy approach. We
explain this last point in the conclusion section of this thesis.
To start we will make the following interesting observation in the study of the
greedy algorithm about the properties of (2,5) and (2,6)-reductions. We observe that
one of the two choices of the roots of an (2,5)-reduction must be a good reduction,
depending of the type of the root vertex that the greedy chooses. It is also true for
a (2,6)-reduction, however, the difference between it and the (2,5)-reduction is that
the choice of the vertex adjacent to the root vertex of the (2,6)-reduction violates the
greedy order. Thus, we cannot modify any greedy algorithm to accommodate for such a
rule. However, it seems that this provides a potential implication for the further study
of the maximum independent set problem. Particularly, for the design of an algorithm
with a better approximation ratio, which is not necessary greedy. Nevertheless, we also
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expect to adopt such technique to obtain a better greedy algorithm. Therefore, the
following section will present the technique based on such observation and general idea
of how to use it to improve the performance of the algorithm, even though the analysis
here is not complete.
Firstly, we consider a simple case to illustrate the general idea of Super-Advice. In
this section, the default potential function Φ(R) is Φ
5
4 (R). Let us consider a sequence of
reductions Sa = {Ra1, . . . , Rak} executed by the ultimate greedy algorithm of Algorithm
9, where Ra1 is a bad odd-backbone reduction. We know that for an odd-backbone
reduction, there exists an alternative choice by choosing a vertex b adjacent to the
root vertex a of reduction Ra1, which we denote by R
b
1. And if the greedy algorithm
chooses Rb1 and executes the subsequent reductions, then we denote this sequence of
reductions as Sb = {Ra1, . . . , Ram}. Now, assume that for any reduction R ∈ Sa and
R′ ∈ Sb, except Ra1 and Rb1, both R and R′ are not odd-backbone reductions. Then for
one of the choices, say a, Φ(Sa) ≥ 0. Note that it is the moment when the analysis for
the 54 -approximation ratio fails, because the inductive hypothesis cannot be preserved.
Moreover, at this moment, the greedy algorithm in the worst case will choose the wrong
vertex as a bad (2,5)-reduction. But by the super-advice, at this moment, the greedy
algorithm is able to choose the right vertex as good a (2,5)-reduction.
Lemma 11 (Super-advice). Consider a sequence of reductions Sa = {Ra1, . . . , Rak},
where R1 is a bad odd-backbone reduction. Now consider the alternative choice of
such a bad odd-backbone reduction, which means, that greedy algorithm now chooses
the alternative degree 2 vertex b. This implies a new sequence of reductions Sb =
{Rb1, . . . , Rbm} than after the execution of Rak or Rbm. Moreover, for any reduction
R ∈ Sa and R′ ∈ Sb, except Ra1 and Rb1, both R and R′ are not odd-backbone reductions.
Then for one of the choices of a,b, say a is the right choice, we have Φ(Sa) ≥ 0.
Proof. Note that the choice of the greedy algorithm will be arg maxi∈{a,b} |Si|, which
means that the sequence of reductions will be Sa or Sb depending of which maximises
the size of the solution. Firstly, let us assume that the size of the solution by choosing
a is larger than when b is chosen. Thus a is the right choice, which means Φ(Ra1) = 0.
Thus, by the contact edge lemma, Φ(Sa) ≥ 0, because there is no reduction R in Sa
with Φ(R) = −1. Secondly, assume that the size of the solution by choosing a is larger
than b, but b is the right choice. This means that Φ(Rb1) = 0. In this case, note that
Ra1 is possible to be a bad odd-backbone reduction, which means that Φ(R
a
1) = −1.
However, the sizes of the optimum in both sequences of reductions are equal, because
the optimum is fixed. Thus, we have that |OPT (Sa)| = |OPT (Sb)|. Also, we assume
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that the size of Sa is equal to Sb. By the property of the potential function and the
fact that Φ(Sb) = Φ(Rb1) + Φ(S
b
























This also implies that Φ(Sa) ≥ 0, which concludes the proof of the lemma.
Inspired by the above lemma, we can generalise it: we can not only apply it to the
case where for every reduction R in (Sa \Ra1) ∪ (Sb \Rb1), its potential value of Φ(R)
is non-negative, but also to the case where Φ(Sa \Ra1) ≥ 0 and Φ(Sb \Rb1) ≥ 0.
Lemma 12. For Sa and Sb, if Φ(Sa \ Ra1) ≥ 0 and Φ(Sb \ Rb1) ≥ 0, then one of the
choices of a and b is the right choice, and if a is the right choice, then Φ(Sa) ≥ 0.
Remark. The technique of Super-Advice is aimed to obtain a greedy algorithm with
5
4 -approximation ratio, however, it does not work alone. But, this technique can be used
to address the problem when the input graph is cubic.
Chapter 7
Further applications
We study further applications of the techniques we developed in the previous chapter.
The chapter is organised as follows. In Section 7.1.1, we extend our method to MIS
on general degree bounded graphs, to obtain an alternative proof that the primitive
greedy algorithm is a ∆+23 - approximation algorithm for any ∆ bounded degree graph.
Next, in Section 7.2, we present a 1.8-approximation ratio for the greedy algorithm
for MIS on degree at most 4 graphs. In the next section, we address a closely related
optimisation problem: minimum vertex cover, and we present a complementary greedy
algorithm for this problem on degree at most 3 graphs.
7.1 Greedy algorithm for MIS on bounded degree graph
In this section, we study what performance the greedy algorithm can obtain in bounded
degree graphs. We first present an alternative and simpler proof for a ∆+23 -ratio for
primitive greedy algorithm on bounded degree graphs. Secondly, we present a lower
bound of ∆+13 for any greedy algorithm on bounded degree graphs.
7.1.1 Alternative proof for ∆+2
3
-ratio greedy algorithm on ∆-degree
graphs
Halldorsson and Radhakrishnan [31] proved that for any bounded degree graph, the
primitive greedy algorithm obtains ∆+23 -approximation ratio. In here, we present an
alternative proof for the same result, but using our method of a payment scheme. Our
proof will be incredibly short as compared to the proof in [31].
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Let us define the following potential function:
Φ(R) = (∆ + 2) · ∆ + k
3
· |SOL(R)| − 3 · ∆ + k
3
· |OPT (R)|+ |Eloan(R)| − |Edebt(R)|,
where k ∈ {0, 1} is fixed. If S is the sequence of all reductions, note that |Eloan(S)| −
|Edebt(S)| =
∑
R∈S(|Eloan(R)| − |Edebt(R)|) = 0. If we prove that Φ(R) ≥ 0 for any
reduction R, then we obtain that Φ(S) = (∆+2)·∆+k3 ·|SOL(S)|−3·
∆+k
3 ·|OPT (S)| ≥ 0,
and |OPT (S)||SOL(S)| ≤
∆+2
3 . Therefore, we want to show for all reductions R ∈ S, Φ(R) ≥ 0.
We note that although there are many types of reductions, their structure is highly
regular. The idea of the proof is to find the worst type reduction and show that its
potential is non-negative. Observe that if we want to find a reduction R∗ to minimise
the potential, R∗ = arg minR∈RΦ(R), then such reduction needs more debt edges and
vertices in OPT and less loan edges. Also, for each v ∈ V (R) \ v∗, if dR(v∗) = k,
dR(v) ≥ k, by the greedy rule. For any reduction R, let j be the number of vertices in
OPT and ` be the number of vertices not in OPT . We have following formulas:
|Eloan| ≥ (j + `− 1− `) · j,
|Edebt| ≤ (∆− j − `+ 1) · `.
We will justify these bounds now. Given any reduction, the degree of its root
vertex is j + `− 1. The lower bound on Eloan depends on the vertices in OPT , by the
definition. By the greedy order, in the current graph G′, for each of vertex v ∈ OPT ,
|NG′(v)| ≥ j + `− 1. There are at most ` vertices not in OPT which can be connected
to v, thus, the total number of loan edges of v is at least (j + `− 1− `), and we have j
such vertices. The upper bound on Edebt depends on ∆, the degree of root vertex and
the number vertices not in OPT . The number of debt edges is at most ∆− j − `+ 1,




· (∆ + 2)|SOL(R)| − (∆ + k)|OPT (R)|+ |Eloan(R)| − |Edebt(R)|
(7.1)
≥ ∆ + k
3
(∆ + 2)− (∆ + k)j + (j − 1)j − (∆− j − `+ 1)` (7.2)
= `2 − (∆− j + 1)`+ ∆ + k
3
(∆ + 2)− (∆ + k)j + (j − 1)j (7.3)
Let F (∆, j, `) = `2−(∆−j+1)`+ ∆+k3 (∆+2)−(∆+k)j+(j−1)j. Then, the question
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now is to find the minimum value of F (∆, j, `) with constrains ∆, j, ` ∈ Z+ ∪ {0}.
We will first prove that F (∆, j, `) ≥ k/3 − k2/3 − 1/3 for any ∆, j, ` ∈ R+ ∪ {0}.
For any fixed ∆ and j let us first treat the function F (∆, j, `) as a function of `. We
know that it is a parabola with the global minimum at point ` such that ∂F∂` = 0, which
gives us that ` = (∆− j + 1)/2.
Plugging ` = (∆− j + 1)/2 in F (∆, j, `), we obtain the following function:
F (∆, j, (∆−j+1)/2) = F (∆, j) = −1
4






j2 − (∆/2 + 1/2 + k)j + ∆ + k
3







Similarly as above, for any fixed ∆, we see that the function F (∆, j) = 34j
2−(∆/2+





4 as a function of j is a parabola with the global
minimum for j such that ∂F∂j = 0, which gives us that j =
2
3(∆/2 + 1/2 + k).






(∆/2 + 1/2 + k)
)
= F (∆) = k/3− k2/3− 1/3.
From the above we have that F (∆, j, `) ≥ k/3−k2/3−1/3 for any ∆, j, ` ∈ R+∪{0}.
Now, let us observe that if ∆ ≡ 0, 1 (mod 3), then F (∆, j, `) with k = 0 is an
integer whenever ∆, j and ` are integers. This means that in those cases we have
F (∆, j, `) ≥ −1/3 which in fact implies that F (∆, j, `) ≥ 0. In case when ∆ ≡ 2
(mod 3), we have that F (∆, j, `) with k = 1 is an integer whenever ∆, j and ` are
integers. This again means that in those cases we have F (∆, j, `) ≥ −1/3, again
meaning F (∆, j, `) ≥ 0 .
This proves the following theorem.
Theorem 21. For MIS on any graph with maximum degree ∆, any greedy algorithm
achieves ∆+23 -approximation ratio.
7.1.2 Limitations of greedy algorithm on ∆-degree graphs
In this subsection, we present a result showing that the approximation ratio of any
greedy algorithm cannot be improved for graphs with degree at most ∆. This result
is an extension of Theorem 6 in [31]. In this result Halldorsson and Radhakrishnan
present examples where the ratio between the worst execution of the primitive greedy
of Algorithm 5 and the optimal independent set is
∆ + 2
3
− O(∆2/n). However, on
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Figure 7.1: An example when ` = 3. K` and K` respectively denotes a clique and an
independent set of size `.
these examples there exists several vertices with minimum degree and picking the right
minimum degree vertex could lead greedy to an optimal solution. Our extension of these
examples consists in increasing the degree of some vertices by one in these graphs so





Theorem 22. The approximation ratio of any greedy algorithm in form of Algorithm




Proof. We show this construction for the case ∆ ≡ 2 (mod 3). See Figure 7.1. Let
` be the integer such that 3` − 1 = ∆. The graph consists in a chain of subgraphs,
alternating with a clique on ` vertices and an independent set of size `. Each subgraph
is completely connected with the adjacent subgraphs in the chain. This structure ends
with a complete graph on ` vertices. The degree of the vertices in the extreme clique
is 2`− 1, while the degree of vertices of the other cliques and the independent set are
respectively ∆ = 3`− 1 and 2`. Any greedy like algorithm will pick one vertex in each
clique while the optimal solution is the union of all vertices in the independent sets. If
n denotes the number of vertices in the graph, the ratio between the size of the optimal





= `−O(`2/n) = ∆ + 1
3
−O(∆2/n)
In particular for any instance where n = Ω(∆3), we obtain the claimed result.
For the case ∆ ≡ 1 (mod 3), we need a more complicated graph that can be
described as a chain of groups of six subgraphs. Consider the integer ` such that
3` − 2 = ∆. Each group is formed by a chain of subgraphs of size ` or ` − 1 that are
alternately a clique and an independent set. The complete graph consists of a chain of
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Figure 7.2: The construction when ∆ = 3`− 2.
`(`− 1) + 1 such groups where the last independent set and the first clique of the next
group are completely connected. Then, this chain ends with a clique of size ` fully con-
nected with the last independent set of the last group. Additionally, we add a matching
of size ` − 1 between the first independent set of each group to the first clique of the
next group. Because these independent sets have size `, there is one unmatched vertex
per each such independent set. Finally, we add an edge from each of these vertices to
the final clique. It is not difficult to see that this can be done so that all vertices of the
final clique have degree 3`− 2 = ∆. See Figure 7.2. We can see that on this graph, the
maximum degree is D = 3` − 2, the vertices of the first clique of the first group have
degree 2` − 2, while all independent set vertices have degree 2` − 1. It is not difficult
to check that any greedy algorithm will pick one vertex in each clique for a total of
3(`(`− 1) + 1) + 1 vertices, while the maximum independent set consists of the union
of all independent sets from each group. This number is (3` − 1)(`(` − 1) + 1). The









The case ∆ ≡ 0 (mod 3) is treated similarly to the previous one, using instead the
following group
K`−1 −K`+1 −K` −K` −K` −K`,
and where the matchings are between the first independent set and the first clique of
the following group and between the last independent set and the last clique of the next
group. Details of the construction and calculation are left to the curious reader.
7.2 MIS on degree at most 4 graphs
We can use the same technique for degree at most 4 graph. The greedy algorithm for






Figure 7.4: Avoiding the
(3,7)-reduction
(3,7)-reduction.
Algorithm 10 Greedy algorithm for ∆ = 4 graph
Input: a graph G = (V,E)
U ← V
S ← ∅
while U 6= ∅ do
Choose v ∈ U with minimum degree in G[U ].
(3,8)-reduction has higher priority than (3,7)-reduction.
U ← U \ V (R)
S ← S∪ root vertices in S
end while
return S
A important observation of about the greedy algorithm of 10 is stated as follows:
Lemma 13. The reduction (3,7) will not be executed by Algorithm 10.
Proof. When the algorithm meets a (3,7)-reduction, it will execute the adjacent vertex
with degree 3. Observe that in such a case, it will be a (3,8)-reduction, and it is im-
possible that a (3,7)-reduction occurs again. See Figure 7.4. Note that it is impossible
that all three vertices a, b, c are root vertices of the (3,7)-reduction. Therefore, if there
exists a (3,7)-reduction in the graph, then there must exists a reduction with higher
priority than that of the (3,7)-reduction.
Therefore, we obtain the following theorem.




Figure 7.5: Example for greedy algorithm for minimum vertex cover
Theorem 23. The greedy algorithm of Algorithm 10 for MIS on degree at most 4
graphs achieves a 95 -approximation ratio.
Proof. We define the potential function as Φ(R) = 9|SOL(R)|−5|OPT (R)|+|Eloan(R)|−
|Edebt(R)|. Then we can show for all reductions R, except a (3,7)-reduction illustrated
in Figure 7.3, Φ(R) ≥ 0. Therefore, by the same argument as before, it proves the
theorem.
Remark. Observe that for a graph with degree at most ∆ = 4, the ratio given in
Theorem 23 is 95 , which is better than the ratio of the primitive greedy algorithm. The
lesson learn here is that if we are able to design a sophisticated greedy algorithm by
advising it to avoid choosing particular graph structures, then it might give a better
approximation ratio. That is because the lower and upper bound on the number of loan
and debt edges in the proof of Theorem 21 might be relaxed.
7.3 Study for vertex cover
In the vertex cover problem, we are given a graph G = (V,E). A vertex cover S is a
subset of V such that each edge has at least one end vertex in S. A minimum vertex
cover of G is a vertex cover of G in which the number of vertices is minimised. The
goal is to find such minimum vertex cover of G. The vertex cover problem is a special
case of the set cover problem.
The approach is basically same as we had for the maximum independent set prob-
lem. We want to identify which graph structures are problematic.
Theorem 24. For any greedy algorithm for the vertex cover problem on degree at most
3 graphs, the approximation ratio r ≥ 43 .
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Proof. See Figure 7.5. It is easy to see that the greedy algorithm will take a as the
solution and then c1, c2, c3. The optimum is {b1, b2, b3}, which covers all the edges.
Therefore, the ratio of the greedy algorithm is r = |OPT ||SOL| =
4
3 .
Conjecture 3. The greedy algorithm achieves the approximation ratio r = 43 for the
vertex cover problem on degree at most 3 graphs.
We believe that this conjecture is true and as such it would imply a fundamental
fact about the greedy algorithm for the vertex cover problem. However, in the next
subsection, we will present a different but closely related algorithm whose approxima-
tion ratio is strictly better than 43 , and the time complexity is as good as that of the
greedy algorithm.
Remark. In the reminder of this section, we assume that the ultimate greedy algorithm
of Algorithm 9 for MIS on sub-cubic graphs obtains a 54 -approximation ratio. Therefore,
some of the following results will be proved conditionally on this assumption. Our
current proof shows only a 43 -approximation ratio of the ultimate greedy. But we will
also present unconditional results, that use the 43 -approximation ratio of the ultimate
greedy for MIS and apply it to the vertex cover problem.
7.3.1 Complementary Greedy algorithm for vertex cover problem
In this section, we present direct applications of the greedy algorithm with the previ-
ously developed techniques. Given a graph G with degree at most 3, observe that if I
is the maximum independent set of G, then C = V (G) \ I is the minimum vertex cover
of G. Also, for any maximal independent set I ′, C ′ = V (G) \ I ′ is a vertex cover of G.
Therefore, given any algorithm which computes a maximal independent set, if we take
the complement of this set, we will obtain a vertex cover.
This is easy to prove, because a set I of vertices is an independent set if and only
if every edge in the graph is adjacent to at most one member of I, and also if and only
if every edge in the graph is adjacent to at least one member not in I, and thus also
if and only if the complement of I is a vertex cover. Therefore, if I is the maximum
independent set in G, then C = V (G) \ I is the minimum vertex cover in G.
A natural idea is to run the ultimate greedy algorithm of Algorithm 9, and take the
complement of the output solution, which will form a feasible vertex cover.
In the following subsections, we present a series of analyses to obtain algorithms
for the minimum vertex cover problem with improved running time for a given approx-
imation ratio. In subsection 7.3.3, the analysis shows that the complementary greedy
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Algorithm 11 Complementary Greedy algorithm:
Require: G
Ensure: Vertex cover S
1: Run ultimate greedy algorithm of Algorithm 9 on G, get independent set I.
2: Let S = V (G) \ I.
3: S is the solution.
algorithm of Algorithm 11 obtains a 43 -approximation ratio with running time O(n
2).
And in subsection 7.3.4, we present an algorithm based on the complementary greedy
algorithm which obtains o ration of 54 and has running time O(n
2). For a comparison,
let us recall the known results for the minimum vertex cover problem on sub-cubic
graphs. In [34], the author provides a 43 -approximation ratio algorithm with running
time O(n
3
2 ); and in [12], they provide a 54 -approximation ratio algorithm with running
time O(n7.3) for the minimum vertex cover problem on sub-cubic graphs. Here, n
denotes the number of vertices of the input graph.
Firstly, we study limitations of the complementary greedy algorithm of Algorithm
11.
Theorem 25. No kind of complementary greedy algorithm for the vertex cover problem
can achieve an approximation ratio of 87 on sub-cubic graphs.
Proof. Consider the example illustrated in Figure 5.5. The complementary greedy
algorithm has an unique sequence of reductions S. The argument is basically the same
as in the Claim 6, but the difference is now that we consider the vertex cover rather
than an independent set. Let r(2,6) be the number of (2,6)-reductions in the graph, and




















2 · 4k−13 + 8 · 4
k−1
4k−1
3 + 8 · 4k−1
=
8(4k−1)− 2 + 24 · 4k−1




Theorem 26. The complementary greedy algorithm of Algorithm 11 cannot achieve a
6
5 -approximation ratio for the minimum vertex cover problem on sub cubic graphs.
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Proof. Consider a graph which contains a seven-cycle, and a (2,6)-reduction that con-
nects to that cycle as illustrated in Figure 5.8. If the algorithm executes the top
(2,6)-reduction, then the solution of the algorithm has size 5. However, the optimum
size is 6.
7.3.2 Naive analysis for 7
5
-approximation ratio
In this section, we present a simple analysis for proving that complementary algorithm
has an 75 approximation ratio under the assumption that the ultimate greedy algorithm
for MIS obtains a 54 -approximation ratio. This results by itself is less significant, but
it provides the idea of how to use the complementary property between the maximal
independent set and the minimal vertex cover.
Theorem 27. Under the assumption that the ultimate greedy algorithm of Algorithm 9
obtains a 54 -approximation ratio for MIS, the complementary greedy algorithm of Algo-
rithm 11 achieves an 75 -approximation ratio with running time O(n
2) for the minimum
vertex cover problem on sub-cubic graphs.
Proof. Let G = (V,E) and G be sub-cubic. Denote |E| = m. Let I be an independent
set in G found by the ultimate greedy algorithm, which we assume is a 54 -approximation
to MIS on G. Let I∗ be the maximum independent set in G. Thus, we have |I| ≥ 45 ·|I
∗|.
Note that I is a maximal independent set, because the greedy algorithm always outputs
a maximal independent set. Therefore, S = V (G) \ I is a vertex cover in G. Then, we
have:
|S| = n− |I| ≤ n− 4
5
|I∗| = n− 4
5










If |S∗| ≥ m3 , then |S











· |S∗| = 7
5
· |S∗|
This proves that the complementary greedy algorithm achieves a 75 -approximation
ratio for the vertex cover problem on sub-cubic graphs.
Now, we will prove the claim |S∗| ≥ m3 . We write the linear programming relaxation
of the vertex cover problem and its dual linear program.





s.t. xu + xv ≥ 1, ∀e = (u, v) ∈ E








y(v,u) ≤ 1, ∀v ∈ V
y(v,u) ≥ 0, ∀e ∈ E
Note that
∑
v∈V xv will be a fractional vertex cover. And for the dual linear pro-
gram, assigning each variable y(u,v) =
1
















This proves the claim we needed.
7.3.3 Sophisticated analysis for 4
3
-approximation ratio
In this section, we present a more sophisticated analysis for the complementary greedy
algorithm which achieves an even better approximation ratio.
Theorem 28. Under the assumption that the ultimate greedy algorithm of Algorithm
9 obtains 54 -approximation ratio for MIS, the complementary greedy algorithm of Algo-
rithm 11 achieves a 1.25-approximation ratio with running time O(n2), for the mini-
mum vertex cover problem on sub-cubic graphs.
For the vertex cover problem, we define a potential function Ψ(R) in analogy to
what we did in Chapter 6 for the MIS problem.
Firstly, we present the definition of reductions in the vertex cover problem. A
reduction R executed by the complementary greedy algorithm on graph G is defined
as R = {VR, ER} and it is exactly the same as the reduction in MIS problem. Note
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however that the difference is that the vertex which is in C is black, and the vertex
which is not in C is white.
We present a definition of a loan and debt edges for the vertex cover problem. The
loan edge e of a reduction R is an edge such that e ∈ Econtact and N(e) ∩ VR is white;
and a debt edge of R is an edge e such that e ∈ Epast and NG(e) \ VR is white. The
situation is the same as in the MIS problem, that is for a sequence of reductions S












Then, we define the potential function Ψ(R) for the vertex cover problem:
Ψ(R) = 4|SOL(R)| − 5|OPT (R)| − |Eloan(R)|+ |Edebt(R)| (7.6)











(4|SOL(R)| − 5|OPT (R)|) (7.8)








This proves the 54 -approximation ratio.
To finalise our proof, we need to prove the following lemma. For clarity, we use an
upper index to refer to the different terms in Φ(R) and Ψ(R).
Lemma 14 (The Duality Lemma). For all reductions R except an isolated vertex
reduction, −Φ(R) ≥ Ψ(R).
Proof. Recall the definition of the potential functions:
Φ(R) = 5|SOLΦ(R)| − 4|OPTΦ(R)|+ |EΦloan(R)| − |EΦdebt(R)|,
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and
Ψ(R) = 4|SOLΨ(R)| − 5|OPTΨ(R)|)− |EΨloan(R)|+ |EΨdebt(R)|.
For any reduction R, it is easy to check the following statement by the definition of
loan edges and debt edges: |EΦloan(R)| = |EΨloan(R)| and |EΦdebt(R)| = |EΨdebt(R)|.
Then, we have:
−|EΨloan(R)|+ |EΨdebt(R)| = −(+|EΦloan(R)| − |EΦdebt(R)|)
Therefore, if we can show for any reduction R, that we have:
5|SOLΦ(R)| − 4|OPTΦ(R)| ≤ −(4|SOLΨ(R)| − 5|OPTΨ(R)|),
then we prove what we desire.
Observe that following claims: |SOLΦ(R)| = |VR| − |SOLΨ(R)| and |OPTΦ(R)| =
|VR| − |OPTΨ(R)|. Thus:
5|SOLΦ(R)| − 4|OPTΦ(R)| ≤ −(4|SOLΨ(R)| − 5|OPTΨ(R)|)
5|SOLΦ(R)| − 4|OPTΦ(R)| ≤ −(4(|VR| − |SOLΦ(R)|)− 5(|VR| − |OPTΦ(R)|))
|SOLΦ(R)|+ |OPTΦ(R)| ≤ |VR| (7.9)
Observe that |VR| ≤ 3, |SOLΦ(R)| = 1 and |OPTΦ(R)| ≤ 2 for any reduction R. These
hold by the following checks:
1. for a single edge reduction R, |VR| = 2, and |SOLΦ(R)|+ |OPTΦ(R)| ≤ 2.
2. for a triangle reduction R, |VR| = 3, and |SOLΦ(R)|+ |OPTΦ(R)| ≤ 2.
3. for a branching reduction R, |VR| = 3, and |SOLΦ(R)|+ |OPTΦ(R)| ≤ 3.
Thus, the inequality (7.9) holds, which concludes the proof of the lemma.
To complete the proof, we need to show that the isolated vertex reduction does not
affect our argument.
Claim 16. For an isolated vertex reduction R, we have Ψ(R) ≤ 0.
Proof. If v∗ is black, then Ψ(R) ≤ −2. If v∗ is white, then Ψ(R) = 0.
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Note that for the case of v∗ being white, Ψ(R) = 0 < 1 = Φ(R). This explains the
reason why the dual lemma does not apply to all reductions.
Proof. (of Theorem 28) For any reduction R, if Ψ(R) = k > 0, then Φ(R) = j < 0 and
−j ≥ k. And for every reduction such that Φ(R) < 0, if such a reduction is executed by
the complementary greedy algorithm, then we have proved there exist unique savings
to pay for it. And thus Φ(S) ≥ 0 when we consider the MIS problem. And by the
Duality Lemma 14, the reductions which have these savings in the MIS problem also
have enough savings for the corresponding reductions in the vertex cover problem.
Therefore, Ψ(S) ≤ 0. This proves Theorem 28.
If we remove the assumption about the 5/4-approximation of the ultimate greedy
for MIS, and we apply the approximation ratio of 43 rather than
5
4 of Algorithm 9 from
Theorem 20, then we are able to obtain following theorem.
Theorem 29. The complementary greedy algorithm of Algorithm 11 achieves a 43 -
approximation ratio with running time O(n2), for the minimum vertex cover problem
on sub-cubic graphs.
Although the analysis in here shows a worse running time compared to O(n
3
2 ) by
[34], however, we strongly believe that we are able to obtain a refined ultimate greedy
algorithm of Algorithm 9, whose the running time will be reduced to O(n). Therefore,
in such a case, we could improve the running time from O(n
3
2 ) to linear time.
7.3.4 Further analysis for 5
4
-approximation ratio
If the ultimate greedy algorithm of 9 obtains a 54 -approximation ratio for the MIS prob-
lem, then we are able to use a Nemhauser-Trotter technique to obtain a 65 -approximation
ratio algorithm for the vertex cover problem. In [5], they claim that there is a 76 -
approximation algorithm for the minimum vertex cover problem in sub-cubic graphs
by using a 65 approximation ratio algorithm for MIS for sub-cubic graph. They only
outline a proof of the this fact but do not provide the full proof. We provide here
a complete proof of the essentially same claim but with different 65 ratio, under the
assumption that the ultimate greedy for MIS achieves a 54 approximation ratio.
Firstly, we present the Nemhauser-Trotter technique.
Theorem 30 (Nemhauser-Trotter [54]). For any graph G = (V,E), there is a way to
compute a partition {V1, V2, V3} of V with time complexity of the bipartite matching
problem, such that:
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1. there is a maximum independent set I containing all of the nodes of V1 but none
of V2, i.e. I ∩ V1 = V1 and I ∩ V2 = ∅,
2. there is no edge between V1 and V3, i.e. N(V1) ⊆ V2,
3. α(G(V3)) ≤ 12 |V3|.




Therefore, the algorithm would first execute the Nemhauser-Trotter reduction on
the original graph G, and then run the complementary greedy algorithm on G(V3) and
obtain a solution of S. The final solution would be the set V2 ∪ S.
Theorem 31. Under the assumption of the ultimate greedy algorithm of Algorithm 9
obtains a 54 -approximation ratio for MIS, the algorithm which combines the Nemhauser-
Trotter reduction with the complementary greedy algorithm of Algorithm 11 achieves a
6
5 -approximation ratio with running time O(n
2), for the minimum vertex cover problem
on sub-cubic graphs.
Proof. We apply the Nemhauser-Trotter reduction from Theorem 30 to G = (V,E),
and V is partitioned into V1, V2, V3. Then we run the
5
4 -approximation greedy algorithm
on G3 = G(V3), and we choose the complement of the independent set J output by the
algorithm. Then let C3 = V3 \ J denote the resulting vertex cover in G3. Let also C∗
denote a minimum vertex cover of G, and I∗ be a maximum independent set in G.
Observe that for (any) graph G3, we have that V (G3) \ I∗ is the complement of a
maximum independent set on G3, so its size is equal to the size of the minimum size
of a vertex cover in G3. Analogously, let I
∗
3 be a maximum independent set in G3 and
C∗3 = V3 \ I∗3 be a minimum vertex cover in G3.
Thus, we have: |C∗| = |V2| + |C∗3 | = |V2| + (|V3| − α(G3)) by Theorem 30. The
vertex cover of G3 computed by the algorithm is C3 = V3 \J . By Theorem 20, we have:
|J | ≥ 45α(G3). By Theorem 30, α(G3) ≤
|V3|





|C3| ≤ |V3| −
5
4











· (|V3| − α(G3)).
Our algorithm outputs C = V2 ∪ C3 as the vertex cover in G, and we have that











and this concludes the proof of the approximation guarantee. The running time bound
follows from Theorems 29 and 30.
Without the assumption that the ultimate greedy algorithm obtains a 54 -approximation
ratio for MIS, but only a 43 -approximation, we obtain the following theorem.
Theorem 32. The complementary greedy algorithm of Algorithm 11 with Nembauser-
Trotter reduction achieves a 54 -approximation ratio with running time O(n
2), for the
minimum vertex cover problem on sub-cubic graphs.
Proof. The proof is the same as that of Theorem 31, but in this proof, we only apply the
approximation ratio of 43 rather than
5
4 of the ultimate greedy algorithm of Algorithm
9 from Theorem 20.
Remark. Theorem 32 shows the existence of an algorithm which obtains the best cur-
rently known running time of O(n2) with an approximation ratio of 54 for the minimum
vertex cover problem on sub-cubic graphs.
7.4 Conclusion
In this chapter, we have obtained a series results. We extended our method to MIS on
general bounded degree graphs, and have given an alternative and simple proof of the
known ∆+23 -approximation ratio for MIS on graphs with maximum degree ∆. Also,
we have presented an 1.8-approximation ratio greedy algorithm for MIS on degree at
most 4 graphs. Furthermore, we presented an interesting algorithm which is based on
our greedy algorithm for MIS, which obtains a 65 -approximation ratio for the minimum
vertex cover problem on sub-cubic graphs.
Chapter 8
Heuristic and experimental study
for MIS
We first note that the experimental analysis presented in this section is preliminary and
it only supplements the theoretical results that are proved in the previous chapters.
Although we have proved in the previous chapter better results for the greedy
algorithm for the maximum independent set problem on degree at most 3 graphs,
such theoretical study only applies to the worst case analysis. It provides very few
insights in terms of practical use of such algorithms. Thus an experimental study
of how the greedy algorithm performs in practice is conducted here to reveal some
connections to the theoretical study. The experimental study shows that even for
the primitive greedy algorithm 5, which in each iteration, arbitrarily chooses one of
the minimum degree vertices v and removes it and all neighbour vertices of v from
the graph, without any specific advice of order, in almost every ”realistic” input, its
approximation ratio is much better than 1.25. For the updated greedy algorithm of
Algorithm 8, the experiments show that it obtains significantly better ratios as we have
expected.
This phenomenon is not surprising, because the tight lower bound examples illus-
trated in Figure 5.5 and others which are not presented, are highly restricted by theirs
peculiar graph structure. More essentially, they are restricted by the specific sequence
of reductions which consists of particular type of reductions after an execution of a
bad reduction. Any slight disturbance of such graph structure will change the order
of greedy execution significantly, and basically, such disturbance rather improves the
performance than attenuates it. As shown in Chapter 6, each bad reduction (2,6) will
receive four units of savings from somewhere in the sequence of reductions. That im-
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plies that the good reductions which offer these savings in the sequence of reductions
must exactly satisfy this correspondence to the bad reductions. Intuitively, the number
of instances where such a precise situation occurs should be rare within the set of all
possible instances. To characterise such phenomenon, we need to develop some differ-
ent kind of arguments, but it will depend on the techniques that we developed in the
previous chapter.
Observe that for any sequence of reductions S executed by a given greedy algorithm
on G, the problematic type of reductions are only bad odd-backbone, even-backbone
and isolated odd cycle reductions. The remaining type of reductions, including an
isolated vertex reduction, single edge and single edge branching, good odd-backbone,
even-backbone, and an isolated even cycle reduction, are good. As we have already
shown, in S, if there only exist these good reductions R ∈ S, which means that there
are no debt edge which really requires a payment, then the greedy will provide an
optimal solution. This implies that if the number of good reductions is much larger
than the number of bad reductions, then if the difference between these two numbers
increases, the approximation ratio should decrease and it should tend to 1.
Therefore, we are curious about the following question:
Question 1. What is the distribution of each type of reduction in the sequence of
reductions executed by a given greedy algorithm?
For an initial study, we implement an experimental approach in order to answer
this question. The experiment is conducted by the following steps:
1. Instance generation: The designed program randomly generates a graph G
with degree at most 3. The generation of this graph is as follows: the program
determines the number of vertices of an current instance by sampling a number
from a uniform distribution from U [50, 150]. For each pair of vertices (v, v′) in
V 2 chosen uniformly at random, the program assigns an edge between v and v′
with probability p. If one of the vertices v and v′ in the pair already has degree 3,
then the program will not assign an edge between these two vertices. Note that
if the probability p is set to be higher, than the graph will be denser.
2. Optimum computation: The program will compute an optimum solution OPT
on an instance G by using integer linear programming (ILP). An integer linear
programming formulation of the maximum independent set problem is the stan-
dard one. An ILP solver does not only provide the size of OPT , but also provides
which vertices in G belong to the set OPT . Thus, after the program obtains the
Chapter 8. Heuristic and experimental study for MIS 119
optimum solution, it will label G: for each vertex v, if v ∈ OPT , a label will be
given to v.
3. Execution of the greedy: The program will execute the given greedy algorithm
on such labeled graph G. It will record the number of each type of reductions
according to the vertices’ labels. The experiment considers bad, 1-good and 0-
good reductions among all kinds of reductions.
4. Experimental analysis: The program repeat this process from 1 until it collects
enough data. Then, we will compute a ratio of each type of reductions.
We consider two kinds of greedy algorithms, the primitive greedy algorithm (Algo-
rithm 5) and the updated greedy algorithm (Algorithm 8). For each type of reductions
R ∈ R, let N(R) be the number of occurrences of this reduction in the experiment.
Thus, each cell in Table 8.1 and 8.2 contains the percentage of N(R)/
∑
R∈RN(R).
We run both greedy algorithms for different choices of the probability p. We consider
five cases, where pi = (2 + 0.2i)/|V |, where i ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4, 5}. Note that if i is smaller,
then the graph would be sparser, and denser otherwise. The expected average degree
of such a generated graph is |V | · (1 + 0.5i)/|V | = 1 + 0.5i. Because, if the maximum
of degree of G is 2, then the greedy algorithm always finds the optimum, for our
experiment, we start with the expected average degree from at least 2. Also, because
the maximum degree of G is 3, it is reasonable to set the expected average degree to be
3. For each value of the probability p, we generate and test 10000 instances and 50000
instances in total for each of the greedy algorithms.
8.1 Results and discussion
The results are presented in Table 8.1 and 8.2, and illustrated in the bar chart 8.1 and
8.1. The average approximation ratio is 1.0227 for the primitive greedy and 1.0083 for
the updated greedy algorithm.
We can observe a presence of a significant number of (1,2) and (1,3)-reductions, for
both algorithms, as their proportion is about 67% of the total number of reductions.
This result is not very surprising, and it can be roughly deduced from the following
observation.
Firstly, triangle reductions such as (2,3), (2,4)-1 and (2,5)-1 -reduction are rare,
because if such a reduction is executed, it implies that in the original graph, such
triangle is already present, and the probability to form a 3-clique is low.
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Secondly, observe that for each bad reduction, we can use a 0-good reduction to
balance its demand for payment. In general, a 0-good reduction contributes 1 to the size
of the solution and 0 to the size of the optimum. And a bad reduction contributes 1 to
the size of the solution and 2 to the size of the optimum. Then, together, they contribute
2 to the size of the solution and 2 to the size of the optimum, which is equivalent to two
1-good reductions. Therefore, let Rb be a bad reduction, R0 be 0 a good reduction and
R1 be a 1-good reduction found in an experiment. Then 2(N(Rb) −N(R0) + N(R1))
would be equivalent to the total number of 1-good reductions. By the experiment, the
ratio between the number of 1-good and bad reductions is: for the primitive greedy,
r = 2.56%, and for the updated greedy, r = 1.2%.
Although, the approximation ratio of the updated greedy algorithm is better as
expected, the main difference between the primitive greedy algorithm and the updated
greedy algorithm seems to be that for the former, the number of bad reductions is
smaller, and the number of 0-good reductions is also smaller. For the latter algorithm,
the number of bad reductions is not only larger but it is significantly larger.
Thirdly, for the primitive greedy algorithm, the number of (1,3) reductions of both
1-good and 0-good type is approximately 8.2% larger than that of (1,2)-reductions.
But for the updated greedy algorithm, this relation is opposite, that is, the number of
(1,2)-reductions is about 8.4% lager than that of (1,3)-reductions.
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0-good 1-good bad
(0,0) 0.76 5.8 ∅
(1,1) 0.19 2.1 ∅
(1,2) 1.5 30 ∅
(1,3) 1.3 38 ∅
(2,3) 0.00 0.36 ∅
(2,4)-1 0.00 0.15 ∅
(2,5)-1 0.00 0.18 ∅
(2,6) 0.03 4.7 2.7
(2,5) 0.05 6.1 2.0
(2,4) 0.02 1.7 1.6
Table 8.1: Results of experiments for the primitive greedy algorithm.
0-good 1-good bad
(0,0) 1.2 3.5 ∅
(1,1) 0.25 1.4 ∅
(1,2) 4.3 33.4 ∅
(1,3) 2.24 27.0 ∅
(2,3) 0.00 0.02 ∅
(2,4)-1 0.00 0.1 ∅
(2,5)-1 0.02 1.4 ∅
(2,6) 0.11 18 8.7
(2,5) 0.03 0.4 0.3
(2,4) 0.06 0.5 0.4
Table 8.2: Results of experiments for the updated greedy algorithm.
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(0,0) (1,1) (1,2) (1,3) (2,3) (2,4)-1 (2,5)-1 (2,6) (2,5) (2,4)
0-good 0.76 0.19 1.5 1.3 0 0 0 0.03 0.05 0.02
1-good 5.8 2.1 30 38 0.36 0.15 0.18 4.7 6.1 1.7










Distribution of reduction for primitive greedy algorithm
0-good 1-good bad
Figure 8.1: The performance of primitive greedy algorithm.
(0,0) (1,1) (1,2) (1,3) (2,3) (2,4)-1 (2,5)-1 (2,6) (2,5) (2,4)
0-good 1.2 0.25 4.3 2.24 0 0 0.02 0.11 0.03 0.06
1-good 3.5 1.4 33.4 27 0.02 0.1 1.4 18 0.4 0.5










Distribution of reduction for updated greedy algorithm
0-good 1-good bad
Figure 8.2: The performance of the updated greedy algorithm.
Chapter 9
Conclusions and further study
9.1 Conclusions
In this thesis, we studied the new model of mechanism design in context of ontolo-
gies. We showed negative and positive results on the approximation ratios of truthful
mechanisms in this setting. We moreover showed upper and lower bounds on the price
of anarchy and stability of the Nash implementation of a greedy mechanism in this
setting.
Moreover, we studied the inapproximability of the greedy algorithms for the maxi-
mum size independent set problem (MIS) on general graphs and in particular on planar
cubic graphs. The main and strongest contribution of the thesis is a development a se-
ries of effective techniques to prove the approximation ratios of greedy algorithms for the
MIS problem. The specific achievement is the proof of existence of a 43 -approximation
greedy algorithm for MIS on sub-cubic graphs. This result does not only improve on
the current best known ratio of greedy algorithms, but it provides a very precise analy-
sis of the greedy. This new methodology holds a promise to help us obtain even better
approximation ratios, such as 54 -ratio of the greedy algorithm. Based on the techniques
we developed, some further applications have also been studied. We proved a ∆+23 -
approximation ratio for any greedy algorithm for MIS on bounded degree ∆ graphs.
We showed an improved 95 -approximation ratio for the ∆ = 4 case. We have also used
a complement property between the maximal independent set and the minimum ver-
tex cover to show a 54 -approximation ratio for the minimum vertex cover problem on
sub-cubic graphs. Finally, We conducted an experimental study to explore the average





9.2.1 Study for ontology mechanism design
The main goal in the future about the ontologies matching game is to prove that the
price of stability is 2.
Question 2. Is it possible to prove that the ontologies matching game has the price of
stability of 2?
Since we already observed that there are only few instances which admit pure Nash
equilibrium, the initial idea is to characterise in which instances pure Nash equilibrium
exists. Then, among these instances, we can start to characterise a sub-class of these
instances, whose structure and properties are nice enough for us to be able to prove the
price of stability of 2. Then, we might try to extend these results from such sub-class
of instances to general cases.
9.2.2 Study for maximum independent set and minimum vertex cover
problems
Although the techniques developed in Chapter 6: Payment scheme with potential func-
tion and Backward inductive method already have proven their usefulness with ad-
dressing the maximum independent set (MIS) and the minimum vertex cover (MVC)
problems, their potential is far from being fully explored. There are numerous intrigu-
ing directions.
The most promising work for the future is to prove that the ultimate greedy algo-
rithm of Algorithm 9 is really ultimate. As we observed in Section 6.3.4, it very likely
to be possible to obtain the analysis of 54 -approximation ratio for the ultimate greedy
algorithm of Algorithm 9. The only obstacle is how to address a problem that occurs
in the analysis of the odd-backbone reductions in our inductive proof. We have two
directions to explore here. The first promising approach is to extend the potential func-
tion to Ψ(R) = Φ(R) +L(R), where L is an extra parameter to measure the reduction.
Informally, if a reduction R contains a “blocking” structure, then L(R) = 1. And for
any reduction R, where its contact edges “remove” such “blocking” structures, if the
number of “blocking” structures it “removes” is k, then L(R) = −k. Note that then
for a sequence of reductions S on graph G,
∑
R∈S L(R) = 0. The second promising
approach is to explore the power of greedy advice further. It might be possible to design
a new greedy advice or find out a new way to use the current advice to preserve the
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inducting hypothesis that is required. For example, we do not use the greedy advice to
deal with odd-backbone reduction, which might be helpful.
Question 3. Does the ultimate greedy algorithm obtain a 54 -approximation ratio with
running time O(n) for the MIS problem on sub-cubic graphs?
The second direction for the future is to study the performance of greedy algorithms
for MIS on bounded degree graphs. Although Theorem 21 implies that the primitive
greedy algorithm cannot be improved to obtain a better approximation ratio than ∆+23 ,
Theorem 22 implies that the lower bound for any greedy algorithm is only ∆+13 −O(
1
∆).
Thus, there exists a chance to improve the approximation ratio, if the greedy algorithm
is advised properly. Therefore, we aim to answer the following question.
Question 4. Is there an ultimate greedy algorithm that obtains a ∆+13 -approximation
ratio for MIS problem on ∆-bounded degree graphs?
Moreover, observe in Theorem 25, that for any complementary greedy algorithm,
the approximation ratio cannot be improved to be better than 87 . And even if we are
able to prove that the ultimate greedy algorithm obtains a 54 -approximation ratio and
thus the complementary greedy algorithm of Algorithm 11 obtains a 65 ratio, there still
exists a huge gap between the upper and lower bounds.
Also observe that in the analysis of the complementary greedy algorithm, it seems
that a tighter analysis might be feasible to obtain a 87 -approximation ratio for the MVC
problem on sub-cubic graphs. Note that the potential value in the vertex cover problem
is in general better than that for the MIS problem. Therefore, with a carefully designed
advice and greedy order, a tighter approximation ratio might be possible. Therefore,
we aim to answer the following question.
Question 5. Is there a complementary greedy algorithm that obtains a 87 -approximation
ratio for the MVC problem on sub-cubic graphs? Or is it possible to find a counter-
example to show a larger lower bound for the complementary greedy algorithm?
Furthermore, in chapter 8, we conducted an experimental study on the power of
two kinds of greedy algorithms on various instances. The results show that for both
primitive and updated greedy algorithm, the observed average approximation ratios
are extremely good. The interpretation of such phenomenon is as follows. Let RbG =
{R ∈ SG|R be a bad reduction}, and G be the set of all sub-cubic graphs. Then for
all G in G with |V (G)| ≤ k, consider the sequence of reductions SG executed by the




be much smaller than the number of good reductions in
⋃
G∈G SG. Therefore, we aim
to answer the following question.
Question 6. How to theoretically prove that
∑
G∈G |RbG| ≤ α ·
∑
G∈G |SG|, for any
α ≤ 1?
Finally, the ultimate goal of further study is to design a non-greedy algorithm which
obtains a better approximation ratio than 54 .
Question 7. Is there a non-greedy algorithm that obtains a 65 or
7
6 -approximation ratio
with running time O(n2) for the MIS problem on sub-cubic graphs?
We believe that our technique of super-advice will be very useful towards reaching
this goal.
Appendix A
A.1 Graph structure of extended reductions
Figure A.1: Collections of extended reductions
We give an interpretation of extended reductions in Figure A.1. For details see Defini-
tion 17.
(1) Single edge non-branching reduction consist of a series of (1,2)-reductionsR1, . . . , Rk,
where ERicontact ∩ E
Rj
past 6= ∅ for every i = j − 1.
(2) Single edge branching reduction consist of a series of reductions R1, . . . , Rk in
which R1 to Rk−1 are (1,2)-reductions and Rk is a (1,3)-reduction. Moreover
ERicontact ∩ E
Rj
past 6= ∅ for every i = j − 1.
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(3) Loop reduction consist of a series of reductions R1, . . . , Rk, in which R1 is a (2,5)-
reduction, R2 to Rk−1 are (1,2)-reductions, and Rk is a (1,1)-reduction, where
ERicontact ∩ E
Rj





(4) Even-backbone reduction is either a (2,6)-reduction, or it consists of a series of
reductions R1, . . . , Rk, where R1 is a (2,5)-reduction, R1 to Rk−1 are (1,2)-




past 6= ∅ for every
i = j − 1.
(5) Odd-backbone reduction consists of a series of reductions R1, . . . , Rk, where R1 is





for every i = j − 1.
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